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Abstract 
In the last decade, the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities by 
emerging market firms has rapidly increased to exploit growing markets at home and 
abroad. In order to be successful in their M&A goals, these firms need to develop a 
specific M&A capability and manage post-M&A processes effectively. Drawing on 
the dynamic capabilities view, I develop a theoretical framework for emerging market 
acquirers that outlines the development of the acquisition capability mechanisms. I 
first examine the influence of prior acquisition experience on acquisition performance. 
I then go on to study the integration capability of emerging market firms and examine 
the effect of post-M&A integration strategies on the performance of acquisitions by 
emerging market firms. The overall results indicate that a firm‘s focal acquisition 
performance positively relates to prior acquisition experience that is similar to the 
focal acquisition. Moreover, post-M&A integration strategies vary depending on the 
geographical similarity of the focal acquisition. Replacing the target‘s top manager is 
a particularly important determinant of acquisition performance in domestic M&A. 
Finally, in this research, I also extend the organisational learning view and develop a 
multi-level analysis that examines the role of business groups alongside firm-level 
learning from acquisitions. 
 
The usual focus in emerging market studies is on the big emerging economies of 
Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). I focus instead on the country case of Turkey, 
one of the second tier of ―biggish‖ growing economies of ―MIST‖ (Mexico, 
Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey). The empirical results are based on a unique 
hand-collected dataset of acquisitions in Turkey culled from publicly available data. 
The final dataset consists of 279 acquisitions between 1998 and 2011. 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities continue to be popular in the business 
world and are a big part of today‘s corporate environment. In 2013, the worldwide 
volume of M&A deals reached more than $2.319 billion according to Thomson 
Reuters (Thomson Reuters, 2013). Despite their worldwide sustained popularity, 
M&A remain highly controversial both in academic and business worlds (Muehlfeld 
et al., 2012). Making M&A deals has always been a very difficult organisational 
activity for firms, and about two-thirds of M&A fail to meet expectations (Dobbs et 
al, 2007). Given that most of the research indicates that M&A activity has an overall 
success rate of less than 50%, the main questions to ask are which firms succeed in 
their M&A and what factors lie behind this success. Thus, examining M&A is a good 
opportunity to study the factors that distinguish firms which perform better from those 
which underperform or worse.  
 
The vast majority of acquisition researchers, as well as strategic consultants (e.g. 
Harding et al., 2013 – Bain & Company), have suggested that firms which are active 
in M&A deals usually outperform those that stay away from M&A. Thus, M&A 
frequency might be the important determinant of success, and firms with more M&A 
experience might perform better than those without, as they generate better strategies 
in the focal acquisition by learning from their previous M&A activities. Apart from 
the role of acquisition experience in M&A performance, acquirer firms‘ skills in 
finding, evaluating, and executing the transaction, and then especially integrating the 
two firms in an effective manner during the post-acquisition period, determines the 
success of M&A activities (Harding et al., 2013). The main takeaway here is that 
management of the deal-making pre-M&A period and the deal-executing post-M&A 
period are the important determinants of M&A performance. The pre-acquisition 
phase includes the identification and evaluation of appropriate targets and the 
selection of a suitable target from among the candidates, whereas the post-acquisition 
phase includes the integration process of combining two or more firms into a single 
firm. In this study, I will focus on the latter and examine the overall influence of 
 15 
acquisition experience and post-acquisition strategies on the acquisition performance 
of acquirers. 
  
The majority of M&A scholars in strategic management and finance have largely 
based their studies on developed-world cases, and the emerging market context 
remains under-explored. In the last two decades, the world has witnessed a dramatic 
economic shift from developed economies to emerging market economies, thanks to 
the globalisation and economic reforms initiated by emerging market countries. By 
2010, the emerging market economies together accounted for 40% of world‘s global 
output, as opposed to only half of that (20%) in 1990 (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013). 
Given this rapid growth rate and the unique characteristics of emerging market 
economies, the exploration of the influence of acquisition experience and post-
acquisition strategies contributes to both theory and practice for better understanding 
of the phenomenon in emerging markets.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the research and to outline the aims and 
objectives of the study. The chapter also describes the level of analysis, and the 
concepts and context used in this study. In the next section, I will provide a small 
summary of the relevant literature for the study. Subsequently, I will discuss the 
importance of the study and outline the aims and objectives to be examined (Section 
1.3). Then, in Section 1.4, I will briefly mention the context of the study. In Section 
1.5, I will present an outline of the research methodology. In the last section, I will 
describe the structure of the research and the order of presentation (Section 1.6).  
 
1.2 Background of the study 
 
Globally, M&A have become a popular corporate activity and firms undertake M&A 
to fulfil several of their corporate objectives. M&A may provide complementary 
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resources, new opportunities and new markets, or cost efficiency for an acquiring firm 
(Hitt et al, 2001). However, M&A may be a risky investment that might cause 
damage to the organisational structure and affect firm performance. Many scholars 
find M&A to be a risky strategic change that a firm might pursue, because an 
acquiring firm may face undesired results via inadequate acquisition strategies, 
unsatisfactory management, or unsuccessful integration in the post-M&A process 
(King et al., 2004; Anand et al., 2005).  
 
Managing M&A successfully is a complex organisational task, and in general, deals 
end in disappointment (Voss, 2008). While some researchers have suggested that 
M&A increases the performance of the firm (Seth et al., 2002, Healy et al., 1992), the 
empirical evidence has generally shown that the expected benefits of the M&A were 
not realised and the acquirer showed poor performance following an acquisition (Hitt 
et al., 2001, Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Birkinshaw et al., 2000). According to a 
report by McKinsey Quarterly (2010), more than 50% of M&A fail to achieve their 
business goals. This leads to the implication that some acquirers succeed in building 
the appropriate strategies for an acquisition, whereas others do not. In an attempt to 
identify the main reasons behind this failure rate and understand the main reasons 
behind these poor performances, M&A researchers from different disciplines have 
increased their interest in the M&A integration strategies of combined firms. M&A 
have been largely researched in finance and these studies, generally, deal with the 
performance of the acquirer and target, and examine the causes and shareholder 
wealth effects of M&A (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Conn et al., 2005; Bradley and 
Sundaram, 2005). On the other hand, strategic management researchers attempt to 
answer the question of why the acquisition strategies of some firms are more 
successful than others. The fundamental assumption of strategic management research 
predominantly focuses on the resource-based view1 of firms (Penrose, 1959) and 
suggests that related acquisitions, those with industrial similarity between acquirer 
and target, are more successful than unrelated ones (Barney, 1988; Kusewitt, 1985; 
Rumelt, 1982; Singh and Montgomery, 1987).  
                                                 
1 For a detailed overview of the resource-based view, please refer to Section 2.3.1. 
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In the next group, some acquisition researchers have studied the acquisition from an 
organisational learning perspective. These studies prioritised the managerial decisions 
and learning issues, particularly during the post-M&A process, in order to focus on 
the factors influencing the process (Krishnan et al., 1997; Pablo, 1994; Nemanich and 
Keller, 2007). Scholars have suggested that the firm‘s past experience and learning is 
a major determinant of acquisition performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002). Lessons from prior acquisition experience have been learnt 
and can be applied to the focal and future acquisition activities (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999). According to organisational learning theory, experience-based 
learning leads to performance enhancement of the acquisition through its influences 
on knowledge creation and transfer, and by triggering changes to firm‘s strategies and 
implementations (Levitt and March, 1988). Yet, despite the significant progress of the 
existing literature on learning from prior acquisitions (e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1999; Kale and Singh, 2007; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Zollo and Reuer, 2010), it is 
confusing that there have been many conflicting findings on whether firms learn from 
their previous acquisition experience: multiple studies have variously found a positive 
effect, a negative effect, a u-shaped effect, and no effect of acquisition experience on 
the subsequent acquisition performance of the firms (see Barkema and Schijven, 
2008). Thus, the question of whether experienced acquirers are more successful in 
their acquisition strategies than those that have little or no acquisition experience has 
remained not fully answered (King et al., 2004). Additionally, the accumulation of 
acquisition experience may not be enough for an effective learning mechanism, and 
thus not lead to acquisition performance enhancement. Identification of prior 
acquisition attributes may help to find the way in which experience affects learning 
and leads to performance improvement. Answering these questions is highly 
important to better understand the determinants of successful firms‘ acquisition 
strategy and thereby differentiate the successful acquirers. 
 
Moreover, firms‘ prior M&A experience may not be the sole factor for performance 
enhancement from acquisitions. Strategies specific to the management of the post-
M&A period may affect acquisition performance. Thus, a firm may make a successful 
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acquisition by taking advantage of post-acquisition strategies that would help 
acquirers achieve higher levels of success and reach their desired goals. For instance, 
in the case of Cisco Systems, where 140+ firms have been acquired by Cisco since 
1993, superior integration capability is one key to their successful M&A approach, 
and they use this capability to maximise the value of acquisitions (Harvey, 2000; 
Szulanski, 2000). Evaluating the target and choosing appropriate resources2 that best 
fit with the acquirer firm remains one of the most strategic and essential roles of the 
acquirer‘s top management during the post-acquisition period (Zollo and Singh, 
2004). Given the risky and complex nature of acquisitions, in order to be successful 
with the acquisition it is essential to use an appropriate post-acquisition strategy by 
taking into account the critical evaluation of target‘s resources and the acquirer firm‘s 
integration capability, which is an important acquisition-based dynamic capability. 
The benefit here comes from a successful combination of resources between the target 
and acquirer. Thus this practice emphasises the importance of the decision-making 
process of the acquisition and top management (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Then, in 
the post-acquisition period, there appears the question of which resources from the 
target will be retained or replaced with new ones. To this end, an obvious addition to 
the literature about post-acquisition management would be examining the relationship 
between resource replacement and acquisition performance. 
 
A complementary framework is required to better capture and analyse the important 
corporate development activity of acquisitions. In this study, I investigate learning 
with respect to the underexplored phenomena of the capability development of 
acquisition. By drawing upon the multiple theoretical foundations employed in the 
post-M&A literature, namely organisational learning theory (Hayward, 2002), 
behavioural learning theory (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), and the knowledge-
based perspective (Zollo and Singh, 2004), and using the fundamental insights of the 
resource-based view of the firm, my analysis draws on a dynamic capabilities view of 
strategic management as the theoretical foundation of this study. The motivation for 
M&A is that the firms use acquisitions to obtain new resources and improve their 
                                                 
2 For a detailed explanation of resources, please refer to Section 2.3.2. 
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existing resource base (Capron and Anand, 2007). It is necessary to have specific 
capabilities to be successful in M&A (Helfat et al., 2007). To explore this 
explanation, benefiting from Voss‘s (2008) and Capron and Anand‘s (2007) studies, 
in this study I examine M&A capability3. M&A capability is a dynamic capability 
allowing the firm to change its resource base and capabilities in order to stay 
competitive in dynamic environments. Furthermore, like many of strategic 
management researchers, in considering the post-acquisition integration strategies I 
also adopt the view that firms usually use acquisitions in order to reconfigure the 
target and acquirer businesses as part of the combination process (Steiner, 1975; Seth, 
1990; Capron et al., 1998). An integration capability specific to managing the post-
acquisition process has been highlighted as a key prerequisite for completing these 
complex corporate activities (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Zollo and Singh, 2004). 
Then, I propose that the firm‘s integration capability is the needed ability that helps 
firms to effectively complete the integration of the combined firms, and achieve a 
successful post-acquisition process and increase their acquisition performance.   
 
1.3 Study setting: an emerging market case  
 
One important factor which might have contributed to the inconsistent findings in the 
extant literature is that prior studies have almost exclusively conceptualised and 
captured acquisition experience and post-acquisition issues from developed-world 
perspectives (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Capron, 1999; Hayward, 2002) and ignored the 
emerging market4 case. Many firms in emerging markets are active in various 
businesses. Emerging market firms that focus primarily on growth have tended to 
became more acquisitive during the last decade in order to stay competitive and catch 
up to their developed-world counterparts (Khanna and Palepu, 2013). Therefore, an 
investigation of emerging market firms is worthwhile, since the number of M&A 
                                                 
3 For a detailed overview of M&A capability, please refer to Section 2.3.3. 
4 For a detailed overview of emerging markets, please refer to Section 2.5.2. 
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activities by emerging market firms has rapidly increased so as to exploit growing 
markets at home and abroad. 
 
Importantly, by examining the determinants of acquisition performance in emerging 
markets, I will shed light on the environmental influence of these phenomena. Here, 
given the unique characteristics of emerging markets and the existing studies‘ 
inconsistent findings, studying the context of an emerging market is the appropriate 
approach. It provides a good example for investigating whether different acquirers‘ 
strategies for post-acquisition management are systematically related with different 
performance consequences.  
 
Moreover, what are main characteristics of emerging market acquirers that 
differentiate them from their developed-world counterparts? Kumar (2009), and 
Khanna and Palepu (2010) assert that firms from emerging market firms employ 
M&A as their core globalisation strategy. Unlike the developed-world approach of 
using M&A mainly to lower costs or direct growth, emerging market firms use M&A, 
especially cross-border M&A, for more strategic purposes, such as acquiring new 
technologies and brands, and growing in the long term (Kumar, 2009; Ghemawat et 
al. 2008). Rather than making several changes in the post-acquisition period soon 
after the completion of the cross-border acquisition, emerging market firms prefer to 
keep this process softer and usually retain the target‘s resources (Kumar, 2009; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2013). Given the predominant argument that integration is a 
major challenge during the post-M&A process, these emerging market firms approach 
post-acquisition strategies differently than the traditional approach by developed-
world firms.  
 
On the other hand, in their domestic markets‘ weak institutional environments, lack of 
corporate governance mechanisms, common relational ties, and family owned 
management structures give these emerging market firms unique characteristics 
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relating to their own environment  (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Young et al, 2008; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2009; Gammeltoft et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2008). This results in 
a more path-dependent approach in their domestic acquisitions for managing the post-
acquisition integration process. During the post-acquisition period of domestic deals, 
these firms are more likely to replace the target‘s resources, contrary to their 
behaviour in cross-border deals.  
 
Notably, the usual focus in emerging market studies is on the big emerging economies 
of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). I focus instead on the country case of 
Turkey5, one of the second tier of ―biggish‖ growing economies of ―MIST‖ (Mexico, 
Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey). Furthermore, the Turkish context provides an 
interesting geographical setting characterised by its nature and attempts to become 
both a more Western-style market economy and an emerging Muslim country 
negotiating to join the European Union (EU). Also, recent political and economic 
uncertainties, and a highly volatile environment, make Turkey a more interesting 
research setting to focus on. Therefore, the Turkish context provides a good emerging 
market case to test a number of new theories as well as previously tested variables.  
 
To sum up, we know little about the role of the environment in organisational learning 
and management of the post-acquisition period. This is an important theoretical gap 
because evidence suggests that learning is highly specific to context and its resulting 
environment, particularly when one considers complex organisational activity such as 
acquisitions (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Williams, 2007; Muehlfeld et al., 
2012). In the present study, by focusing on the emerging market case, I attempt to 
address this gap by examining the influence of prior acquisition experience and post-
acquisition strategies on the acquisition performance of emerging market acquirers. 
 
                                                 
5 For a detailed overview of the Turkish economy, please refer to Chapter 3.  
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1.4 Aims and objectives of the study 
 
In this study, I will focus on emerging market acquirers‘ variations in performance 
and empirically examine the influence of acquisition experience and post-acquisition 
strategies on the acquisition performance of emerging market firms. My focus will be 
on the acquirer firm, rather than the target firm. Overall, I aim to assess what factors 
have contributed to the success of acquisitions in emerging markets. 
 
Firstly, considering the emerging market firms, I will examine the influence of prior 
acquisition experience on the performance of acquisitions. I aim to extend the 
literature on organisational learning in acquisitions (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Hayward, 2002; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Zollo and Reuer, 
2010) by broadening our knowledge of how and in which conditions firms learn from 
their prior acquisition activities in the emerging market. To this end, I will address 
two questions. First, do firms directly learn from their prior acquisition experiences? 
Second, do firms‘ learning patterns depend on the similarity conditions between the 
prior and focal acquisitions? 
 
Moreover, I aim to provide important insights about organisational learning by 
examining the different levels involved in the learning process in acquisitions. In this 
regard, I will also take account of the role of business groups in organisational 
learning processes. Examining the role of business groups6 in the emerging market 
and accounting for how group-level learning affects the groups‘ subsidiaries‘ 
acquisition performance is important to capture the linkages between the different 
levels in organisational learning. I will also discuss how group-level learning shapes 
the firm‘s acquisition capability. Thus, in addition to using the same approach as that 
                                                 
6 For a detailed overview of business groups in emerging markets, please refer to Sections 2.5.2 and 
3.3.1.  
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of the existing literature on organisational learning, which analyses acquisitions at the 
firm level, by examining business groups as individual units I aim to contribute to the 
literature by advancing the level one step further. 
 
Furthermore, given that undertaking an M&A is a complex issue and takes on 
different characteristics in the emerging market context, an interesting question is how 
the target‘s resources are reconfigured in the post-M&A process. Therefore, in this 
study, I will examine how post-acquisition strategies influence the economic 
performance of acquisitions in emerging markets. Through this study, I aim to explore 
which strategies enhance acquisition performance, and whether there is any difference 
between domestic and cross-border acquisitions. Additionally, I will consider the role 
of top manager replacement in acquisitions.  
 
Given that the theoretical base for this study derives from what is referred to as a 
dynamic capability perspective on strategy, I will address the question of how 
acquisition capability developed in emerging markets. Furthermore, accepting that the 
management of the post-acquisition process is an important determinant of acquisition 
capability, I will further indicate which strategies lead to development of integration 
capability successfully for emerging market firms. 
 
Consequently, I aim to make some contributions to the M&A literature in the field of 
strategic management by shedding light on ―organisational learning in M&A 
activities‖, ―development of M&A capability‖, ―management of M&A integration 
strategies in emerging markets‖, and ―cross-border and domestic post-acquisition 
strategies of emerging market acquirers‖. Practically, I also aim to contribute to the 
decision-making process of emerging market firms by providing practised cases from 
the post-M&A process and acquisition performance determinants, and providing 
contemporary evidence on the corporate strategy of Turkish listed firms.  
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1.5 Methodology 
 
The aim of this section is to present a brief outline of the data and methods used in 
this study. The Turkish setting was deemed to be particularly well-suited for my 
research aims and objectives for several reasons. First, by examining the case of 
Turkey, I ensure that the firms used in the analysis are relatively uniform in the 
environmental setting that they faced. Second, Turkey has seen a period of rapid 
growth during the last decade, and this has led to an increase in the number of M&A 
deals. Third, in terms of the unique characteristics of emerging markets, Turkey meets 
these conditions well, and is an appropriate case to achieve the aims of this study. In 
chapter 3, I will provide an insight into the nature of the Turkish economy. 
 
The research design of this study is as follows. Initially, I conducted fieldwork based 
on seven informal exploratory interviews and researched the existing literature to gain 
a deeper understanding of the influence of acquisition experience and post-acquisition 
strategies on the economic performance of acquisitions. Subsequently, I collected data 
by focusing on publicly traded firms‘ completed and majority-owned acquisitions7. 
Data on acquisition experience, announcement and completion dates, and several of 
the control measures came from the Mergermarket database. Then, I measured the 
extent to which the acquirer used resources from the target firm in each deal. 
Measuring the extent of these resource replacements during the post-acquisition 
period has allowed me to not only capture the resource fit but also to examine the 
integration capability of the emerging market acquirer to implement the redeployment 
of target‘s resources. To do so, I collected data specific to post-acquisition strategies 
by examining the annual reports of the firms, Istanbul Borsa‘s official websites, and 
publicly available reports. After a long process of data collection, I performed a data 
                                                 
7 The processes of reaching the final dataset can be seen in Section 4.2. 
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analysis of the resulting dataset using Stata8. Lastly, I also conducted a further set of 
validated interviews to ensure the established causal relationships and the results 
gathered from the data analysis were in line with the insights gained from the cases of 
post-acquisition strategies. These unstructured interviews could be perceived as 
questioning the hypotheses and results of this study and providing practical 
interpretations. 
 
The data and methods section is covered in detail in Chapter 5 of this study. Notably, 
to develop a theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that influence acquisition 
performance I will use a unique hand-collected dataset of M&A in Turkey culled from 
the Mergermarket database as well as from publicly available data. The Mergermarket 
database includes mergers and acquisitions, where there is a transfer of possession of 
an economic interest in an on-going business concern (Mergermarket, 2012). The 
Mergermarket database has made acquisition data available for 1998 onwards, and the 
final sample of this study consists of all publicly disclosed firms‘ acquisitions for the 
fourteen years of 1998 through 31 December 2011. Through the all available datasets 
of M&A in Turkey, I consider the performance of 279 focal deals that took place 
between 1998 and 2011. Importantly, the dataset in this study was chosen by 
examining acquirer Turkish firms only, while the target firm can be either Turkish 
(domestic acquisitions) or foreign (cross-border acquisitions).  
 
Data analysis of the resulting dataset was performed with Stata. Firstly, an 
independent samples t-test was conducted to assess the differences in the sub-groups 
of the determinants of acquisition performance. Then, a multiple regression method 
was used to assess the predictors of acquisition post-acquisition performance in 
different settings. The performance of acquisitions was measured objectively using 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) by using the event-study method9, which is the 
                                                 
8 Stata is a statistical software package that provides data analysis, data management, and graphics.  
9 For a detailed overview of the subject, please refer to Section 4 of Campbell, Lo, and MacKinley 
(1997).  
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commonly used method to assess event performance within strategic management and 
finance (Brown and Warner, 1980; 1985; Campbell et al, 1997). Additionally, I 
conducted a supplemental analysis in which I used an alternative performance 
measure and estimated models through an accounting method by using Return on 
Assets (ROA). The predictors of acquisition experience and measures related to post-
acquisition strategies were gathered by drawing on the existing literature in strategic 
management. 
 
1.6 Structure of the study 
 
This study consists of eight chapters. In this introductory chapter, I have outlined the 
study‘s overall research aims and objectives, as well as briefly clarifying its 
theoretical relevance, and the setting and methods used.  
 
In Chapter 2, I will present an extensive literature review of the theoretical 
background. First, I will begin the critical review of the literature by providing an 
overview of literature on mergers and acquisitions in Section 2.2. Then, I will 
introduce the theoretical base of this study by examining the literature on the dynamic 
capabilities view. Next, I will critically review the studies on dynamic capabilities in 
the context of M&A. In the last part, Section 2.5, I will review the characteristics of 
emerging markets and examine acquisitions by emerging market firms.  
 
Taking account of the importance of the geographical setting of a study, in Chapter 3, 
I will examine the Turkish corporate structure and M&A environment in the study 
period. I will start this chapter by briefly analysing the Turkish economic outlook and 
stock market setting. Then, I will introduce the business atmosphere and corporate 
governance in Turkey. Specifically, I will emphasise the role of business groups in the 
Turkish business environment, which is something that possesses distinct 
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characteristics in emerging markets generally, and especially in the case of Turkey. 
Then, I will identify and discuss the pattern of M&A strategies of Turkish acquirers. 
In the last section of this chapter, I will present the post-acquisition strategies of these 
emerging market acquirers by providing real-world examples. With the help of this 
chapter, I intend to improve our understanding of the emerging market context 
through observing the Turkish setting.  
 
The hypotheses of this study will be presented in Chapter 4. In Hypothesis 1, I will 
emphasise the arguments related to acquisition experience, while post-acquisition 
arguments will be covered in Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5.  
 
I will present the empirical approach to this dissertation‘s research hypotheses in 
Chapter 5. In Section 5.2 I will outline the deal selection procedure. Then, in Section 
5.3 I will discuss the data gathering process. This will be followed by the introduction 
and operationalisation of the measures used in this study (Section 5.4). Lastly, I will 
present the models used in this study to test the hypotheses of the research (Section 
5.5).   
 
In Chapter 6, I will provide the univariate data analysis of this study. The initial 
results and insights gained from the data analysis will be presented in this chapter 
through a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of the dataset, as well as the 
differences in the sub-groups of the dataset. I will also introduce the general Turkey 
M&A outlook throughout the study period with graphics and tables.  
 
In Chapter 7, I will present the findings from quantitative analysis, at the firm level, 
by making use of the independent samples t-test and multiple regression methods. 
After the presentation of results, I will extensively discuss the findings from each 
hypothesis and explicate this study‘s contribution.  
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In the final chapter, I will start by discussing the empirical findings of this study. 
Moreover, to further investigate the findings and identify key strategies of the post-
acquisition process, I will also utilise validation interviews conducted after the 
quantitative analyses. Then, I will provide a brief review of this research‘s aims and 
objectives, as well as key findings, by discussing how this study contributes to 
management theory and practice. I will also discuss the theoretical and 
methodological limitations this research faces. Then, I will provide several 
recommendations for future research. Lastly, I will give a brief description of this 
research‘s potential and value. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Literature Review 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Many firms today seek to achieve growth and competitive advantage by entering new 
markets or developing their existing businesses. The trend toward continuous business 
growth and evolution of firms‘ capabilities is making corporate acquisitions a critical 
driver of growth strategies and enhanced performance. Undertaking M&A to 
effectively reach its desired goals requires specific skills to define strategic objectives, 
and a successful integration management (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Therefore, 
a clear M&A strategy is a critical first step for firms, and without a strategic rationale 
and thoughtful approach to M&A it is hard to increase the acquisition‘s performance. 
The complex phenomenon that M&A represent has attracted the interest of a broad 
range of management, finance, and economics researchers. Given the practical 
perspective that M&A are usually unsuccessful at achieving desired results (Porter, 
1985; Hitt et al., 1991; Capron and Mitchell, 1998), scholars have been continuously 
attempting to explore the nature of acquisitions from different perspectives, and to 
study the strategies that firms can use to get more value from this complex corporate 
activity and sustain their business growth (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and 
Singh, 2004; Shimizu et al., 2004).  
 
One of the initial studies on managing acquisitions, by Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991), examined the subject of how to make M&A work and this is still a crucial 
topic in the literature. Many scholars are still investigating why is it that some firms 
are better able to handle M&A decisions and enhance their performance than others. 
My aim is to contribute to the scholarly discussion in the M&A literature by providing 
insights into the determinants of acquisition performance and examining the 
acquisition capability-development mechanisms in emerging markets. Throughout 
this chapter, by reviewing the relevant theoretical and empirical studies, I will provide 
an understanding of the context of M&A, the dynamic capabilities view, and 
emerging markets.  
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This chapter consists of four sub-sections. These sub-sections will establish the 
context and rationale for this research project. In Section 2.2, I will critically assess 
the literature on M&A, particularly focusing on the theoretical and empirical studies 
in management. Then, I will present the theoretical and empirical studies on the 
dynamic capabilities view in section 2.3. Next, I will attempt to establish the 
theoretical foundations through reviewing the studies on dynamic capabilities that see 
M&A as a potential contributor to success (Section 2.4). Lastly, I will review and 
synthesise research from strategy and economics in the context of emerging markets, 
emphasising their M&A strategies and unique characteristics.   
 
2.2 What we know about Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
 
In this section, I will critically review the mainstream M&A studies, particularly those 
that have appeared in strategy, finance, and economics studies. The main questions to 
be addressed in this section are as follows:  
 
x Why would one firm seek to merge with or acquire another firm? What are the 
main reasons behind this corporate development activity? (Section 2.2.1). 
x What are the main discipline lines that strategic management scholars base 
their studies on? What is the main focus of M&A according to these 
disciplines? (Section 2.2.2) 
x What are the main phases of an M&A? What are the strategies for executing 
the pre-M&A phase? (Section 2.2.3) 
x What are the determinants of acquisition performance according to the prior 
research on post-acquisition performance? What are the main factors 
influencing M&A outcomes? (Section 2.2.4) 
x Do firms learn from their previous acquisition experiences? (Section 2.2.4.1) 
x What are the main post-acquisition integration strategies? What factors 
influence the management of the post-acquisition phase? (Section 2.2.4.2) 
 32 
x What are the other factors specific to the deal that impact the M&A outcome? 
(Section 2.2.4.3) 
What are the main predictors for measuring acquisition performance? (Section 2.2.5) 
 
2.2.1 Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
 
Why would firms merge with or acquire other firms? Many researchers over the years 
have provided many patterns of acquisition motives, but have not yet reached a single 
theory that gives a comprehensive explanation. Theoretical research and studies offer 
a lot of possible reasons for why firms would choose M&A as a way of growth. 
According to Martin and McConnell (1991) there are two broad motives for corporate 
acquisitions. The first and most common cited motive is the creation of synergy, 
where acquisition benefits are recognised through combining business units of 
acquirer and target firms and the combined firm gains efficiency. The second motive 
focuses on disciplinary acquisitions, where acquisition benefits are realised by 
changing the target‘s top management in order to use decision-making strategies 
effectively. Nevertheless, there are several other factors, such as market power, 
diversification, tax benefits, etc., which serve as reasons for mergers and acquisitions. 
For instance, Trautwein (1990) grouped theories of merger motives into seven, which 
were efficiency, monopoly, valuation, empire-building, process, raider, and 
disturbance theories. The author found the valuation, empire-building, and process 
theories to hold the highest degree of plausibility (Trautwein, 1990). Another 
perspective by Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007), classified these motives into managerial 
discretion, corporate control, the hubris theory, and overvaluation. Moreover, three 
major groups were observed by Seth et al. (2002), namely managerial aspects, hubris, 
and synergy. In another categorical classification Mukherjee et al. (2004) also 
provided more than one group, such as tax considerations, diversification, and 
management incentives, in order to examine the motives that drive acquisitions to take 
place. 
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A review of the literature suggests that there are numerous motives and taxonomies 
that explain why firms merge with or acquire other firms. The M&A motives 
investigated in the received literature can be, however, assessed by including both 
financial and strategic motives at the same time with a broader classification. This 
will also fulfil the need for a common categorisation and allow a better assessment of 
M&A motives. Drawing on the various suggestions for motives of mergers and 
acquisitions, I will examine the main motivations behind undertaking an M&A within 
four broader categories: value creation, managerial factors (managerialism), strategic 
moves, and environmental factors.  
 
2.2.1.1 Value Creation 
 
The value creation motive implies that acquisitions exist because of the economic 
gains after the combination of the resources of two firms (Bower, 2001). The acquirer 
firm‘s value after the acquisition is greater than the values of the single firms 
operating individually. Firms seek to maximise shareholder wealth and engage in 
acquisition activity only if both sides expect to achieve more shareholder wealth 
(Martin and McConnell, 1991).   
 
Market power is considered as one of the sources for creating value. It is an attempt to 
appropriate more value from customers when firms reach greater size and use this 
ability to control prices (Haleblian et al., 2009). Firms can create value by being a 
monopoly in their market and this is the main reason given by the market power 
hypothesis, which states that it can be reached by pushing customers to agree to 
higher prices. Firms can also create value by being a monopsony, and this could be 
reached by pushing suppliers to agree lower prices (Sharma and Ho, 2002). 
Researchers investigate whether decreases in firm numbers in an industry increase 
firm-level pricing power by measuring rival firms‘ stock market returns for 
horizontally related mergers (Stillman, 1983; Eckbo, 1983). However, in the initial 
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stages of the market power theory, researchers found no support for their argument 
that fewer firms in a business augment pricing power at the firm level. Then, by 
following a similar methodological approach, Prager (1992) found some support for 
the market power theory through investigating the railroad industry, and observed an 
increase in rivals‘ market prices following the acquisition announcement. Likewise, 
Kim and Singal (1993) found a relationship between the market power of merged 
firms and rival firms‘ market prices through an analysis of the 1980s airline industry. 
It can be seen that there is some evidence to support the view that firms undertake 
M&A to gain more market power. 
 
Researchers also examined the value creation motive from the efficiency perspective, 
in which firms create value through lowering their costs after an acquisition. In 
general, researchers found some support for their efficiency arguments when both 
acquirer and target firms share the same industry (Banker et al., 2003; McGuckin and 
Nguyen, 1995). On the other hand, Banerjee and Eckard (1998) found evidence in 
support of their efficiency argument from the first great merger wave (early 1900s) 
and concluded that operational efficiency was the probable source of value gains from 
horizontal mergers. However, the findings were not straightforward and more analysis 
is required to ensure a valid explanation.  
 
Scholars have pointed out that economies of scale and scope are the main elements for 
creating value through operational efficiency (DeLong, 2003). Economies of scale are 
reached by generating cost efficiency through increase in production units 
(Sudarsanam, 2003). For this motive, size matters and acquirer firms gain the ability 
to discuss prices with their suppliers, plus an acquirer firm can borrow with lower 
interest rates by using economies of scale. Economies of scale were the major drivers 
behind Henry Ford‘s world-shattering assembly line, and still lead to many mergers 
and acquisitions (Hindle, 2008).  
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In order to generate economies of scope, managers view horizontal mergers and 
acquisitions as facilitating reconfiguration of resources and skill transfers (Capron et 
al., 1998). In line with the resource reconfiguration argument, Karim and Mitchell 
(2000) found that acquisitions play a vital role in resource reconfiguration, offering 
greater opportunities for both developing existing resources and obtaining different 
resources. They investigated 3000 U.S health sector firms to study the reconfiguration 
of product lines between acquirers and non-acquirers. Notably, acquirer firms tend to 
use acquisitions either for deepening their existing resources and developing their 
skills or for extending resources and gaining new skills. More specifically, economies 
of scope arise during the usage of the same resources in the joint production of 
products (Singh and Montgomery, 1987). For instance, when an automobile 
manufacturer‘s assembly facility is used both for cars and light trucks, there might be 
an increase in operational efficiency and this leads to operation of scope economies 
(Singh and Montgomery, 1987). In that case it is the complementarity, rather than 
similarity, that presents the greatest opportunities to achieve synergy and create value 
(Harrison et al., 1991). In a similar vein, King et al. (2008) reported that there is a 
positive relationship between the degree of resource complementarity of target and 
acquirer firms, and acquirers‘ stock market returns. More recently, investigating 
internet firms, strategic management scholars have argued that firms engage in 
acquisitions in order to obtain scarce resources, which leads to positive stock market 
returns for the acquirer (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). It is important to note that the 
acquisition of firms with similar resources may generate more short-term economic 
performance due to economies of scale, which are easier to achieve than economies of 
scope. However, the combination of firms with different but complementary resources 
may create new and unique opportunities for the acquirer, depending on the success of 
integration (Harrison et al., 2001).  
 
Finance researchers have also claimed that another way of value creation through 
mergers and acquisitions could derive from managerial discipline. The main idea 
behind this motive is that firms with less effective management teams are acquired by 
firms with better management teams, and this combination in managerial resources 
leads to higher performance and greater shareholder wealth. Agency theorists have 
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suggested that acquisition can help enhancement of firms‘ shareholder wealth due to 
inefficient management within target firms (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Consistent 
with the agency motive, research found cases where the acquirer‘s management team 
had greater competencies than that of the target firm, which was the main reason 
behind the acquisition, and less competent managers within the target firm were 
dismissed in order to increase managerial efficiency and gain shareholder wealth 
(Martin and McConnell, 1991). In line with this idea, Agrawal and Walkling (1994) 
asserted that acquisition reduced target firms‘ dependence on management and 
resulted in a decrease in management compensation. However, that is not the case all 
the time, and firms with similar managerial capabilities could engage in merger and 
acquisition activities as well. Wang and Zajac (2007) showed that similarity in 
resource increase between both parties increases the likelihood that firms combine 
their resources through an acquisition rather than an alliance. Because two firms 
evaluate each other‘s assets and the potential targets, and this evaluation decreases the 
information asymmetry problem, as a result both parties generate information about 
each other. In conclusion, the value creation motive assumes that gains to the acquirer 
and target firms are positively correlated with each other.  
 
2.2.1.2 Managerial Factors  
 
In this type of study, researchers propose that managers seek to maximize their own 
self-interest and this behaviour by managers destroys shareholder value. Some 
researchers have argued that acquisitions are made to maximise the quality of the 
managers‘ own conditions and not of the firm‘s conditions, and thus that managers 
use acquisitions for their own self-interest (Haleblian et al., 2009). The first motive in 
this category is the hubris hypothesis, which refers to managerial confidence and ego 
in an acquisition process. Narcissism, a successful career, the acceptance of praise 
without any criticism, and exclusion from procedures are the main sources of hubris 
(Kroll et al., 1997). Finance scholars were the first to examine the hubris issue and 
found that CEO hubris caused mistakes in evaluating target firms and that the total 
synergy gain from such acquisitions was near zero (Roll, 1986). In line with the 
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hubris theory, management researchers also demonstrated that CEO hubris, expressed 
as exaggerated self-confidence, plays an important role in acquisition process, and 
found that greater CEO hubris increases the acquisition premium to be paid and 
decreases shareholder wealth (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). This can be explained 
by the acquirers‘ overconfident CEO‘s behaviour in overestimating target companies 
and their judgement that they are correct in their evaluation ultimately causing 
overpayment for target firms due to misjudgement (Malmendier and Tate, 2008).  
 
The second value-destructive motive in this category is the compensation issue. 
Agency theory holds that the acquirers‘ management‘s self-interest is the motivation 
behind acquisition activities. This leads to the problem that managers seek their own 
wealth and interest by gaining extra power and prestige for themselves, rather than 
benefitting the firm‘s shareholders‘ wealth and being interested in their firm‘s 
profitability from acquisitions (Hopkins, 2002). Finance and management scholars 
have found links between acquisition behaviour and CEO expectations of 
compensation. For instance, sectors where higher CEO compensation is required 
mostly exhibit more acquisition activities (Agrawal and Walkling, 1994). Finance 
scholars have also found evidence that increases in acquiring firms‘ CEO wealth and 
firm performance are positively correlated (Harford and Li, 2007). Acquirer firm 
CEOs seek to increase manager utility through acquisitions with obtaining new stock 
and control of larger units, resulting in higher pay levels and bonuses (Harford and Li, 
2007). In addition to this argument, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) found that 
CEOs‘ power increases and they perform better when they are in charge of larger 
firms. Accordingly, CEOs tend to engage in acquisition activities due to overpay in 
acquisitions and to maximize their own interest. However, this self-interest effect may 
decrease when owner-controlled acquiring firms place limits on CEO compensation 
and associate this reward with shareholder returns (Kroll et al., 1997).  
 
In summary, in contrast to the value creation motive, there is a negative association 
between the acquirer and target gains when self-interested managerial factors exist in 
acquisitions.  
 38 
 
2.2.1.3 Strategic Moves 
 
In this category, the motivations behind acquisition are regarded as a strategic 
decision in order to sustain and enhance the competitive advantage of the firm. 
Mergers and acquisitions are used as a method to seek entry into new markets and 
new distribution channels, to gain a strategic position in the market, to develop 
capabilities through organisational learning, and to enhance resources (Hitt et al., 
1997).  
 
Acquiring a firm provides additional skills and resources in order to achieve 
competitive advantage and organisational growth. DiGeorgio (2003) claimed that 
acquisition is the fastest way for firms to take strategic actions, as opposed to creating 
resources internally via organic growth. Unlike the 1980s acquisition trend, which 
aimed at gaining control of undervalued and dissimilar assets, at present firms are, 
rather, strategic and operational in their actions. Firms are aiming to acquire new 
capabilities and extending strategic opportunities in new markets through acquisitions 
(Vasilaki, 2009). This is because rapid changes in technology and market conditions 
require the restructuring of firms‘ resources (DiGerogio, 2003). Additionally, 
maintaining innovation and R&D is essential for firms to stay competitive in the 
market. When firms realise a lack of innovativeness and R&D activity, they target and 
aim to obtain appropriate resources through acquisitions, which seems to be the 
quickest solution to this problem (Hitt et al., 1991). The main strategy behind these 
acquisitions is obtaining target firms‘ skills and a mixture of high-level resources that 
leverages and extends strategic opportunities within the combined firm. Therefore, the 
acquirer may be interested in targets from dissimilar industries or may possess distinct 
business lines in this type of acquisition (Vasilaki, 2009). 
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Product diversification is also implemented by firms as a corporate-level acquisition 
strategy. Firms usually evaluate the acquisition option when they operate in an 
industry with rapid technological changes, reliance on continuous innovation, and 
depth of knowledge-based assets (Sirmon et al., 2007). Acquisition is seen as the 
quickest way to implement a product diversification strategy and increase the 
profitability of the firm through extending market reach and accessing more buyers. 
Moreover, acquisition also provides immediate new market access to the acquirer 
when firms seek risk reduction for entering a new geographical market, in order to 
lower barriers to entry (Bower, 2001). Established firms that exist in this market may 
already hold larger portions of market share, and competition with these firms may be 
tough. The only way to overcome barriers to entry and broaden market operation is 
practicing mergers and acquisitions activities.  
 
Moreover, firms also use acquisitions as a mode of entry into other geographies. 
Firms in this group consider acquisitions as a strategic move that allows them to be 
active across borders and seek capability development. The strategic motive within 
this category is developing the strategic positions of the firm. The main idea of this 
theory is that firms‘ strategic positions in their home country and interest in going 
global influences their overall corporate decisions to seek expansion through M&A. 
Recently, internationalisation process of emerging market firms has received 
increasing interest from strategic management scholars through theoretical studies on 
the increasing involvement of emerging market firms in the global economy and their 
impact on global competition. For instance, Demirbag et al. (2009) examined 522 
foreign subsidiaries of Turkish MNEs and suggested that emerging market MNEs use 
corporate development activities as springboards to acquire strategic resources 
required to compete more effectively with their global counterparts. Additionally, 
some researchers further argue that the internalisation strategies of emerging market 
firms are different to those of developed world firms (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2007; Khanna 
and Palepu, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007). Mainly, emerging market firms aim to 
undertake M&A for more resource-oriented activities. Focusing on international 
strategy, Harzing (2002) empirically showed that developed world firms following a 
global strategy would prefer corporate greenfield activities over acquisitions, where 
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firms following a multi-domestic strategy would prefer acquisitions over greenfield. 
Thus, taking account of the institutional perspective, the strategy followed by the 
MNEs in the developed world has a significant effect on the choice of corporate 
development activity. Multi-domestic firms are more likely to undertake M&A, 
whereas due to firm-specific advantages global firms are more likely to pursue 
greenfield strategies to enter a new market (Harzing, 2002). According to the author, 
the core capabilities of multi-domestic firms lie in the exploitation of firm-specific 
location advantages in their home country. Thus these firms pursue acquisitions, 
whereas firms following global strategies would be more likely to establish greenfield 
ventures to avoid internal isomorphism and the disadvantages of cultural distance 
(Harzing, 2002). The subsidiaries of MNCs may be subject to institutional pressures 
to become isomorphic to the parent firm (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Moreover, 
Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) considered the target‘s perspective and found that 
when target firms face difficult strategic hurdles they pull sellers toward interest in 
being acquired, whereas when target firms are not facing these hurdles they pull 
sellers toward accepting attractive acquirers.  
 
Given the increasing strategic importance of cross-border acquisitions by emerging 
market firms, examining the value of these corporate international expansions from 
the dynamic capabilities view contributes to the literature by providing theoretical 
insights about the phenomenon. From the dynamic capabilities perspective10, 
acquisitions take place to reconfigure acquirers‘ existing resource bases in order to 
achieve a competitive advantage in changing environments.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The dynamic capabilities perspective will be examined broadly in the next section (Section 2.3). 
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2.2.1.4 Environmental Factors 
 
Scholars from the field of strategic management have examined whether a close fit 
between the environment and corporate expansion strategy motivates M&A to take 
place (Haleblian et al., 2009). For instance, Folta (1998) examined how the 
management strategy is affected by technological uncertainty, which was explained as 
being exogenous to the firm, and found that equity collaborations are useful when 
faced with exogenous uncertainty because they provide a choice for acquisition of a 
firm. In a similar vein, Schilling and Steensma (2002) asserted that uncertainty 
increased the opportunity for acquisition than undertaking a licence agreement. 
Furthermore, drawing from transaction cost economics, researchers test if there is a 
link between environmental uncertainty and acquisition activity. Bergh and Lawless 
(1998) suggested that managers of highly diversified firms are more likely to take part 
in acquisition activities when exogenous uncertainty decreases. Likewise, Thornton 
(2001) showed that failure in firms‘ strategy changes due to environmental shift 
increased the likelihood of acquisition. Finance scholars have also examined 
environmental factors. By focusing on differences in laws and regulation, Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) found that the number of mergers and acquisitions activities is greater 
in countries with improved accounting standards and advanced shareholder 
protection. On the other hand, much debate surrounds the literature on the driving 
forces of emerging market firms‘ strategies in expanding abroad (Brouthers et al., 
2005; Peng et al., 2008). Many studies based their assumptions on the institutional 
perspective, since the political, legal, and societal improvements in emerging markets 
shape the firms‘ growth strategies in pursuing more M&A activities (Dacin et al., 
2007; Peng et al., 2008). This improvement prepared the ground to study the nature of 
M&A in emerging markets and further explore the context of M&A.  
 
Another motive for acquisition is the resource dependence asserted by management 
literature. Through re-examining Pfeffer‘s (1972) pioneering study on inter-industry 
merger patterns, Finkelstein (1997) replicated the study‘s arguments and found 
analogous but weaker results than the original. The main finding from the Pfeffer‘s 
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(1972) study was that resource dependencies described merger patterns. Later, 
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) extended the resource dependence theory and stated 
that while mutual dependence is main driver of mergers and acquisitions, a power 
imbalance functions as a hurdle to their integration.  
 
The last motive in this category is the importance of network ties as an explanation of 
mergers and acquisitions. For example, Haunschild (1993) argued that firm managers 
imitate the mergers and acquisitions activities of other firms on whose boards they 
hold places. Another organization theory-based paper examined whether firms‘ 
acquisition decisions were affected by the acquisition activities of competitors. This 
paper identified that when similarity between ―tied-to‖ firms, which offers an actual 
model that boosts imitation by the focal firm and other firms in their sector, is greater, 
similarity between the acquisition activity of the focal firm and other firms is greater 
(Westphal et al., 2001). This study pointed out that managerial attempts to achieve 
peer isomorphism are an important antecedent of M&A.  
 
All in all, as can be seen from the big picture of the studies reviewed above, there is a 
mixture of motivations for M&A and their performance implications. Given the 
increasing role of emerging market firms in global economies, integrating institutional 
and dynamic capabilities-based motivations would be a way for further research to 
contribute to the literature on why M&A occur in emerging markets and what the 
performance implications of these acquisitions are. Reviewing the literature highlights 
that the institutional perspective is more likely to drive domestic acquisitions, and this 
will be discussed later in this study, whereas the dynamic capabilities perspective is 
more likely to drive cross-border acquisitions, and this will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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2.2.2 Schools of Thought in Mergers and Acquisitions Literature 
 
The academic scholars that seek to develop insights on mergers and acquisitions area 
fall into several schools of thought from different perspectives. In the most advanced 
and widely accepted classification, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) divided these 
schools of thought into four, which are the capital market school, the strategic 
management school, the organisational behaviour school, and the process school.  
 
Firstly, the capital market school is mostly concerned with the question of whether a 
merger or acquisition activity leads to value creation and corporate control, and how 
this value is shared between the shareholders of the acquirer and the target. The main 
research areas in this group are agency issues, the efficient market, the role of 
investors, and corporate governance. Jensen and Ruback (1983) presented some initial 
work and found that gains from acquisitions accrue to target shareholders but not 
acquiring shareholders. From the market of corporate control perspective, more recent 
work has showed that Canadian acquirer firms produce more positive returns than 
their US counterparts (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000).  
 
Secondly, the strategic management school has examined the acquisition performance 
of firms by focusing on issues such as the characteristics of acquisitions, how the 
acquirer firm selects targets, and the determinants of successful acquisitions. The core 
concept for these researchers is the influence of a merger or acquisition activity on 
acquiring firm performance, and I will rely on this group to formulate my research 
aims and objectives. To a large extent, this area is focused on diversification strategy 
and how industrially related and unrelated acquisitions perform relative to each other 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).  
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Thirdly, the organisational behaviour school has examined the effects of acquisitions 
on the organization and the people in it. Thus, researchers in this group have 
investigated the question of how people react to acquisition activity. Cultural and 
organisational fit and turnover due to acquisition activity are the main elements for 
this school‘s researchers and they use qualitative conceptual studies for their 
arguments (Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Gertsen and Soderberg, 1998).  
 
Lastly, the process school scholars have studied how the acquisition process (pre and 
post) determines the opportunities for successful acquisition. Different from the 
previous schools, the process school is not result oriented and is generally interested 
in the acquisitions‘ decision process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). The process 
school focuses on the important role of the choice of M&A processes (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006). Its scholars have highlighted conceptually that inappropriate 
decision-making during pre- and post-acquisition phases can lead to poorer 
acquisition results (Schweiger and Very, 2003; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).  
 
Another classification has been suggested by Bower (2004), and he offers three 
groups for mergers and acquisitions research. The first group examines the effects of 
acquisition on the performance of target or acquirer firms. The second group attempts 
to explore the effects of acquisitions on other corporate strategies such as foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and learning. The third group investigates the process of an 
acquisition. Another researcher has identified four different theoretical perspectives, 
namely financial economics, agency theory, strategic management research, and 
organisational learning theory (Voss, 2008).  
 
As can be seen from this section, M&A research has been characterized by a high 
degree of diversity. Therefore it is hard to offer an exact theoretical perspective that 
describes how to examine the M&A phenomenon. Haspeslagh and Jemison‘s (1991) 
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model reflects the particular interests of several different groups of M&A scholars 
better than others.  
 
2.2.3 Pre-Acquisition Phase 
 
A general overview of academic papers in the M&A literature (Gomes et al., 2013; 
Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006) divides M&A studies into two phases, which are 
pre-acquisition phase-based studies and studies based on the determinants of post-
acquisition performance. The main element in this consideration is the closing date of 
the deal, at which the new owner of the target can now make direct changes (Gomes 
et al., 2012). Below, I will review and discuss these two areas of interest in the M&A 
literature. Particularly, I will focus and give more details on the determinants of post-
acquisition performance.  
 
During this initial stage of the pre-M&A phase firms typically search through their 
opportunities, explore the range of possibilities that would fit their pre-M&A 
strategies, and think of their comprehensive post-M&A strategies (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). During the pre-acquisition phase, acquirers generally evaluate a 
number of probable target firms. Target and acquirer firms typically sign 
confidentiality agreements in order to get admission to private information for a due 
diligence process. Following successful negotiations they sign a preliminary contract. 
Then, they announce the deal officially and the acquiring firm applies to obtain the 
required regulatory approval. This is the process for the pre-acquisition phase.   
 
Scholars have investigated the pre-acquisition phase from different angles. Following 
capital market theories, Sanders (2001) investigated the effects of stock ownership 
and stock option pay, and found that they had utterly reverse effects on the propensity 
of a firm to undertake acquisition and divesture activity. Building from the agency 
 46 
school arguments that mergers and acquisitions are disciplinary mechanisms, scholars 
have argued that after a failed attempt at an M&A activity, the board of directors‘ 
characteristics can help corporate strategies refocus (Chatterjee et al., 2003).  
 
In studies by the strategic management school, scholars have investigated the pre-
acquisition phase through empirical studies. Anand and Delios (2002) examined the 
choice between acquisition and greenfield modes of international entry by linking it to 
upstream (technological) and downstream (marketing) capabilities. Moreover, 
Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) studied the influence of greenfield and acquisition on 
a firm‘s later expansions and asserted that undertaking an acquisition enhances the 
practicality of its later ventures through broadening a firm‘s knowledge base. Some 
scholars have focused on the target selection process from the organisational learning 
perspective and examined why acquirers take over a specific target rather than others 
that are better options for them. For instance, establishing organisational learning as a 
conceptual framework, Baum et al. (2000) examined acquisitions from 1971 to 1996 
to determine why they acquired a particular target rather than others. They suggested 
that experiential and vicarious learning processes lead to a basis for understanding the 
locations of chains‘ acquisitions. Moreover, Capron and Anand (2007) investigated 
the pre-acquisition phase from the dynamic capabilities perspective. In order for a 
firm to be successful in the pre-acquisition phase, it should possess acquisition 
selection and acquisition identification abilities (Capron and Anand, 2007). With the 
selection ability, firms can accurately assess the need for new resources and 
capabilities, whereas identification ability helps firms to appropriately detect and 
negotiate with the potential targets. Then, of course, the firms will need the ability to 
complete the pre-acquisition phase successfully, but I will focus on the post-
acquisition phase of the M&A process in this study.  
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2.2.4 Determinants of Post-Acquisition Performance 
 
Post-acquisition performance studies have commonly analysed the impact of four 
issues: whether the acquiring firm‘s learning from acquisition experience influences 
acquisition performance, the role of post-acquisition integration management on 
acquisition performance, whether the characteristics of the deal in terms of industrial 
and geographical relatedness affect acquisition performance, and measurement issues 
of assessing acquisition performance.  
 
2.2.4.1 Learning from Acquisition Experience 
 
Empirical research has consistently attempted to identify the role of acquirer firms‘ 
acquisition experience on acquisition performance. I will discuss the organisational 
learning from acquisition experience perspective‘s assumptions and present findings 
from the relevant literature in this section.  
 
Organisational learning is an iterative and dynamic process where a firm learns 
through engaging in experiences, drawing inferences from their experiences, and 
storing these inferences in order to use them in their future activities (Levitt and 
March, 1988; Weick, 1979). One way of framing this is that firms learn ―by encoding 
inferences from history into routines that guide behaviour‖ (Levitt and March, 1988, 
pp. 320). Previous experience enables firms to respond to issues that could occur 
during acquisitions and to develop routines and policies to deal with them (Hayward, 
2002). Experienced acquirers are more self-confident and flexible in their acquisition-
related decisions and better able to find policies for varying situations (Brutton et al., 
1994). Taking account of the individual effect, lack of prior acquisition experience 
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may make a top executive particularly subject to escalation of commitment that can 
drive them to the successful completion of deals at unreasonably high costs 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). For that reason, experienced top executives are more 
familiar with implementing an acquisition due to the capability of evaluating, valuing, 
and managing this process gained from past experience, which also leads to better 
acquisition results (Shaver, 2006). Moreover, as discussed in the ―pre-M&A phase‖ 
section, knowledge from prior acquisition experiences can also help firms to achieve 
better selection and identification ability. In turn, these pre-acquisition based 
capabilities may lead to improvement in the post-acquisition integration process by 
realising synergies between combined firms more quickly and efficiently (Hitt et al., 
1998). 
 
Based on the notions above, the literature in organisational learning expected that 
acquisition experience should positively influence the acquisition performance of the 
acquirer firm (Lubatkin, 1983). However, data from organisational learning studies 
has not confirmed this assumption of a positive relationship, and the literature on 
learning through acquisition experience has yielded contradictory outcomes. Despite 
the noteworthy development by the existing literature, scholars have variously found a 
positive relationship, a negative relationship, a u-shaped relationship, and no 
relationship between acquisition performance and acquisition experience. I visualised 
these relationships in Figure 2.1. Additionally, a review of the main studies related to 
learning from acquisition experience can be found in Appendix A.  
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between M&A experience and M&A performance 
Source: Author 
 
The existing literature on organisational learning in corporate expansion has mainly 
focused on firm-level learning and has investigated how a firm‘s prior acquisition 
experience shapes subsequent acquisition performance by focusing on developed 
world or US cases. The empirical studies show that ―learning curve‖ explanations are 
of limited relevance (Zollo and Singh, 2004). For instance, some scholars have 
reported that such acquisition experience positively impacts subsequent acquisition 
performance (Lubatkin, 1983; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Hitt et al., 1993; Bruton et 
al., 1994; Barkema et al., 1996; Beckman and Haunschild, 2002). The main idea 
behind this group is that firms develop routines and capabilities from prior experience 
and this allows them to handle same situations in the future (Anand and Khanna, 
2000). A firm with greater acquisition experience is more likely to have a greater 
economic gain in subsequent acquisitions due to this learning effect. In one of these 
positive effect studies, Hitt et al. (1993) considered twelve acquirers and found that 
the acquirer‘s prior experience led to better synergy realisation and a quicker and 
more effective acquisition integration process. Following this study, Bruton et al. 
(1994) looked at a sample of distressed firms using the subjective assessment method, 
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and found that experienced acquirers outperformed inexperienced ones. However, due 
to the small samples used in these studies, we need larger-sample research to conclude 
that acquisition performance is inevitably higher for acquirers with prior acquisition 
experience (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). 
 
Conflicting with the works that showed a positive effect, Kusewitt (1985) predicted a 
drop in acquisition performance as the number of acquisitions rise. It appears that this 
negative effect was only statistically significant in a univariate analysis, due to the 
importance of relative size because both very small and very large sizes of target to 
acquirer were associated with negative performance (Kusewitt, 1985). So far this is 
the only study that I have come across which reports a direct negative effect between 
acquisition rate and performance. On the other hand, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) 
found that the relationship between the number of acquisition experiences and 
acquisition performance was non-linear and U-shaped. They emphasised the novice 
problem and argued that the first acquisition appears as a baseline for acquirer 
knowledge. Following that, inexperienced acquirers are still novices after the first 
acquisition, and they inappropriately apply knowledge gained from the experience, so 
that these acquirers perform less well than the initial acquisition. Yet as the firms gain 
experience from acquisitions and develop capabilities, they are more able to avoid the 
missteps that were previously made and they will achieve greater performance. 
 
On the other hand, although some scholars mentioned above found conflicting direct 
effects on acquisition performance and acquisition experience, other researchers have 
suggested that no such linear relationship exists (Lubatkin, 1987; Lahey and Conn, 
1990; Baum and Ginsberg, 1997; Kroll et al., 1997; Hayward, 2002; Zollo and Singh, 
2004; King et al., 2004). In one of the initial analyses of the relationship between 
acquisition performance and acquisition experience, Lubatkin (1982) examined a 
large merger series of listed firms and did not find a significant relationship between 
acquisition experience and acquisition performance. More recently, King et al. (2004, 
pp.195) cumulated the scholars‘ findings on the subject of the relationship between 
acquisition experience and acquisition performance and concluded that ―the true 
 51 
population relationship between the presence of M&A activity and performance of 
acquiring firm is very near zero or negative beyond the day a merger or acquisition is 
announced‖. Both Zollo and Singh‘s (2004) and King et al.‘s (2004) studies found no 
sign that acquisition experience, on average, increased the focal acquisition 
performance of the acquiring firm after the announcement day.  
 
Nevertheless, King et al. (2004) suggested that moderating effects between 
acquisition performance and acquisition experience were present and these 
moderators may be interpreted as evidence of the significant influence of 
organisational learning. In support of this argument, Hayward (2002) found that prior 
acquisition experience increased focal acquisition performance when both firms‘ 
businesses were not too similar or different to one another. This means that when 
prior acquisitions are highly similar to the focal one, the acquirer firm may not 
generalise previous learning, whereas when prior acquisitions are completely different 
to one another, the acquirer firm may not specialise in specific learning. Therefore, 
the author suggested following a midcourse action when pursuing an acquisition. This 
argument seems somewhat vague, as it is difficult to justify as well as apply generalist 
and specialist skills in all settings, such as when emerging market firms are active in 
various industries and we are not sure where these learning skills are coming from.  
 
Hayward (2002) also asserted that the success of acquisition learning was related to 
the quality of a firm‘s prior experience, such as the average success of past 
acquisition, rather than the quantity. In that case, acquisition experience is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for organisational learning. Firms can also learn by giving 
attention to the nature, performance, and timing of acquisition experience (Hayward, 
2002). Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) also emphasised ―target-to-target similarity‖ 
in terms of targets‘ businesses, and found that when the similarity of an acquisition to 
prior acquisitions by the same firm increases, so does the focal acquisition 
performance of the acquirer firm.  
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More recently, while Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) and Hayward (2002) stressed 
the importance of acquisition timing and sequencing, Laamanen and Keil (2008) 
extended the firm-level moderating variables. Based on a sample of the most active 
US acquirers in the 1990s, Laamanen and Keil (2008) found that there is a negative 
effect between acquisition performance and a high rate of acquisitions as well as a 
high variability in terms of rate. Additionally, the negative relationship was weakened 
when the size of an acquirer, the scope of its acquisition program, and acquisition 
experiences were employed to moderate the relationship (Laamanen and Keil, 2008). 
In this study, Laamanen and Keil (2008) used the acquisition experience measure as a 
proxy for a firm‘s acquisition capability. 
 
Moreover, Zollo and Singh (2004) offered support for the moderator effect, and by 
examining the US banking industry they reported that acquisition experience alone 
did not positively impact subsequent acquisition performance, but when the degree of 
knowledge codification from prior acquisition experience rose, the acquirer firm 
performed better. This is because codification of knowledge through past acquisitions 
is a necessary precondition in order to manage the post-acquisition process effectively 
(Zollo and Singh, 2004). From another perspective, Delong and Deyoung (2007) 
showed that large commercial banks learned through observing other banks‘ 
acquisition successes and failures. Thus, indirect learning may positively influence the 
decision-making process.  
 
2.2.4.2 Management of the Post-Acquisition Integration Process 
 
The post-acquisition integration process is an important aspect of mergers and 
acquisitions literature. Scholars support the idea that the post-acquisition integration 
process is a vital factor for the success of the focal acquisition. Where acquisitions fail 
to provide the anticipated outcome, poor integration in the post-acquisition phase is 
the principal reason for that failure (Muehlfeld et al., 2012). This is determined by the 
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process acquiring firms use to coordinate and control the activities of the acquired 
firms, so as to realise the potential of the interdependencies which drove the focal 
acquisition (Shrivastava, 1986). The failure or success of acquisition depends mainly 
on the management of the post-acquisition process (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Thus, top 
management plays a critical role in integration success.  
 
Scholars, mostly from the process school, as well as from the organisational 
behaviour school, have focused on the decisions and actions taken by management in 
order to organise the post-acquisition integration process. Studies on the post-
acquisition integration period suggest that a division of strategic, financial, 
organisational, and cultural analyses leaves the top management holding various and 
usually competing perspectives on how to combine two firms (Vasilaki, 2008). The 
post-acquisition integration literature is reasonably consistent in terms of its 
conceptualisations of the different perspectives used by decision-makers (Ellis, 2004). 
Given the consistency between different research streams for the post-acquisition 
integration period, I identified four main research strategies in the literature, which are 
the cultural dissimilarities view, the level of integration between firms, the degree of 
resource redeployment, and lastly the retention of top management, and their 
performance implications.  
 
2.2.4.2.1 Cultural Dissimilarities 
 
The cultural dissimilarities view has focused on how much autonomy exists between 
combined firms (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988). The target firm can be integrated 
more easily when cultures are more similar between acquirer and target. To put it 
another way, as organisational cultures vary, it can be more difficult to combine 
acquirer and target firms. Therefore, greater autonomy is required to help preserve 
tacit knowledge and to ease the disruptions that can occur (Ranft and Lord, 2002). 
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More recently, scholars have argued that the most challenging part for acquirer firms‘ 
managers after the completion of the focal acquisition period is managing the 
transition from two organisations to one combined organisation (Stahl and Voigt, 
2008). Acquiring a new firm also means acquiring a new culture, a new management 
system, and a new organisational structure as well. This requires that an integration 
process be managed properly and decisions consider such differences, so that 
anticipated synergies can be achieved (Stahl and Mendenhall, 2005). One of the 
potential difficulties for reaching integration benefits is the presence of cultural 
differences between combined firms, and this represents a risk for acquisition 
integration. On the other hand, those cultural differences may lead to value creation 
and enhance the performance of the combined firm. Considering these contradicting 
views, Stahl and Voigt (2008) have argued that the effects of cultural dissimilarities 
differ depending on the degree of relatedness and the dimensions of the cultural 
dissimilarities separating the combined firms.  
 
2.2.4.2.2 Level of Integration  
 
Strategic and organisational fits offer the potential for synergies between combined 
firms, but realisation of synergistic resources depends entirely on the management‘s 
ability to coordinate the post-acquisition process effectively (Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Scholars have argued that conceptualizing 
acquisitions from the decision-making perspective may boost researchers‘ 
understanding of acquisition activity and its outcome (Pablo, 1994; Jemison and 
Sitkin, 1986). Therefore, theoretical attempts that aim to explain integration 
consequences should first take into account the managerial judgements which 
ultimately form a firm‘s integration strategy (Pablo, 1994).  
 
Integration may include a multifaceted and interactive mutual adjustment process 
between combined firms, but the change is normally one-sided, taking place mainly 
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within the target firm (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). The top management of 
acquirer firms is expected to coordinate and manage these adjustments. So it is vital 
and enlightening to examine the post-acquisition process from the perspective of the 
acquirer firm‘s management.  
 
The level of integration is defined ―as the extent to which the functions of the 
acquired unit are linked to, aligned with, or centralized in, the equivalent functions of 
the acquired organization‖ (Zollo and Singh, 2003, pp. 1236). It is a key factor for the 
acquisition management process, because in theory while high levels of integration 
add to recognition of interdependency-based synergistic potential, they may also 
cause inter-organisational conflict and increase coordination costs. Thus, negative 
synergies may be recognised (Pablo, 1994). Datta and Grant (1990) tested the 
performance implications of decisions about the level of integration and found a 
positive relationship. Pablo (1994) also studied the antecedents of level of integration 
decisions and asserted that the level of integration depends on the type of acquisition 
and on similarities between the firms‘ operational characteristics.  
 
Opportunities to exploit synergies are associated with the resources of either the target 
or the acquirer (Capron and Pistre, 2002). Acquisitions are strategic actions that often 
allow firms to transfer their resources and reconfigure their businesses in order to stay 
competitive in their environment (Kogut and Zander, 1996; Capron et al., 2001). 
Following the acquisitions, firms can modify their capabilities. Modifying capabilities 
takes account of the redeployment of resources to or from the target and allows firms 
to benefit from new resources or capabilities (Capron et al., 2001). These resources 
can be redeployed and reconfigured for new productive use and create new value 
(Mazzola and Kellermans, 2010).  
 
For instance, Karim and Mitchell (2000) have argued that in order to change their 
resource base, acquirers frequently use targets‘ resources. Initial studies of these 
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important dimensions of the post-acquisition integration process triggered more fine-
grained research. Capron (1999) extended the theory and examined the extent of 
resource redeployment and knowledge transfer between the combined firms by 
considering horizontal mergers and acquisitions. She provided evidence that some 
degree of integration between the target and acquirer can contribute to acquisition 
performance (Capron, 1999). Then, scholars found that post-acquisition resource 
redeployment led to divesture of assets from the receiving firm (Capron et al., 2001). 
In general, acquisitions provide a means of reconfiguring resources within firms, and 
following this reconfiguration process asset divesture appears as a rational result 
(Capron et al., 2001). Following these studies, Capron and Pistre (2002) attempted to 
identify the conditions under which acquirers gain economic benefits. The authors 
found that there is a positive association between the contribution of the acquirer‘s 
resources and the economic gain of acquirers, whereas this is not the case for the 
target‘s resources (Capron and Pistre, 2002). While this research confirms the 
importance of redeployment of resources, it does not explain how resources are 
redeployed and how the process of decision-making takes place. With the help of 
detailed interview data and questionnaires, Birkinshaw et al. (2000) investigated the 
sub-processes of human integration and task integration, and showed that effective 
integration was reached through a two-phase process. They argued that the human 
integration process led to more exhaustive integration than a task integration process, 
and expected synergies between firms was achieved more rapidly. 
 
Additionally, Saxton and Dollinger (2004) examined the relationship between 
attractiveness of target assets and acquisition outcomes by considering managerial 
satisfaction of acquirer firms. According to the paper‘s findings, perceived positive 
target reputation enhanced the acquisition satisfaction, as did greater integration 
(Saxton and Dollinger, 2004).  
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2.2.4.2.3 Degree of Resource Transfer 
 
Acquisitions provide an opportunity for firms to attain new resources of knowledge. 
However, the degree to which resources within the target firm that existed before the 
acquisition are replaced or dismissed is a major strategic decision for post-acquisition 
management (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Different cultures, different organisational 
structure, and different nature of resources can impact on the degree of changes in the 
acquirer firm‘s resource base. In order to enhance economic gain from the acquisition, 
the ability to transfer strategic and organisational resources appropriately is required 
(Hitt et al., 2001). Therefore, management of resources is an important subject and 
scholars put much effort into clarifying the issue.  
 
In line with the resource transfer argument, Brock (2005) found that managing the 
resource transfer effectively led to performance development of combined firms, as 
compared to the aggregated performance of the target and acquirer firms if they 
remained independent. In a similar study, scholars asserted that there is a positive 
association between the amount of resource transfer and organisational performance 
(Kanter and Dretler, 1998). Moreover, Anand and Singh (1997) studied the 
acquisition strategies for firms in declining industries and concluded that it is 
imperative for firms to transfer resources and capabilities in order to reach the 
anticipated outcome. Similarly, scholars stressed the importance of resource transfer 
and emphasised that value is not created until resources are transferred and people 
from the acquirer and target firms work together to create expected synergy 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Birkinshaw et al., 2000).  
 
Another empirical analysis emphasised the strategic importance of resource transfer 
between target and acquirer firms following horizontal acquisitions. Drawing on prior 
research (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece and Pisano, 1994), Capron et al. (1998) 
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firstly defined a typology of resources, which are R&D, manufacturing, marketing, 
managerial, and financial resources. They defined R&D resources as laboratory 
materials, process and product designs, and research staff. In their definition the 
manufacturing resources may include equipment for production, guidelines, and 
related staff. Whereas the marketing resources may involve brand names and their 
management, distribution channels, customer service, and sales networks. These 
marketing resources frequently represent socially complex incentive mechanisms and 
tacit knowledge in regards to the competitive environment (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984). In their categorisation, the managerial resources 
were defined as reporting systems, planning tools, and other management skills 
related to organisational operation, and manager transfer counted as a physical 
resource transfer between firms. Lastly, financial resources may help firms to raise 
capital on the financial markets more efficiently. After empirical analyses Capron et 
al. (1998) concluded that R&D, manufacturing, and marketing resources are 
redeployed from and to targets, where acquirer firms redeploy managerial and 
financial resources to targets only.  
 
Some scholars have examined the speed of resource transfer and its effects on 
acquisition success. For instance, Homburg and Bucerius (2006) investigated the 
speed of integration and found that speed is an important determinant to lessen 
customer uncertainty, and it is more beneficial to transfer rapidly when organisational 
fit is high. On the other hand, slower integration may be beneficial for combined firms 
during the post-acquisition period. Scholars have stated that transferring resources too 
quickly may damage the target firm‘s socially complex knowledge-based resources 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Ranft and Lord, 2002). For instance, unclear responsibilities 
may cause key employees to resign, and power imbalances may occur.  
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2.2.4.2.4 Retention of Top Management  
 
Another important issue in the post-acquisition period is management turnover within 
the target firms. Researchers attempted to find association between managerial 
turnover and acquisition performance. The role of top management is important, as 
capabilities and un-codified learned knowledge in organisational resources depend 
upon these individuals.  
 
Taking account of the resource-based perspective, top management retention is 
required for acquisition success because these managers are familiar with the target 
firm‘s resources, its organisational structure, and its on-going culture (Ranft and Lord, 
2000). At least in the short term, the target firm‘s managers can help to integrate the 
two firms effectively and gain economic benefits (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). 
The top management team is considered a valuable component of the target firm‘s 
resource base (Castanias and Helfat, 1991) and these assets may directly contribute to 
a firm‘s economic performance (Michalisin et al., 2004). Saxton and Dollinger (2004) 
stated that the managerial capability within the target firm plays a vital role in 
successfully transferring skills and knowledge, especially for tacit knowledge. For 
instance, the turnover of many key executives from Chrysler is one of the main 
reasons for the struggle of Daimler-Benz‘s mergers (Saxton and Dollinger, 
2004).They went on to find a strong relationship between acquisition outcomes and 
retention of the target firms‘ top management.  
 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993) also found that executive change was detrimental to 
acquirer firm acquisition performance and that the influence went up in magnitude 
when more executives were changed.  Krishnan et al. (1997) pointed out the same 
negative relationship and noted that complementary backgrounds, defined as 
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differences in functional backgrounds between combined firms, have a positive 
influence on acquisition performance in both related and unrelated acquisitions.   
 
While many studies have reported a positive relationship between management 
retention and acquisition performance, some studies have examined the antecedents of 
the top management replacement decision. Walsh (1989) predicted that when the 
target firm‘s executive team was familiar with the acquirer firm‘s businesses, there 
would be higher turnover within the target firm because the acquirer firm can 
compensate when dropping the target firm‘s managers.  In that case, acquirer firm 
managers even encourage departure of the target firm‘s managers because they do not 
have to rely on them for specialized skills. By contrast, if there are considerable 
differences in operational backgrounds, the acquiring firm may be interested in 
keeping the target firm‘s managers because they cannot afford to reduce the target 
firm‘s management abilities and experiences (Walsh, 1988). In a subsequent work, 
Walsh and Ellwood (1991) asserted that if the pre-acquisition profitability of the 
acquirer firm was to increase, the post-acquisition management turnover of the target 
firm would decrease.  
 
Lubatkin et al. (1999) used social capital theory to argue that executive replacement is 
dependent on perceived cultural dissimilarities. They found that there is a high level 
of executive replacement when there are great cultural differences between the 
combined firms. Using the human capital perspective, Buchholtz et al. (2003) tested 
the influence of industry and firm specificity on management turnover. They 
concluded that there is a positive relationship between level of relatedness and rate of 
management turnover.  
 
Drawing upon the resource-based view; Bergh (2001) suggested that retaining the 
target firm‘s top management with longer organisational tenure improved the 
acquisition‘s outcomes. However, Buchholtz et al. (2003) argued that organisational 
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tenure is related to higher turnover rates. The main idea behind Bergh‘s (2001) theory 
was that longer-tenure executives have tacit knowledge and this knowledge can 
generate value (Vasilaki, 2008).   
 
More recently, researchers have attempted to investigate the role of executives‘ 
experiences and characteristics in corporate development. The prior literature 
examined how the firm‘s prior experiences in organisational learning influence post-
acquisition performance (Barkema and Schiven, 2008); however, despite the 
importance of the prior experience issue, research examining when or how firms learn 
is largely unexplored in the literature (King et al., 2004). In order to refine the 
understanding of how firms learn in corporate development, McDonald et al. (2008) 
examined how the nature of outside directors‘ prior experience impacts on acquisition 
performance. However, they miss the point that these outside directors, being board 
members, are usually not directly involved with the acquisition decision process. 
Meyer-Doyle (2012) extended the work and investigated how the experience and prior 
acquisition performance of those top managers influences the performance of the 
focal acquisition. Experienced managers may help with the integration of the target 
firm by providing the benefits of their practical knowledge, as they can help solve 
problems that may be encountered.    
 
2.2.4.3 Deal Characteristics 
 
Relatedness: As discussed before, achieving synergy between combined firms is the 
critical aim of acquisitions (Hitt et al., 2001). Synergy can be defined as the added 
value to the combined firm and this can be achieved from cost savings through the 
exploitation of economies of scale and scope, or revenue enhancement through 
accessing complementary assets (Capron, 1999). Cost reduction can be obtained 
through the combination of two industrially related firms. Related and unrelated 
mergers and acquisitions are the two major forms of M&A literature and they have 
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been deeply examined by researchers in the last few decades. Unrelated or 
diversifying acquisitions and related or horizontal acquisitions are terms used 
interchangeably in the M&A literature. Scholars usually define relatedness in terms of 
resource or product-market similarity, where unrelated acquisitions refer to the 
combination of two firms from different industries with different resources and 
markets (Harrison et al., 1991; Datta, 1991).  
 
Industrial relatedness between the acquirer and the target firms influences the 
acquisition performance of the acquiring firms (King et al., 2004). However, the 
results examining the impact of relatedness on acquisition performance are not 
consistent. While a group of researchers has suggested that, in terms of post-
acquisition performance, acquiring firms with related acquisition outperforms 
acquiring firms with unrelated acquisition (Rumelt, 1974, 1982; Lubatkin, 1983; 
Shelton, 1988; Harrison et al., 1991; Morosini et al., 1998; Capron, 1999; Hitt et al., 
2001), some researchers have argued the opposite (Elgers and Clark, 1980; Chatterjee, 
1986; Dubofsky and Varadarajan, 1987), while others have found no effect (Lubatkin, 
1987; Lubatkin and O‘Neill, 1987).  
 
Scholars have also employed the term ―strategic fit‖ (Lubatkin, 1983; Shelton, 1988; 
Hitt et al., 1998) in order to indicate the possibility of synergy through 
complementary resources. The pioneering study examining ―strategic fit‖ was 
conducted by Lubatkin (1983). He reported that some degree of relatedness between 
the acquirer and the target firm can lead to enhanced performance results when 
compared to unrelated acquisitions. He also noted that related acquisitions can be seen 
as a way of expansion of market limits beyond existing boundaries (Lubatkin, 1983). 
This market power argument may not be a generalizable case. George (1989) found 
no evidence that related acquisitions usually led to an upsurge in market power 
concentration. Later, Shelton (1988) expanded Lubatkin‘s (1983) theory and offered 
four categories to show how a target firm changes the product-market capabilities of 
an acquirer firm. These categories are: related-complementary, unrelated, identical, 
and related-supplementary. Shelton (1988) also found that related acquisitions create 
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more shareholder value for the acquirer firm than unrelated ones. In line with these 
value creation arguments, scholars have posited that allocating and managing more 
similar resources between the target and the acquirer firm leads to synergies and, 
therefore, increased acquisition performance (Harrison et al., 1991).  
 
Following this line of thought, Capron (1999) attempted to examine related 
acquisitions on a large-scale basis, where previous literature basically relied on case-
studies or lesser samples. Capron (1999) concluded that both asset divesture, defined 
as the extent to which the combined firms dispose of their tangible assets, and 
resource redeployment, defined as the extent to which the combined firms use the 
other resources that existed before the acquisition, contribute to post-acquisition 
performance. This is because similarity between the businesses of combined firms can 
eradicate or considerably reduce the necessity of the target firm, and this industrial 
familiarity can help firms to learn from each other during the acquisition process per 
se (Hitt et al., 2001). Acquisitions also require significant managerial participation. 
Managers more familiar with the target firm‘s market have better chances to be 
successful in the post-acquisition integration process (Roberts and Berry, 1985). Thus, 
managers can leverage the acquiring firm‘s pre-existing resources more efficiently, 
where those resources are more likely to be related (King et al., 2004).  
 
Above all, it is assumed that if the acquiring firm can only find the right target, the 
firms can be effectively integrated and the acquisition will achieve its desired results 
(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Otherwise, if those combined firms are not perfect 
identical partners, then the notion of fit is not consistent. Chatterjee et al. (1992) 
found that although there are many studies that suggested that related acquisitions 
increase the acquisition performance, there are some cases where combined firms do 
not find any strategic fit effect. For instance, conglomerate firms are usually 
characterised as those displaying a substantial amount of unrelated product-market 
diversification (Rumelt, 1974). Therefore, conglomerate firms are more likely to 
pursue unrelated M&A activities. Campa and Kedia (2002) found that due to many 
conglomerate firms‘ possession of business integration capability, they are more 
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likely to create value from unrelated M&A rather than simply creating value from 
related M&A activities. Additionally, King et al. (2004) argued that since 
conglomerate firms‘ financial performances are aggregated from several divisions, it 
is hard to predict their cash flows and make appropriate inferences.  
 
Domestic/Cross-Border: The impact of globalisation and better trade liberalisation 
has escalated the opportunities and pressures to undertake cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (Hitt et al, 1998; Shimizu et al., 2004). Given the growing number of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions and their increasing importance in the global 
market, strategic management and finance scholars have been giving more attention to 
understanding the opportunities and challenges for firms following cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (Shimizu et al., 2004). Studies on cross-border acquisitions 
have focused on different issues, such as the mode of entry (Madhok, 1997; Barkema 
and Vermeulen, 1998), cultural perspectives (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Teerikangas and 
Very, 2006), and post-acquisition outcomes from domestic or cross-border 
acquisitions (Morosini et al., 1998; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Very and 
Schweiger, 2001; Anand et al., 2005; Collins et al., 2009). Bringing together all these 
studies on domestic/cross-border mergers and acquisitions, Shimizu et al. (2004) 
offered three theoretical classifications, namely mode of entry, dynamic learning 
process, and value creating/destroying strategy.  
 
There is a similarity between the dynamics of cross-border and domestic acquisitions. 
But, due to their international nature, cross-border acquisitions may face certain 
challenges, such as differences in economic, institutional, and regulatory structures 
(Harzing, 2002). On the other hand, firms can achieve some advantages through 
cross-border acquisitions by expanding their market portfolio, acquiring new 
capabilities, and developing their knowledge (Anand et al., 2005). However, these 
advantages cannot be achieved easily. Firms undertaking a cross-border acquisition 
may face unique challenges such as ―Liability of Foreignness (LOF)‖, which is all the 
additional costs of operating across the border that result in a competitive 
disadvantage (Zaheer, 1995), and ―double-layered acculturation‖, which suggests that 
 65 
firms can face operational challenges from both partner and host country national 
culture differences (Barkema et al., 1996). Cultural, structural, regulatory, and 
customer-oriented differences can prevent firms from fully achieving synergy 
between combined firms (Kogut and Zander, 1995). Those firms expanding their 
activities through cross-border acquisitions may face uncertainty and information 
asymmetry problems and these serve as barriers to synergy realisation and capability 
development, thus potentially affecting acquisition performance (Shimizu et al., 
2004). 
 
Firstly, cross-border acquisitions as a mode of entry into foreign markets were 
mentioned extensively in the M&A literature (Kogut and Singh, 1998; Harzing, 
2002). Greenfields, alliances, and strategic agreements are some of the other entry 
tools for firms. The selection of cross-border merger or acquisition activity as a mode 
of entry into a foreign area is usually influenced by firm-level, industry-level, and 
country-level factors (Shimizu et al., 2004). The firm-level factors involve 
multinational experience, international strategy, and diversification (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998; Harzing, 2004). The industry-level factors include technological 
and marketing intensity, while the country-level factors involve market growth and 
culture-based issues (Shimizu et al., 2004). Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) found 
that product diversification and multinational experience create opportunities for 
capability development through setting up new ventures rather than through cross-
border acquisitions.  
 
Secondly, once the firm selects cross-border merger or acquisition as a mode of entry, 
the routine pre- and post-acquisition processes begin, and firms can learn from these 
dynamic processes. Prior cross-border experience and past mistakes might be helpful 
for the focal acquisition. Some scholars have examined the influence of the learning 
process on cross-border acquisitions. For instance, Very and Schweiger (2001) 
revealed that organisational learning from cross-border acquisitions depends on the 
acquirers‘ experience in a particular target country. Another study by Anand et al. 
(2005) found that accessing a multinational target is very important for capability 
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development. ―Multinational targets provide additional sources of value creation by 
drawing on national differences and diverse environments, while acquired firms 
present in a foreign country may not provide the same richness of resources‖ (Anand 
et al., 2005, pp. 213).  
 
Moreover, Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) stressed the importance of learning in the 
foreign market, as cross-border mergers and acquisitions are more complex than 
domestic mergers and acquisitions. They suggested that cross-border acquisitions may 
revitalize the target firm and develop its capabilities to react adequately to changing 
environments. Following initial success, firms enhance their capabilities through 
repetitive momentum and they repeat their past actions (Collins et al., 2009).  
 
From the other perspective, Anand and Delios (2002) contended that cross-border 
acquirers mainly undertake acquisition activity to gain upstream (technological) and 
downstream (marketing) capabilities, which are complementary to the acquirers‘ 
existing resource base of the. On the other hand, the degree of cultural differences in 
the cross-border acquisitions may negatively affect the integration process, which also 
influences acquisition performance. For instance, Hitt et al. (1997) determined 
significant differences between US and Korean managers in terms of strategic 
orientations. US managers emphasised the necessity of financial returns, where 
Korean managers stressed growth instead (Hitt et al., 1997). Furthermore, it is also 
suggested that managers from different countries are more likely to use diverse 
managerial practices. Supporting the argument, national cultural differences and 
diverse managerial practices may negatively affect the integration process through 
serious problems in transferring complementary resources, thereby decreasing the 
performance of the combined firm (Shimizu et al., 2004). Therefore, top management 
and interaction between combined firms‘ managers are important to create a global 
vision (Hitt et al., 2001).  
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Thirdly, scholars examined the cross-border acquisitions from a value creation 
strategy. Some researchers (Markides and Ittner, 1994) have stated that cross-border 
acquisitions create value for both acquirer and target firm, whereas others (Kaplan and 
Weisbach, 1992) argue that cross-border acquisitions reduce the acquirer‘s 
shareholder value but enhance the target‘s shareholder value. Lastly, Seth et al. (2002) 
examined the factors that create or destroy value in cross-border acquisitions. They 
found that the value-creating acquisitions originated from synergy-oriented deals, in 
which the acquirer firms and the target firms seek to combine their complementary 
resources. Conversely, value-destroying acquisitions arise from managerial 
motivation, such as hubris, self-interest problem, and cultural differences (Seth et al., 
2002).  
 
In this section (Section 2.2.4), I have attempted to critically review how scholars in 
financial economics, strategic management, and organisational learning have 
examined and discussed the performance implications of M&A. In general, scholars 
have focused on the role of acquisition experience and post-acquisition integration 
strategies as potential factors that might influence the acquisition performance of the 
acquirers. The evidence, however, suggests that no one clear factor can explain the 
increase in the post-acquisition performance. It is still an important question why so 
many M&A are reported to have disappointing results. Exploring the factors that have 
contributed to the success of the acquisitions from the emerging market context by 
taking account of the role of dynamic capabilities might be a promising direction to 
follow. In the next section, I will present the main predictors for measuring 
acquisition performance.  
  
2.2.5 Post-Acquisition Performance Predictors 
 
There is considerable heterogeneity in respect of the explanation of post-acquisition 
performance measurement, as well as the measurement criteria to assess acquisitions 
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impacts (Voss, 2008). By combining the findings of published studies, scholars have 
attempted to analyse current literature on post-acquisition performance and to guide 
researchers on their future M&A research (Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004; Zollo 
and Meier, 2008; Haleblian et al., 2009). Despite the large amount of work done, it is 
hard to say that the empirical findings on acquisition performance measures are 
conclusive. There is little or no agreement in the M&A literature on how to measure 
the success or failure of the acquisitions accurately (Zollo and Meier, 2008). Table 2.2 
distinguishes the studies that employed financial and accounting based M&A 
performance measures. 
 
For example, in their meta-analyses of post-acquisition performance, King et al. 
(2004) analysed 93 empirical published studies of M&A activities over 74 years. 
Meanwhile, Zollo and Meier (2008) analysed 88 studies employed in M&A literature 
and those published in top finance and management journals between 1970 and 2006. 
The largest group of studies within these M&A performance measurement studies 
used the short-term window abnormal return method (35-40% of all analysed studies). 
A second strong measure for acquisition performance studies was the long-term 
accounting measure method (25-30% of all analysed studies). The use of the long-
term window abnormal return method, which is employed nearly exclusively in 
finance journals, ranked as a third strong measure (15-20% of all analysed studies). 
Other studies adopted subjective performance measures or used the variance of 
integration process in order to assess overall acquisition performance.  
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Table 2.1: Categorisation of Studies of M&A Performance Measures 
Financial Measures Accounting Measures 
Agrawal et al., 1992 
Capron and Pistre, 2002 
Capron and Shen, 2007 
Carow et al., 2004 
Chatterjee et al., 1992 
Clark and Ofek, 1994 
DeLong and DeYoung, 2007 
Fowler and Schmidt, 1989 
Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999 
Hambrick and Cannella, 1993 
Harrison et al., 1991; 2005 
Hayward, 2002 
Hayward and Hambrick, 1997 
Hoskisson et al., 1993 
Jensen and Ruback, 1983 
Kroll et al., 1997 
Kusewitt, 1985 
Laamanen and Keil, 2008 
Lubatkin et al., 1997 
Seth et al., 2002 
Singh and Montgomery, 1987 
Walker, 2000  
 
Anand and Singh, 1997 
Barkema and Schijven, 2008 
Cannella and Hambrick, 1993 
Chang, 1996 
Clark and Ofek, 1994 
DeLong and DeYoung, 2007 
Fowler and Schmidt, 1989 
Harrison et al., 1991 
Hitt et al., 1996;1998 
Krishnan et al., 1997 
Kusewitt, 1985 
Morosini et al., 1998 
Ramaswamy, 1997 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987 
Zollo and Singh, 2004 
 
 
Source: Zollo and Meier, 2008 
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In most cases, scholars used short-term financial measures (e.g. Capron and Pistre, 
2002; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Krug and Hegarty, 2001; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1999; Seth et al., 2002; Harrison et al., 2005; Haleblian et al., 2006; Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997; Hayward, 2002; Kroll et al., 1997). Many researchers observed 
abnormal returns through short windows (2- to 4-day) around the announcement date 
(Haleblian et al., 2009). A Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) around the 
announcement date of an acquisition reveals investors‘ reaction to the firm‘s 
acquisition activity, which is based on present expectations about the future 
performance of the combined firms (Haleblian et al., 2009). Moreover, short-term 
abnormal return effect can diminish other confounding factors, such as changes in 
market-product portfolio, and management and regulatory as well as strategic changes 
that may impact firm performance (Haleblian et al., 2006). Thus, scholars have argued 
that short-term abnormal returns are representative of long-term performance 
(Sirower, 1997; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Haleblian et al., 2006). Therefore, 
depending on the market efficiency assumption, the short-term Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) is the most effective and the generally accepted technique for 
predicting post-acquisition performance (Haleblian et al., 2009; Capron and Pistre, 
2002; Anand et al., 2005; King et al., 2004); though even it is not a perfect measure 
(Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992). 
 
Given the notion of imperfection of short-term abnormal return as an acquisition 
performance measure, some scholars have used longer-term financial measures (Zollo 
and Reuer, 2010; Kusewitt, 1985; Lubatkin et al., 1997; Fowler and Schmidt, 1987; 
Chatterjee, 1992); whereas some scholars (Anand and Singh, 1997; Cannella and 
Hambrick, 1993; Harrison et al., 1991; Krishnan et al., 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004; 
Morosini et al., 1998) tested acquisition performance through accounting measures, 
such as Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Sales 
(ROS). Technically, these long-term measures can allow an estimation of the post-
acquisition period. However, ―confounding events outside of the acquisition may 
produce significant noise‖ and it may be difficult to distinguish the effect of the 
acquisition (Haleblian et al., 2009, pp. 493).  
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Lastly, some scholars have simply applied managers‘ subjective assessments in order 
to study acquisition performance (Hayward, 2002; Zollo and Meier, 2008; Puranam et 
al., 2006). For instance, Hayward (2002) contacted professionals, who were experts in 
the industries they examine, or investment bankers, and assessed the acquisition 
performance of the sample through survey analysis. Even this method reduced the 
social desirability bias; it may also reduce the objectivity of acquisition performance 
by employing managers‘ subjective opinions.  
 
All in all, it can be seen from the M&A literature that there is no agreement both 
across and within the disciplines on how to measure acquisition performance. Current 
empirical literature on M&A shows that the short-term Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR) around the announcement date of the deal is regarded as the most broadly 
acknowledged measure of the post-acquisition performance, and it is convergent with 
other performance measures (Kale et al., 2002; Haleblian et al., 2009). However, in 
order to increase the effectiveness of acquisition performance measurement and better 
test the broad effect of post-acquisition implications, scholars suggest using various 
methods together, such as stock market and accounting measures.  
 
2.3 Towards a Better Understanding of the Dynamic Capabilities Context 
 
I propose that managing the post-M&A phase successfully requires specific dynamic 
capabilities. This builds on the research on the dynamic capabilities view as scholars 
suggest that through M&A capability firms can successfully reconfigure their existing 
resource bases in response to the changing environment (Winter, 2003; Zollo and 
Singh, 2004; Voss, 2008; Zollo and Winter, 2002). Building on this, organisational 
learning through acquisition experience and the ability to adapt new resources and 
reconfigure them appropriately are not only important success factors for acquisitions 
and important elements of dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1997), but also 
they can be considered as a dynamic capability itself. Based on this consideration, I 
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use dynamic capabilities as the main theoretical framework for this research. In this 
section, I will review the theoretical and conceptual studies on the dynamic 
capabilities view. I will start the review by introducing the foundations of dynamic 
capabilities (Section 2.3.1). This will be followed by the main conceptual definitions 
and sources of confusion regarding the phenomenon (Section 2.3.2). Then, in Section 
2.3.3, I will introduce the conceptual definition of this study. Next, I will discuss the 
role of micro-foundations in shaping the firm‘s M&A capability, which is an 
important element of dynamic capabilities (Section 2.3.4). Lastly, in Section 2.4, I 
will review the studies on dynamic capabilities in the context of M&A that consider 
how they contribute to M&A success.   
 
2.3.1 The Foundations of Dynamic Capabilities  
 
The dynamic capabilities framework was introduced to highlight the importance of an 
organisation‘s internal strategy. The dynamic capabilities context is seen as an 
important factor for the success of firms (e.g. Helfat et al., 2007; Barreto, 2010; 
Teece, 2009). After Teece et al.'s (1997) original contribution to the field, there has 
been an increasing range of research on dynamic capabilities. Despite the increasing 
attention paid by strategy scholars to the concept of dynamic capabilities, however, it 
is generally argued that there are still theoretical and practical problems in 
understanding them (Zehra et al., 2006; Helfat and Winter, 2011; Peteraf et al., 2013). 
Then, the main questions are: what are dynamic capabilities? Where does the dynamic 
capabilities view come from? 
 
 First of all, given the limited understanding of dynamic capabilities, we should 
understand where this view comes from so as to better understand the concept. The 
dynamic capabilities framework draws from many theoretical streams, namely 
behavioural decision theory, organisational theory, transaction cost economics, 
evolutionary economics, and the resource-based view (Teece, 2009).  
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The behavioural theory of a firm considers it a political foundation of organisational 
purpose; a set of anticipations and rules, and bounded assumptions about how the 
interactions between these parameters affect the decision-making process in an 
organisation (Wright, 1984; Cyert and March, 1963). Thus, management plays 
significant role in reflecting the organisational goals, and determining the political 
conceptions of an organisation by diagnosing particular problems. Firms are seen as 
heterogeneous; they have only limited rationality (March and Simon, 1958). 
Organisational and managerial structures differ in terms of their decisions. Managers' 
abilities and experiences shape firms' strategic positions and paths. This is because, 
according to the theory, information is costly and requires appropriate search activity 
from managers. Therefore decision-making in behavioural theory is affected by 
managerial and organisational preconceptions and their response to a problem (Teece, 
2009). The planning of adaptation and the significance of organisation heterogeneity 
are the fundamental additions to the dynamic capabilities view from behavioural 
theory (Winter, 2003). 
 
Secondly, the relationship between dynamic capabilities and transaction cost theory 
arises from the necessity of good governance and the idea of how jobs and tasks 
should be organised (North, 1990). Herein, the firm's performance is impacted by 
production and investment choices, which are directly related to making convenient 
choices with respect to governance. Governance is important, but making appropriate 
choices and using the right assets is the key to a correct business model within this 
theory (Teece, 1982). In terms of relevance to dynamic capabilities, the main 
contribution of transaction cost theory is the importance of the selection process. But 
then Winter (1988, pp.59) contended that, ―to fully develop its capabilities, 
transaction cost economics must be joined with a theory of knowledge and 
production.‖ Therefore researchers began looking elsewhere to improve the theory.  
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In order to develop the foundation of dynamic capabilities, Teece et al. (1997), and 
Winter (2003) specified the importance of evolutionary theory. In evolutionary 
theory, the firm is accepted as a knowledge-creating and learning unit (Kogut and 
Zander, 1993). The development of the firm depends on the efficiency of learning and 
internal knowledge absorptive capacity (Teece, 2009). Penrose (1959) initially 
recognised the firm as an entity endogenously seeking to create itself a productive 
opportunity set. Penrose (1959) also asserted that the ability of managers to look from 
different perspectives and sense opportunities is an important capability of the firm in 
order to acquire new resources and also develop existing ones; this vision can also be 
illustrated with the entrepreneurial mindset (Teece, 2009). She also identified that 
know-how can be used to change physical resources for other purposes. She 
emphasised that the firm‘s resources can be reshaped and that the services extracted 
by these resources are the main elements for a firm‘s specific production processes. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) additionally built on this view and argued that over time 
firms‘ knowledge can be accumulated through a ―learning-by-doing‖ mechanism, 
which is embedded in bundles of routines that are associated with the genetic 
component of the firm (Zollo and Winter, 2002). They described the firm as a 
historical entity which possesses heterogeneous capabilities which are rooted in the 
skills and routines of the firm through repetitively executing productive activities 
(Ethiraj et al., 2005). Thus, history matters and firms can learn from their prior 
experiences in the evolutionary perspective.  
 
More recently, it has become accepted in the literature that the dynamic capabilities 
view is an expansion of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Teece et al., 
1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009). The resource-
based view emphasises the characteristics and resources that make firms different 
from one another and help them to gain a competitive advantage in the market. Even 
in the same industry, firms perform differently in terms of the resources and 
capabilities they possess (Amit and Schoemaker, 1991; Petaraf, 1993). The 
heterogeneity of resources is the underlying assumption in the RBV (Barney, 1991). It 
is vital for resources to be valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) in 
their characteristics in order to gain strategic consequence and sustain the competitive 
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advantage (Lockett and Thompson, 2001). Moreover, the resource-based view pays 
substantial attention to the firm's internal strengths. However, internal development of 
resources can take a long period of time. According to the resource-based view, VRIN 
resources create value by being possessed. However, how future VRIN resources are 
created or how existing valuable resources can be re-organised in changing 
environments is not covered by the RBV. Essentially, creating new resources and 
developing new ones depends on the use of valuable resources. In this respect, RBV 
disregards the importance of the managerial factor for the growth of a firm. In line 
with this argument, Barney and Arikan (2001, pp.174) state that ―resource-based 
theory has a very simple view about how resources are connected to the strategies the 
firm pursues‖. Along with VRIN resources, the skill of top management is a required 
condition for value creation (Castanias and Helfat. 2001).  
 
Moreover, another criticism of the RBV is the unclear treatment of changing 
environments, which makes RBV static in its nature. The rationale is that the 
resource-based view has not sufficiently explained how and why some firms have a 
competitive advantage in the context of rapid and unpredictable change (Teece et al., 
1997). In these conditions, where the competitive landscape is shifting, RBV is 
inadequate for expressing how firms sustain their competitive advantages. With the 
effects of globalisation and a rapidly changing business environment, RBV faces 
difficulties in clarifying how the firm‘s resource base is re-organised and manipulated 
in such conditions (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009). For dynamic capabilities, on the 
other hand, it is important to emphasise the rapidly changing nature of the external 
market of business life. The dynamic capabilities perspective takes the major role of 
the strategic decision-making process, in which firms are required to make decisions 
to shape their major strategic moves in a timely manner, into consideration, especially 
in terms of VRIN resources. (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). Indeed, 
value is created from corporate activities when resources are assessed, operated, and 
organised appropriately within the firm‘s environmental context (Lippman and 
Rumelt, 2003). Therefore, it can be seen from the established literature that the 
dynamic capabilities view can complement the resource-based view, which only 
expresses half of the story, by redefining the role of managerial and environmental 
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factors for value creation. In the next section, some of the key definitions in the 
dynamic capabilities literature will be discussed as a first move to introduce the 
conceptual definition of this study. 
 
2.3.2 Definitions and Some Sources of Confusion  
 
A remarkable number of papers in the management literature concentrate on the 
dynamic capabilities view. Such an impressive scope has resulted in a wealth of 
conceptualisations, but also caused complexity and confusion in the field. More 
recently, Peteraf et al. (2013, pp.1349) made a crucial point regarding the 
understandings of the dynamic capabilities construct that ―the two seminal papers 
(Teece et al., 1997, and Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) represent not only different but 
contradictory understandings of the construct‘s core elements‖. The differences 
between these two ground-breaking and most cited papers have emerged due to their 
dissimilar theoretical approaches, different types of reasoning, and different ultimate 
conclusions (Peteraf et al., 2013).  
 
The stream started with the Teece et al.'s (1997, pp.516) original definition: "dynamic 
capabilities are the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competences to rapidly changing environments.‖ Since this original 
contribution, many researchers offered their own definitions of the dynamic 
capabilities view. Some of the key definitions are presented in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.2: Key definitions of Dynamic capabilities 
Author Definition 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 
(2000, pp.1107) 
Dynamic capabilities are the firm's processes that use resources – specifically the 
processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources – to match or even 
create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are the organisational and strategic 
routines by which firms achieve new resources configurations as markets emerge, 
collide, split, evolve and die. 
Zollo and Winter, (2003, 
pp.340) 
A dynamic capability is a learned and stable pattern of collective activity through 
which the organisation systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in 
pursuit of improved effectiveness. 
Winter, (2003, pp.991) Dynamic capabilities are those that operate to extend, modify or create ordinary 
capabilities. 
Zahra et al., (2006, 
pp.918) 
The abilities to reconfigure a firm's resources and routines in the manner envisioned 
and deemed appropriate by its principal decision makers. 
Helfat et al., (2007, pp.1) The capacity of an organisation to purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource 
base. 
Wang and Ahmed, 
(2007, pp. 35) 
A firm's behavioural orientations constantly to integrate, reconfigure, renew and 
recreate its resources and capabilities and, most importantly, upgrade and reconstruct 
its core capabilities in response to the changing environment to attain and sustain 
competitive advantage. 
Teece, (2007, pp. 1319) Dynamic capabilities can be disaggregated into the capacity 1) to sense and shape 
opportunities and threats, 2) to seize opportunities, and 3) to maintain 
competitiveness through enhancing, combining, protecting, and, when necessary, 
reconfiguring the business enterprise's intangible and tangible assets. 
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Reviewing the literature and the definitions reveals that there are confusions and 
contradictions in the field. These confusions and the proposed components of 
dynamic capabilities will be analysed in terms of their essential characteristics, 
purpose, separation from organisational capabilities, role of environmental context, 
and changeability issues.  
 
As can be seen from Table 2.4, in terms of their essential characteristics, dynamic 
capabilities have been conceptualised as abilities or capacities or patterns, but also 
defined as being routines or processes. In the initial study of the stream, Teece et al. 
(1997) as well as Helfat et al. (2007) and in, an updated study, Teece (2007), espoused 
the term capacities (or abilities) in order to emphasise the main role of the firm's 
strategic management. The word capacity is used to explain not only ―the ability to 
perform a task in at least a minimally acceptable manner‖ but also to emphasise that 
they are ―repeatable and can be reliably executed to at least some extent‖ (Helfat et 
al., 2007, pp. 5). In a similar way, Zahra et al. (2006) defined dynamic capabilities as 
abilities and as routines, not onetime changes, in their nature. It seems that these 
usages define ability or capacity in terms of success. Using these terms may lead to 
some sort of tautology. On the other hand, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) introduced 
dynamic capabilities as processes of the firm that can be distinguishable. For instance 
they pointed out that ―Toyota has used its superior product development skills to 
achieve competitive advantage in the automotive industry‖ (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000, pp.1107). This product development routine for Toyota requires strategic 
decision-making in which managers use their knowledge and practical backgrounds to 
select a strategic move for the firm. Processes refer to the way tasks are performed in 
the firm, and they are the firm's routines of current practices. But it can be said that 
processes are actions which are explicit, and sets of resources which can be 
interchangeable within or between firms (Zahra et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
capabilities address the abilities of the firm, which are unique to it. Thus, dynamic 
capabilities are hidden in their processes; they are not just processes in their nature. 
Therefore, it is critical to differentiate dynamic capability from a one-time specific 
change in an organisation.  
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Next, there are many diverging functions that can be identified with regards to the 
purpose of dynamic capabilities and whether they lead to a gain in competitive 
advantage. Teece et al. (1997) employ the terms ―integrate and build‖ to explain the 
dynamic capabilities‘ task; Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) use the word ―gain‖; Zollo 
and Winter (2002) utilise the terms ―generates and modifies‖. More recently, Helfat et 
al. (2007) adapt the terms ―create, extend, or modify‖ to introduce their concepts. In a 
parallel direction, Wang and Ahmed (2007) use ―renew, recreate‖; Teece (2007) 
employs the word ―enhance‖ to reflect the sense of intention. It can be inferred from 
these terms that dynamic capabilities usually lead to a gain, at least indirectly, in 
competitive advantage, allowing better use of resources. So almost in all cases in the 
literature are associated with success. Helfat et al. (2007), however, have suggested 
that dynamic capabilities do not necessarily lead to gain, and point out that a renewal 
of the resource base may also imply no change in performance, or even failure. Then, 
we cannot separate organisational capabilities from dynamic capabilities, and there is 
no convincing argument to talk about dynamic capabilities. There are some studies in 
the literature which quantitatively associate the types of dynamic capabilities with 
gain in performance. For instance, Arthurs and Busenitz (2006) employed stock price 
performance as a proxy for dynamic capabilities, while McKelvie and Davidsson 
(2009) identified several types of dynamic capabilities that are measured by 
performance.  
 
Another inconsistency arises from different perspectives between organisational and 
dynamic capabilities. In Teece et al. (1997) definition, the affected component that 
matter is the resource base of the firm. In a similar line, Helfat et al. (2007) use the 
'resource base' of an organisation as the component determined by dynamic 
capabilities. According to Helfat et al. (2007, pp.4), the resource base indicates 
"tangible, intangible, and human assets (or resources) as well as capabilities which the 
organisation owns, controls, or has access to on a preferential basis." They consider 
capabilities to be resources, essentially collecting all the elements in a big tent. For 
instance, firms do not own their workers. Firms also have access on a preferential 
basis to various resources and capabilities which they do not own, (e.g. alliances). On 
the other hand, some authors have opted for a two- or more level hierarchy to identify 
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differences between various capabilities. Winter (2003) makes the point that 
capabilities can be divided into two groups, namely ―zero level‖ capabilities which 
emphasise the ordinary capabilities observed in the short term, and ―higher level‖ 
capabilities related to change in the firm's zero level capabilities to make a living in 
the long term. Similarly, Zahra et al. (2006) distinguish ―substantive capabilities‖ 
from other ordinary capabilities to stress the firm's dynamic capabilities. In their 
conception, substantive capabilities serve to solve problems and change other 
capabilities in the firm to improve performance. Furthermore, Wang and Ahmed 
(2007) have asserted that resources and capabilities should be considered in a 
hierarchical order. Therefore, the foundation of the firm is its resources, which are 
called zero level capabilities; whereas capabilities are necessary in a dynamic 
environment to sustain the firm‘s competitive advantage, so capabilities are ―first 
order‖; finally, ―core capabilities‖ are important to integrate resources and capabilities 
for competitive advantage on a strategic level (Wang and Ahmed, 2007). But these 
dichotomies may cause confusion when identifying the higher or lower order. That is 
to say, in earlier studies, researchers have suggested that the resource base comprises 
every internal component of the firm. More recently, researchers have tried to 
distinguish these components into various groups. These later attempts, however, may 
cause further lack of clarity in the literature when it comes to identifying which is 
dynamic capability and which is not.  
 
Another source of confusion in the field stems from the requirement of a dynamic 
environment as part of the concept. In their seminal article, Teece et al. (1997) stress 
the necessity of a rapidly changing environment for the emergence of dynamic 
capabilities. Teece et al. (1997) and Teece (2009) have argued that dynamic 
environments lead to international trade, many entries into the market, systematic 
technological and business changes, and the existence of advanced goods and service 
markets. They have also suggested that it is more convenient to create and develop 
dynamic capabilities in these environments. By contrast, Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) have asserted that dynamic capabilities arise not only in ―high velocity 
markets‖ but can also be observed in ―moderately dynamic environments‖. They 
proposed diverse degrees of dynamic capabilities based on whether a firm exists in a 
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high velocity market or a moderately dynamic environment. From the other point of 
view, Zahra et al. (2006, pp. 6) have said that ―the use of dynamic capabilities is 
greater in dynamic environments, but one should not confound external conditions 
with organisational capability‖. That is, dynamic capabilities can be found in an 
environment with a lower rate of change. Zollo and Winter (2002) have also followed 
Zahra et al.‘s (2006) view and denied the necessity of dynamic or stable 
environments. They argued that even in stable environments changes can occur both 
externally and internally, so there is no need to specify the importance of rapidly 
changing environments for the concept. This lack of clarity in regard to the 
environmental context of dynamic capabilities is also disadvantageous for a better 
understanding and operationalization of the concept.  
 
Another point that needs to be observed in the literature is the changeability issue 
from an evolutionary development perspective. In the initial stream, Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) followed the evolutionary economics perspective and emphasised the 
importance of past mistakes and the role of experience in the learning and 
development process. They also argued that choosing a learning strategy differed 
based on the external environment. For instance, Dougherty and Lindbo (1992) 
examined 18 product development projects in 5 multinationals, including Kodak. 
According to the study, regular client visits and their opinions were important factors 
for successful product development capability. From the other perspective, Zollo and 
Winter (2002) pointed out the significance of more deliberate cognitive approaches 
including knowledge codification (such as written tools) and knowledge articulation 
(discussions) to specify the learning patterns to improve effectiveness. Moreover, 
Zahra et al. (2006) categorised learning mechanisms in terms of firm characteristics 
by defining trial and error; imitation is for new ventures whereas experience is more 
relevant for big firms. Therefore, the existing approaches to explaining learning 
perspectives also make the functionality of dynamic capabilities more difficult to 
understand.   
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2.3.3 Conceptual Definition of Dynamic Capabilities for This Study 
 
The review of the dynamic capabilities literature up to this point allows us to 
emphasise what is within its scope and what is outside it. However, it seems that the 
desire to advance the approach causes further inconsistencies and contradictions in the 
literature. This criticism is the main reason underlying many of the conflicts raised in 
these studies. That is why a theory should include clear links to the constructs or 
variables of interest. Furthermore, without specifying its boundaries, a theory may 
lose its expected outcomes and its accuracy. Most research within the field has not 
paid enough attention to boundary issues, especially in regard to environmental 
settings and the nature of corporate conditions (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). Hence, 
drawing on these conditions, I find the following conceptual definition more inclusive 
for a general understanding of dynamic capabilities.  
 
―A Dynamic Capability is the firm's potential to systematically solve problems, 
formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and 
market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base‖ (Barreto, 2010, pp. 271).  
 
There is no doubt that single phrase cannot include everything, but it can be inclusive 
enough to consider the main constructs of interest in a study. As using the term 
―formed‖ implies, the study considers the link between all four dimensions, which 
also implies that it is an aggregate multidimensional concept. Each dimension has 
some links to other dimensions. For example, the propensity to change the firm‘s 
resource base is appropriate only if there is also a propensity to make decisions. Also, 
the inclination to make decisions is considered only when the firm has the intention to 
identify opportunities and threats, which is also an important element of 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, this concept fits better in a more entrepreneurial 
environment, such as that of emerging markets. Moreover, these changes within a 
firm can achieve great effect only if there is a propensity to make timely and market-
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oriented decisions (Barreto, 2010). This view is also in line with the M&A context, as 
firms seize opportunities or avoid threats as they undertake an acquisition. Then they 
need to make timely and market-oriented decisions in order to reconfigure their 
resource bases and maintain their competitiveness.  
 
The word ―potential‖ here refers to the characteristic of dynamic capability that must 
apply at all times in order to produce the expected effects (Winter, 2003). Firms 
should fulfil their commitments, as well as requiring an adequate management and an 
appropriate organisational structure to achieve superior performance. Without meeting 
these requirements, it is hard for a firm to reflect its high potential and develop the 
most adequate resource base. In my analysis, this can be achievable with an 
acquisition-based ―integration capability‖. Secondly, using the noun ―potential‖ in the 
conceptual framework excludes any sort of capability classification (Barreto, 2010). 
Rather than the existence or nonexistence of capabilities (such as first/second order), 
there can be always high or low potential levels in real business life. Here, the 
intention to use the word ―potential‖ is also coherent with the interest of this research. 
As used here, the word ―potential‖ implies the possibility of achieving higher 
performance or lower performance. It refers to a firm‘s ability to learn from prior 
corporate actions and make appropriate decisions in its future activities.  
 
Reviewing the literature reveals that researchers have tended to define dynamic 
capabilities as an absolute element that leads to success. However, rather than using 
the terms ―modify, increase, extend‖, this study uses the term ―change‖, which 
implies the potential for the firm to do something different rather than staying 
constant. In this study, ―change‖ refers to a change in the resource base of the acquirer 
firm so as to seek improvement of its existing resources. Thus, dynamic capabilities 
often support existing businesses (Helfat and Winter, 2013). Nonetheless, routines by 
themselves are not adequate for a firm to survive in its environment, and 
changeability is therefore a main component of dynamic capabilities that when 
considered from a learning perspective. Moreover, it emphasises the difference 
between organisational and dynamic capabilities. In this concept, only capabilities 
 84 
that promote economically significant change are considered dynamic. This allows 
firms to maintain their competitiveness. 
 
Building on Barreto‘s (2010) definition as well as on studies by Voss (2008), 
Wollersheim et al. (2013), Helfat and Winter (2013), Capron and Anand (2007), and 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), I will use the following definition for the purpose of 
this research on the post-acquisition process: 
 
“M&A capability is a dynamic capability allowing the firm to change its resource 
base appropriately in order to stay competitive in its environment”. 
 
As mentioned in this section, the term ―dynamic capabilities‖ refers to an abstract and 
hard-to-grasp phenomenon. Based on the aforementioned considerations and research, 
I consider M&A capability to be a concept that bundles a variety of tangible 
organisational processes into a collective approach in the post-acquisition phase. 
Every environment can be regarded as dynamic in its own context, especially in the 
global and digital era. Firms should adjust their resource bases appropriately to avoid 
finding themselves in a downward spiral and to stay competitive. 
 
Lastly, as mentioned in the previous section there are inconsistencies in the literature 
regarding the measurement of dynamic capabilities‘ performance. To address this lack 
of clarity, following the suggestions of scholars (Arthurs and Businetz, 2006; 
Mckelvie and Davidsson, 2009; Wollersheim et al., 2013; Barreto, 2010), I will 
attempt to link dynamic capabilities with gain in the post-M&A process. I will focus 
on the M&A capability, and particularly, the integration capability, of firms. Learning 
from prior experiences generally results in reconfiguration of the resource base. 
Wollersheim et al. (2013) has suggested using a process management perspective to 
provide an avenue for measuring dynamic capabilities, and they recommend 
employing firm-level measures such as stock price-based and returning on assets. For 
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instance, through a successful post-M&A process, firms can achieve some degree of 
change in the resource base, which leads to development of M&A capability. Then, 
firms stay competitive in their own environment. This conceptualisation may be able 
to provide a better understanding of the dynamic capabilities context.  
 
2.3.4 Managerial and Organisational Roles in Dynamic Capabilities  
 
Having thus far defined dynamic capabilities at a conceptual level, it is now time to 
stress the special focus of this study and its link to the research. The conceptual 
definition of this study incorporates the search and selection aspects as well as the 
decision-making component of dynamic capabilities. These dimensions underpin the 
importance of the managerial and organisational processes that also enable the 
deployment of dynamic capabilities (Salvato, 2003).  
 
The key role that managers play in their firm‘s potential to adapt to new conditions is 
reflected in many studies (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Salvato, 2003; Helfat et al., 
2007; Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009). The effective layout and utilisation of 
resources owned or controlled by a firm requires appropriate management strategies. 
To quote Helfat et al. (2007, pp.19), ―orchestration directed at achieving new 
combinations and co-alignment of assets is central to the dynamic capabilities 
framework‖ and this orchestration is possible and meaningful only with astute 
decision-making. This puts managers into a central role for dynamic capabilities.   
 
The emphasis on propensity to sense opportunities and threats are in line with Teece's 
(2007; 2009), Helfat et al.'s (2007) studies. In rapidly changing and globally 
competitive environments, opportunities open up for firms. Some recognise these 
opportunities; some do not. Sensing and shaping opportunities is mostly related to 
scanning, searching, and absorbing activities, as well as interpreting this information. 
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Investing in R&D activities is usually a complementary element to these activities. 
According to Teece (2009), opportunities can occur due to two factors. Firstly, firms 
have different styles of accessing and implementing existing information. This 
accessing activity can be seen to arise from either M&A or alliance activity. Secondly, 
acquiring new information and new knowledge might create opportunities for firms in 
developing their existing capabilities. Teece (2007; 2009) also illustrates the 
characteristics of sensing and shaping opportunities through entrepreneurial activities, 
an idea inspired by Schumpeter (1934). Firms should regularly scan, search, and 
explore new markets and technologies in order to sense and shape opportunities. The 
role of opportunity sensing and shaping can originate from the capacities of managers 
or founders, thus being directly related to the micro-foundations of organisations 
(Menguc and Auh, 2006). The ability to recognise an opportunity and manage the 
process suitably requires relevant knowledge, creative activity, and practical wisdom 
from managers (Teece, 2007; Nonaka and Toyama, 2007).  
 
A vast management literature has accepted that the managers have effects on dynamic 
capabilities (Zahra et al., 2006; Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007; Helfat et al., 2007; 
Teece, 2007; 2009; Karim, 2006). Thus, making timely and market-oriented strategic 
decisions plays a vital role for the firm. For instance, decisions in regard to M&A 
activities – which replacements are required to reconfigure the existing resource base 
of the acquirer firm and whether to change or retain the target‘s resources – are the 
main questions to ask during the post-M&A period. These decisions about changing 
the resource base of the combined firms appropriately can be counted as the most 
important components of M&A capability. Decision-making can be observed in 
groups such as the top management team, or sometimes it can be seen in individual 
performance. In this manner, ―dynamic capabilities therefore pertain to both an 
organisational unit (e.g. a firm, a division, other sub-unit, or team) and to an 
individual decision maker within the organisation‖ that implies the role of 
organisational and managerial structure respectively (Helfat et al., 2007, pp.6). Oliver 
and Holzinger (2008) have asserted that the timing of the decisions has an enormously 
important role in gaining and sustaining competitive advantage. For instance, in a 
highly competitive environment it is a distinctive function to quickly search through 
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possibilities in order to make progress and move ahead of competitors, which is surely 
a dynamic capability. Moreover, it is likely that managers will face many potential 
candidates in a dynamic market. To make the right choices managers must assess their 
competitive field, map out the advantages and disadvantages of various options, and 
consider the possible outcomes of each choice so as to achieve an effective result 
(Zahra et al., 2006).  Thus, firms increase their chances to gain and sustain a 
competitive advantage when market-oriented decisions are executed in a timely 
manner. Overall, ―managerial and organisational processes are inextricably linked to 
dynamic capabilities; to understand dynamic capabilities it is essential to understand 
those processes‖ (Helfat et al., 2007, pp. 31). Consequently, the top manager of a firm 
plays an important role in the dynamic capability context, and managerial abilities 
enable firms to stay competitive in their own environment.  
 
2.4 Exploring the Role of M&A in the Dynamic Capabilities Context 
 
Mergers and acquisitions literature creates a central field for researchers to study 
organisational change. Several disciplines have presented the role of change and 
M&A from different perspectives. Although there are many studies on the topics of 
M&A within the management and finance literature, it is hard to say that there is a 
consensus between context and empirical studies (Shimizu et al. 2004; Karim and 
Mitchell, 2000). 
 
A large body of finance and strategic management literature that investigates the 
M&A has concentrated on various issues, such as creating synergy, diversification 
strategy, cultural clashes, acquisition performance, acquisition experience, 
relatedness, cross-border and domestic deals, and efficiency issues. As I discussed in 
Section 2.2, industrial organisation economic theory offers different directions in 
explaining the reason for M&A. Some scholars have proposed strengthening the 
business structure as a main reason, others an acquisition motivation to avoid entry 
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barriers, and some researchers in the field have stated that firms are peforming M&A 
in order to boost their market power. From the other perspective, the behavioural 
scholars have examined the influence of the target firm‘s acquisition on the acquiring 
firm or on the target firm (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Specifically, according to the 
resource dependence perspective, acquisitions make it possible to available to change 
an organisation‘s relationships and its environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Despite the various conceptual differences between scholars, they have all attempted 
to stress the intention to increase the efficiency of on-going operations and to keep 
pace with external changes.  
 
Acquisitions cause a high degree of uncertainty for the acquirer firms, in which they 
need to adapt to previously unidentified resources and unknown procedures from the 
target firm. So, the acquirer firms should seek to learn from the acquisitions in order 
to increase their efficiency, flexibility, and adaptability during times of change 
(Dodgson, 1993). This is the place where dynamic capabilities engage with the M&A 
literature. Researchers have attempted to examine dynamic capabilities from the 
context of M&A from different perspectives. Some scholars have emphasised 
acquisitions as a potential field of use for the dynamic capabilities view without any 
further examination (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). On the other hand, many scholars 
have investigated dynamic capabilities extensively in the acquisition process (Capron 
and Anand, 2007; Meyer and Lieb-Doczy, 2003; Roy and Roy, 2004; Keil, 2004; 
Voss, 2008). Generally, most of the research in the latter group has linked dynamic 
capabilities with acquisition experience (Capron and Anand, 2007; Helfat et al., 2007; 
Roy and Roy, 2004; Voss, 2008).  
 
In the first group of researchers, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), and Helfat and Peteraf 
(2003), have used evolutionary economics and argued that M&A can be considered as 
a possible context of application for dynamic capabilities development. From the 
other perspective, researchers have conceptually analysed M&A in a dynamic 
capabilities context. For instance, a study by Roy and Roy (2004) analysed the post-
merger M&A process of HP and Compaq from the resource base and the dynamic 
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capabilities perspectives. They assessed whether an HP and Compaq merger could 
create value, and suggested that ―dynamic capabilities can be generated or evolve 
through direct experience or from the experience of others through organisational 
learning processes‖ (Roy and Roy, 2004, pp.8). Thus, strategic management scholars 
positioned the organisational learning perspective as a central theoretical element in 
research on dynamic capabilities in the context of M&A (Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
According to Zollo and Winter (2002), with regard to the evolution of dynamic 
capabilities, learning mechanisms are important because dynamic capabilities emerge 
from these processes. Firms gain dynamic capabilities through gradually modifying 
existing capabilities by accumulating tacit knowledge. Then, existing routines can 
change after the adaptation and recombination process (Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
Their understanding of change, however, includes specific learning processes from 
innovation routines, and exhibits particular weaknesses (Wollersheim et al., 2013). 
Considering acquisition capability, for instance, empirical research has shown that 
firms that engaged in M&A with greater frequency had better performance results 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Similarly, Hayward (2002) examined the role of 
acquisition experience and mistakes for superior acquisitions skills. Hayward (2002) 
argued that gaining tacit resources is extremely important for the purpose of M&A. 
This is because, according to the evolutionary perspective, through the routines the 
firm‘s structure includes tacit resources such as knowledge and organisational 
learning. These routines contain a firm‘s standards, procedures, and general meetings 
structure. With well-established routines, organisations reduce the issues of adaptation 
and learning speed, and improve the timing of internal development (March, 1991). 
This coordination and adaptation is the reason for the importance of acquiring tacit 
resources via M&A. In all these studies, the main argument was that organisational 
experiential learning through prior experience led to development of dynamic 
capabilities. They, however, mostly considered intangible resources, which are hard to 
capture and measure, for distinct resource acquisition.  
 
Apart from the organisational learning perspective, researchers have turned their 
attention to exploring how firms reconfigure their resources to sustain their 
competitive advantage in a dynamic environment (Zollo and Singh, 2000; Capron et 
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al. 1998). They have argued that prior acquisition experience may not be the only 
factor for developing specific kinds of capabilities and achieving successful 
acquisition outcomes. Taking account of the notion that resources are created from 
several mixtures of routines, M&A can be considered as a path that leads to change in 
the combined firm. Firms may open doors to new opportunities by earning resources 
through an acquisition (Karim and Mithcell, 2000). Thus, firms that participate in 
M&A activities can retain or exploit and extend their existing resources (Cloodt et al., 
2006). The combination of resources effectively leads to performance enhancement. 
 
An effective integration of the combined firms emphasises the vital role of the top 
management for successful outcomes (Zollo and Singh, 2000). In this case, 
managerial skills play an important role. Integration capabilities can support acquirer 
firms by leaving existing established routines and reconfiguring newly acquired 
resources to stay competitive (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002; 
Capron and Anand, 2007). Then, the firms are able to adapt to change, combine 
heterogeneous resources, and manage the post-acquisition phase to better cope with 
complexity. Therefore, integration capabilities drive the successful post-acquisition 
management process by facilitating timely and market-oriented decisions about 
resource replacements, and this can lead to improved performance.  
 
There are also studies that have examined the roles of organisational learning and 
resource reconfiguration together. Recently, in an in-depth case based study, Voss 
(2008) emphasised the role of acquisitions on M&A capability evolution and 
highlighted the top management‘s role in coordinating dynamic capability evolution. 
In order to build dynamic acquisition capabilities and reconfigure the resource base 
efficiently, firms should coordinate, learn, sense, and adapt acquisitions successfully 
(Voss, 2008). It has been suggested that coordination is a key process in 
organisational strategy and requires task delegation (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998), 
resource allocation (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991), and resource synchronisation 
within top management. Repetitive acquisition activities result in prior acquisition 
experience development due to the on-going learning processes, which enables better 
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reconfiguration process implementation (Teece and Pisano, 1997). Voss‘s (2008) last 
two dimensions, which are sensing and adapting, emphasise the role of the pre-
acquisition period for making decisions on acquisition activity and selecting a suitable 
target. In a similar vein, Capron and Anand (2007) attempted to explore M&A from 
the dynamic capabilities perspective. They offered the term ―acquisition-based 
dynamic capabilities‖, and provided a long-term empirical study in order to explore 
how firms see M&A in terms of obtaining new resources. In their analysis they 
divided acquisition based dynamic capabilities into three main components, namely 
acquisition selection, identification, and reconfiguration abilities. The selection 
process was defined as the firm's ability to recognise convenient opportunities, 
whereas acquisition identification capability referred to the detection and negotiation 
process with selected targets (Helfat et al., 2007). Lastly, reconfiguration capability 
was defined as the firm's potential to adjust firm resources, which included 
transferring resources from the target to change existing resources or create new ones. 
In this hierarchical system, Capron and Anand (2007) focused on the first two 
capabilities, namely selection and identification capabilities, in order to examine 
acquisition performance in terms of domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
perspectives.  
 
As we have seen in this section about dynamic capabilities, organisational learning 
through acquisition experience and reconfiguration of combined resources 
appropriately are not only important success factors for acquisitions (Teece and 
Pisano, 1997), but can also be considered as dynamic capabilities in themselves. With 
the help of appropriate post-M&A processes, firms can reconfigure their resource 
bases and develop their M&A capabilities. 
 
Over time, attempts to study M&A as a means of change have been increasing in the 
finance and strategic management literatures. Reviewing the above literature reveals 
that experience and integration matter in corporate development activities. But how 
much they matter will depend upon the particular environment of the activity (Peteraf 
et al., 2013). In general, the dynamic capability context has been examined by 
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scholars conceptually in the developed world context. Therefore, examining the 
phenomenon empirically in another environmental context might be a supporting 
approach to help better capture the concept. In addition, many studies in the strategic 
management literature that attempted to analyse dynamic capabilities in an acquisition 
context have opted qualitative approaches (Roy and Roy, 2004; Keil, 2004; Meyer 
and Lieb-Doczy, 2003; Voss, 2008). Therefore, quantitative analysis of the dynamic 
capability concept within an M&A context would be important research to undertake. 
Equally, given the high level of failure rates in M&A, analysing dynamic capabilities 
that might explain the performance variance in M&A would also be a fruitful research 
topic. 
 
2.5 What is Really Different about Emerging Market Context?  
 
During the last decade emerging markets have become an increasingly hot topic in the 
world economy. Emerging markets, also known as developing countries, are the 
countries that are progressing toward becoming politically and economically 
advanced. Emerging markets, especially from Asia, Latin America and Eastern 
Europe, are producing some of the strongest growth and revenue for the world 
economy. Growth in the emerging markets has picked up, and these markets serve as 
the world economy‘s engine, rewarding firms with strong businesses both in their 
home country and globally. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
emerging markets generate 40% of global GDP, up from 18% two decades ago. These 
powerful markets have grown much faster than the developed world markets in the 
past half-century. According to Kose and Prasad (2011), in comparison with the 
developed world growth of 300%, the economies of a group of the most prominent 
emerging markets have grown by 600% since 1960. It is expected that the emerging 
markets will grow three times faster than developed world economies and reach 65% 
of global economic growth by 2020. Thus, the rise of the emerging markets has 
transformed the world economy and this has been perhaps the defining characteristic 
of the global economy in this century.  
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The emerging market context creates opportunities for businesses and business 
scholars alike (Xu and Meyer, 2013). The growing appeal of emerging markets has 
attracted scholarly interest, and this is reflected in the rise of research on the topic by 
strategic management scholars. However, current research of this phenomenon still 
lacks focus and a joint theoretical base, and thus provides inconclusive outcomes.  
 
I will start this section by presenting some classifications of emerging market 
countries suggested in the literature. The classification will be followed by 
highlighting some unique features of emerging market firms. Then, by focusing on 
various theoretical perspectives I will discuss the relevant strategies within emerging 
market studies. Finally, in the context of the internationalisation process, I will 
introduce the existing literature on emerging market acquirers. 
 
2.5.1 Categorisation of Emerging Market Countries  
 
There are different categorisations for emerging market countries. But before 
providing some of them, it is important to define what an emerging market is. The 
term ―emerging markets‖ was brought into fashion by economists at the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1981. Since then, many scholars, institutions, and media 
have offered various definitions of emerging markets. For instance, the IMF defines 
emerging markets as ―the capital markets of developing countries that have liberalised 
their financial systems to promote capital flows with non-residents and are broadly 
accessible to foreign investors‖ (IMF, 2013). Different scholars and institutions have 
focused on different aspects of emerging markets in their definitions, and there is no 
commonly accepted one. In their book, Khanna and Palepu (2010) suggested three 
factors that distinguish emerging markets from developed world economies. Their 
growth potential is the first. Growth rates in emerging markets have usually outpaced 
developed world economies. Secondly, low capital market capitalisations relative to 
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GDP are common in many emerging market economies. Lastly, in terms of poverty, 
these markets can be characterised as low- or middle-income economies. In short, 
emerging markets are still ―emerging‖ because they have not ―emerged‖ yet (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2010).  
 
Emerging market countries are not homogenous, and they are not all in the same 
geographic region. Equally, emerging market countries have different levels of 
progress in their economic and institutional development. It is hard to list a standard 
categorisation for emerging market countries. These differences may create problems 
not only in attempts to categorise emerging market countries according to their 
characteristics, but also in attempts to compare developed and emerging market world 
contexts. 
 
Of the 64 emerging markets determined by Hoskisson et al. (2000), 51 of them were 
rapidly developing countries, whereas the remaining 13 countries were from transition 
markets. The most recognised grouping that refers to big four emerging market 
countries is the ―BRIC‖ acronym. Jim O‘Neill (2001), former chairman of Goldman 
Sachs Asset Management, developed the concept of ―BRIC‖, and the term is 
primarily used in the financial and economic environment. Later, he coined the term 
―MIST‖, which refers to Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey. These ―MIST‖ 
countries were recognised as the most likely candidates to join the ―BRIC‖ countries 
list. More recently, Hoskisson et al. (2013) offered a typology for emerging market 
countries in order to place them into groups according to their institutional and 
economic characteristics. By doing so, they intended to promote the notion that, like 
developed world countries, emerging market countries are not homogenous. 
According to their typology, the first group includes countries with low institutional 
development, and low infrastructure and factor development, such as the Philippines 
and Bangladesh. The second group consists of countries with low institutional 
development, and high infrastructure and factor development, such as Turkey, Russia, 
and Thailand; whereas the third group comprises countries with high institutional 
development and low infrastructure and factor development, such as Argentina, 
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Mexico, and Peru. These second- and third-group countries are named ―mid-range 
economies‖ and considered hybrid cases between developed and emerging market 
countries (Hoskisson et al., 2013). In the final group, the authors place countries with 
high institutional development, and high infrastructure and factor development, such 
as China, Chile, and Malaysia.  
 
2.5.2 Characteristics of Emerging Market Firms  
 
Compared to their developed world counterparts, emerging market firms have certain 
distinctive features. These characteristics of emerging market firms imply that some 
of the assumptions made by current theories are less appropriate to the emerging 
market context. Firstly, many big firms in emerging markets are highly diversified in 
terms of their activities in several industries (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). For instance, 
the Economist emphasised the notion of highly diversified emerging market firms by 
examining India‘s Tata group, which is active in everything from cars to chemicals 
and from hotels to steel (Economist, 2011). The analysis also shows that these firms 
are the most common business form in the emerging market environment, and that 
this practice is a distinctive characteristic of emerging market firms. For example, in 
Turkey about half of the firms in the Istanbul Stock Exchange belong to wider 
entities, and these firms operate more than 3-4 different industries (ISE report, 2010). 
They are not just conglomerates, but also large and medium firms as well. In 
particular, many large firms in most emerging market countries are members of 
―business groups‖ (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). These business groups in emerging 
market countries are typically controlled by founding families. I will provide more 
information about business groups in the next chapter.  
 
Secondly, it has long been recognised in the literature that families usually keep their 
ownership and control the emerging market firms (Colpan and Hikino, 2010). These 
firms are often managed with a pyramidal structure, wherein a founding family holds 
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a majority stake in the firm and controls a cluster of subsidiaries through a chain of 
equity ties (Colpan et al., 2010). For instance, in their study Mellahi et al., (2013) 
characterise Turkish firms‘ management structure as centralised, with reliance on 
short-term planning and very strong leadership combined with limited delegation.   
 
Thirdly, there is a transparency problem in emerging markets, and these markets are 
thus less efficient (Xu and Meyer, 2012). The lack of transparency arises due a feature 
of firms, and especially of business groups, in which a family usually controls 
multiple business entities and their more complex organisational structures (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2000). As a result of inadequate transparency in these business groups, 
they move funds across business units within the group, regularly without satisfactory 
disclosure. Such transfers to related business units and the connected lack of 
accountability can be a source of inefficiency (Hoskisson et al., 2000).  
 
Fourthly, studies have emphasised that network-based behaviours are common, and 
political relations are an important factor for emerging market business groups. 
Palepu and Khanna (2010) have argued that in transactional arenas in emerging 
markets, buyers and sellers are not easily or efficiently able to come together, which 
further leads to institutional voids. ―Good connections with powerful political actors 
and institutions constitute a critical element of business success in emerging markets‖ 
(Sun et al., 2010, pp. 1161). Thus, scholars and practitioners have suggested that 
network-based activities and relational ties in emerging markets are common 
behaviours, used to create value (Batjargal, 2003; Li et al., 2008; Peng, 2004; Peng 
and Luo, 2000). These relational perspectives emphasise the social aspects of inter-
firm connections in ineffective emerging market countries. Relationship-specific 
investments enable the construction of relational capabilities, thus enhancing 
performance (Luo et al., 2009). Scholars have also argued that the dimensions of these 
political relations may vary depending on the political structure within a specific 
country (Sun et al., 2012).  
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Fifthly, there is high risk and uncertainty in emerging market countries. This fact 
comes from the characteristic macroeconomic and political volatility of emerging 
markets (Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2009). They also experience economic crises 
more frequently than developed world economies (Arrelano, 2008). Thus, it is tough 
for firms to predict the factors they need for strategic decisions, for instance political 
conditions, the outcome of legal proceedings, exchange rates, and economic 
conditions (Guillen, 2000). Thus, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) that aim to invest 
in emerging market countries should consider the political, regulatory, and cultural 
conditions of emerging markets.  
 
Lastly, emerging market firms have advantages in lowering costs of labour and 
manufacturing facilities, and benefit from high economies of scale from serving a 
large domestic market (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). 
 
2.5.3 Strategies in the Emerging Market Context  
 
Researchers have mostly been interested in the case of China in their studies. Half of 
the emerging market studies published in top journals have covered China; this stream 
was followed by studies that focused on other Asian countries (e.g. Peng et al., 2001; 
Chang et al., 2009; Richardson et al., 2012), Central and Eastern European countries 
(e.g. Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Demirbag et al., 2007; Bertrand and 
Betschinger, 2011; Ozcan and Turunc, 2003), Middle Eastern countries (e.g. Mellahi 
et al., 2011), and African countries (eg., Klein and Wocke, 2007). Studies that focused 
on the emerging market context examined these countries from various theoretical 
perspectives.  
 
Firstly, a number of studies examined emerging market countries from agency theory 
perspectives. Agency theory researchers generally focus on investigating subjects of 
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corporate governance, especially in terms of the influence of ownership types and 
board structures on organisational strategies and firm performance (Hoskisson et al., 
2000). For instance, in China, the main shareholders of the listed firms are state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) or the state itself (Le and O‘Brien, 2010), whereas in other 
emerging market countries the main organisational structure is family-owned 
businesses. These ownership structures influence firms‘ corporate development 
strategies and their subsequent performance (Kim et al., 2008). 
 
Secondly, some work in the emerging market literature has taken account of the 
transaction cost economics perspective. It states that the transaction costs of markets 
are high and hierarchical control forms boost efficiency (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
Therefore, transaction cost theory-based studies examined the rational control choice 
between the transactions costs associated with the market mode and the control costs 
of hierarchy. These studies ranged from market entry modes to the effectiveness of 
controls and other governance modes (Luo, 2007). For instance, Peng and Heath 
(1996) contended that the growth of emerging market firms‘ through internal 
development or with the help of M&A is challenging due to lack of property rights 
and an unstable political environment, which leads to high transaction costs.  
 
Thirdly, emerging market scholars have addressed the resource-based view in their 
studies. The resource-based theory provides firms with a basis to explore valuable 
resources in order to sustain their competitive advantage (Penrose, 1959). In line with 
the theory, scholars have usually examined MNEs operating in emerging market 
countries, and analysed how resource advantages affect a firm‘s cross-border strategy 
(Xu and Meyer, 2012). Firms that are able to manage their resources and capabilities 
can benefit from a competitive advantage in emerging markets. However, it is argued 
that gaining these advantages is complex and difficult for MNEs operating in 
emerging market countries. Local competitors may have already developed their 
relational capabilities, which also mean that these MNEs need to establish a good 
relationship with home governments in the emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 
1999). Relational capabilities give firms some institutional advantages, such as 
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accessing licenses, winning tenders, and gaining tax exemptions. These relational 
capabilities count as a substitute for the lack of institutional infrastructure (Hoskisson 
et al., 2000). More recently, some papers have identified specific types of relational 
capabilities that boost performance, such as managerial political networking (Li and 
Zhang, 2007) and ties with service intermediaries (Zhang and Li, 2010). On the other 
hand, some scholars have considered the resource-based view in the context of MNEs 
from emerging economies operating in foreign countries. In line with this, some 
scholars (Gubbi et al., 2010; Lu et al., 2010) have analysed how M&A enable 
emerging market firms to acquire complementary resources abroad in order to 
overcome their competitive advantage.  
 
Fourthly, some scholars have emphasised the role of learning perspectives for 
emerging market firms during the internalisation process. The main question 
considers the resource transfer between units of firms and the learning processes after 
the internalization process of emerging market firms. Moreover, scholars have 
examined in which emerging market firms learn from their networks and prior 
experience (Yiu et al., 2007). Adaptive capacity (Lu et al., 2010) and prior 
experiences (Yiu et al, 2007) influence the effectiveness of resource transfers for 
emerging market firms. The central research themes in these studies are the 
antecedents of firms and prior experience, learning processes, and governance 
structures. However, the impact of and interaction between antecedents, processes, 
and structures are likely to be determined by the context of the country in which a 
firm is operating (Xu and Meyer, 2012). Thus, examining these learning issues in the 
context of an emerging market country provides an interesting research topic (Xu and 
Meyer, 2012).  
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2.5.4 M&A Activities from Emerging Market Firms 
 
Companies from emerging markets are employing M&A as their core growth strategy 
(Kumar, 2009; Khanna and Palepu, 2010). In particular, strategic management 
scholars have employed acquisition activities while explaining the internalisation 
processes of emerging market firms. Many emerging market multinational enterprises 
(EMMEs) use mergers or acquisitions activity in their expansions overseas. There has 
been a rapid growth in the use of cross-border mergers and acquisitions by emerging 
market firms and the total number of cross-border acquisitions has gradually grown 
from about 4% in 1987 to 20% in 2008 (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). Some studies 
have found that many of the cross-border acquisitions by emerging market firms did 
not meet the expected outcome and did not create value. On the other hand, others 
have found that cross-border mergers and acquisitions create significant value for 
emerging market acquirers when the target is from the developed world.  
 
Strategic management scholars have investigated emerging market firms‘ use of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions, how these firms manage the post-integration 
period, and how they capture synergies. Unlike in the developed world, where M&A 
is used to lower costs or direct growth, emerging market companies use M&A, 
especially cross-border M&A, for more strategic purposes, such as acquiring new 
technologies, brands, and growing in the long term (Kumar, 2009; Ghemawat and 
Hout, 2008). For instance, the Indian company Hindalco took over the developed 
market firm Novelis in order to acquire complementary competencies and develop 
their innovation capabilities (Kumar, 2009). When it acquired Godiva, the Turkish 
company Ulker sought capability development for its existing businesses, and to 
complement their existing strengths of large-volume production rather than just 
buying the company and creating value. In a traditional approach for developed world 
cases, after each M&A, top management attempts to identify synergies between 
resources, and reduce the head count in order to reduce the costs and increase 
margins. However, in the case of emerging market firms, the main aim behind cross-
border M&A is to gain complementary resources when acquiring developed world 
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firms (Kumar, 2009). These firms seek to learn to deploy the resources and 
capabilities of the target firm. They can generate post-acquisition performance 
increases through changing to the low-cost resources and business processes in their 
home country (Kumar, Steenkamp, 2013). Also, emerging market firms use cross-
border acquisitions to access distribution channels and to secure the supply chains of 
the acquired firm (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). 
 
At the initial stages, the post-acquisition integration process is slow. In many cases, 
the emerging market acquirer firm retains the brand of the target firm (Kumar and 
Steenkamp, 2013). If the acquired brand is strong and it has own brand image, and if 
it reaches a variety of customer segments, then the emerging market acquirer firm 
retains the acquired brand. Most developed world multinational acquirers, like Cisco, 
Unilever and Microsoft, seek to rapidly integrate the target firm in order to quickly 
realise synergies (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). By contrast, emerging market 
multinationals take a different approach than developed world multinationals by 
keeping the target firm structurally separate, and tend to integrate the target firm 
slowly (e.g. Ulker‘s acquisition of Godiva and Tata Tea‘s acquisition of Tetley). Two 
benefits may arise from this approach: better understanding of the capabilities of the 
target firm and a sense of comfort for the target firm‘s employees (Chattopadhyay et 
al., 2012). 
 
Successful post-acquisition management requires the efficient combination of 
complementary resources of the acquirer and the target firms. When emerging market 
multinationals acquire overseas firms, they keep the top management team as well as 
the employees of the target firm (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013; Chattopadhyay et al., 
2012; Kumar, 2009). For instance, Hindalco kept all the top executives after the 
acquisition of Novelis (Kumar, 2009), Tata Motors did not ―Indianise‖ Daewoo‘s top 
management after their acquisition (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012), and Ulker kept 
Godiva‘s top management, its headquarters and its brand name after the acquisition. 
These emerging market acquirers possessed vital industry brands and business know-
how necessary for successful integrations. However, replacing these resources in the 
 102 
foreign market may cause disagreement with major customers, suppliers, and other 
stakeholders (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). This is because the pre-existing 
management team has already set up their network and external relationships with 
their stakeholders in order to establish and develop the firm‘s competitiveness in the 
market. One of the reasons for retaining top management can be explained from the 
agency perspective, i.e. because emerging market countries‘ firms generally lack 
managerial skills. Moreover, from the cultural perspective they may not be familiar 
with a multicultural organisational structure, which might be a problem for an 
emerging market firm‘s management team, especially when the culture of the target 
firm differs greatly from the acquirer firms. Given this, the dynamic capabilities view 
of the firm suggests that in order to stay competitive across the border, these firms 
would prefer to employ the target‘s resources to effectively benefit from the 
environment where they operate. In this respect, firms from emerging market areas, 
such as China, Russia, Turkey, and Brazil, should seek to lower the language barrier 
and create a more multicultural corporation when they acquire firms from outside 
their home country (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013). The decision to take cross-border 
M&A may look good on paper, but it risks failing because of these cultural clashes.  
 
To sum up, these issues between developed and emerging market firms have led to a 
new academic interest ―in better understanding how managing in developing countries 
challenges existing ideas given the particularities of these countries‖ (Cuerva-Cazurra, 
2012, pp.154). The first group of authors argue that these emerging market firms 
behave differently and require new theories to explain their management strategies 
and their behaviours (Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2009). According to a second group, 
there is no difference between developed world firms and developing world firms, and 
emerging market firms‘ behaviours can easily be explained with existing management 
theories (Rugman, 2010). A third approach contends that studying emerging market 
companies can help extend existing views and theories. Given that undertaking an 
acquisition is a complex issue and faces different challenges in the emerging market 
context, I will pay attention to examining how M&A capability evolves in an 
emerging market. My aim is to extend the dynamic capabilities view and the M&A 
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literature by empirically examining the post-acquisition performance variations of 
emerging market firms. 
 
2.6 Summary  
 
Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to review the theoretical and empirical 
studies on the contexts of M&A, dynamic capabilities, and emerging market. These 
three contexts are the main elements of my research subject. It can be seen from the 
discussions that there is mixed evidence about whether acquisition experiences lead to 
superior acquisition performance. Examining the phenomenon in an unexplored 
research setting might result in fruitful research and a better understanding of the role 
of acquisition experience in organisational learning. Furthermore, the above 
discussion showed that many acquisition failures can be attributed to the lack of 
required acquisition capability with regards to post-M&A strategies. It is therefore 
very important to analyse post-acquisition integration decisions to understand the 
performance implications.  
 
In the next chapter, I will introduce the environmental setting of this study. First, I 
will present the overall profile and recent evolution of the Turkish economy. Then, I 
will present the corporate environment in Turkey, addressing in particular the role of 
business groups. Lastly, in an attempt to enrich the understanding of emerging market 
acquirers‘ M&A strategies, I will deal with the analysis of Turkish acquisitions.   
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3.1 Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I study Turkey as a particular case among emerging market countries. In 
this chapter, I will present the overall economic and corporate picture of Turkey. 
There is a growing literature on emerging markets‘ economic backgrounds which 
largely focuses on the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) economies. As an 
unexplored yet captivating national case, Turkey presents a fresh look at the 
development of the emerging market context. Therefore, I will give the key features 
of the general economic outlook, corporate governance system and M&A activities in 
Turkey. Firstly, I will briefly give some selected facts about Turkey‘s economy during 
the last decade as well as examine its stock market development (Section 3.2). In the 
following section (Section 3.3), I will give a brief review of the corporate governance 
landscape in Turkey. Then, I will discuss the main characteristics of acquisitions in 
Turkey over the study period, in which I will assemble available evidence on the post-
acquisition strategies of these business groups in both domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions, and discuss the major factors driving the process with the examples from 
this study‘s dataset (Section 3.4).  
 
3.2 A Brief Review of the Turkish Economy 
GDP Growth  
The Turkish economy faced its most disastrous financial crisis in the beginning of 
2000s. The political conflict had a destructive and devastating impact upon it. Then 
the Turkish economy started to recover, and it has shown a successful trend over the 
last decade, whilst European economies and the US struggled to achieve continuous 
GDP growth. During the last decade, Turkey‗s emerging market economy grew 
rapidly, and it underwent a dynamic expansion of the private sector (Gonenc and 
Rawdanowicz, 2010). According to the World Bank Group, Figure 3.1 shows that the 
GDP in Turkey was worth $196 billion in 2001, following the 2001 financial crisis. 
Afterwards, Turkey‘s GDP increased continuously until the 2009 global financial 
 106 
crisis hit Turkey. Turkey‘s GDP decreased by about 5%, in sharp contrast to the 
average 6% annual growth rate during the 2004-08 period (Figure 3.1).  Following the 
2009 global financial crisis, thanks to Turkey‘s well-regulated financial markets and 
banking system, GDP rebounded strongly to a 9.2% annual growth rate in 2010 
followed by an 8.8% increase in 2011, which was above the average of emerging 
market countries‘ GDP annual growth rates (World Bank, 2013). According to the 
OECD report, that the Turkish economy grew with an average annual GDP growth 
rate of 5% throughout the last decade (Ispat, 2012), as shown by Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.1: Turkey Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2002-13 
 
Source: tradingeconomics.com website / World Bank Group 
 
Substantial recent developments have caused Turkey to be considered an important 
emerging market country on the global economic scale. According to 2012 economic 
figures (OECD, 2013), Turkey‘s GDP reached to $786 billion, making Turkey the 
16th largest economy in the world. In addition, it was the 6th largest European 
economy in 2012.  
 
This is what led Jim O‘Neill, the aforementioned former chairman of Goldman Sachs 
Asset Management who coined the abbreviation ―BRIC‖ to indicate the big emerging 
economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China, to include Turkey in his ―MIST‖ 
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acronym alongside Mexico, Indonesia and South Korea as a second row of big 
growing economies, 
 
Figure 3.2: Average Annual Real GDP Growth (%) 2002-12 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat and national sources in ‗invest.gov.tr‘  
 
Sector Breakdown 
In terms of sector breakdown, the Turkish economy is characterised as having a 
strong manufacturing sector, but this particular sector is not as strong as those which 
exist in countries such as China and Germany. During the last decade, however, 
Turkey has experienced a slight shift from an industrial to a service economy; this 
increasing contribution of the service industry can also be observed in BRIC 
economies (Ararat et al., 2011). According to World Bank data (2013), most of 
Turkey‘s GDP comes from services (corresponding to the International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) divisions 50-99) with 61.7%; whereas industry 
(corresponding to ISIC divisions 50-99, including manufacturing) was 29.3% for 
2012 (Figure 3.3). Agricultural production, in turn, decreased to 9% in the economic 
portfolio. Rather than developing technology, growth in Turkey has been driven 
largely by the manufacturing and heavy industrial sectors (Ernst & Young Turkey 
Attractiveness Survey, 2013).  
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Figure 3.3: Turkey GDP – Composition by Sector  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
Trade Liberalisation 
Importantly, the Turkish economy took a significant step towards economic 
liberalisation in January 1980 when it announced a radical policy package. These 
fundamental policies helped Turkey to create a more export-oriented economy and 
made the country competitive within world markets (Ozmucur, 2007). During the 
post-1980 period, Turkey made long-lasting changes in the fundamental structure of 
its economy (Ozcan and Turunc, 2011). For instance, liberalisation policies helped the 
Turkish economy to decrease its inflation rate from over 100% in 1980 to just below 
30% in 1983. Furthermore, the programme was successful in attaining a more 
outward-oriented and market-based economic system (Ozcan and Turunc, 2011). 
Improvements to the country‘s import licensing system during the early 1990s, and 
supplementary agreements with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994, have 
made salient contributions to the country‘s trade liberalisation process (Kar et al., 
2008). In an empirical study, Kar et al. (2008) tested the impact of trade liberalisation 
and financial development on Turkish economic growth and found that trade 
liberalisation and financial development positively contributes to economic growth in 
Turkey for the period 1963-2005.   
 
 
Services, 
etc., $487 
billion 
Industry, 
$231 billion 
Agriculture, $71 
billion 
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Stock Market Background 
Stock markets are the main elements of financial systems, enabling firms to raise 
capital and implement organisational actions and changes at a fraction of the cost 
(Solakoglu and Orhan, 2007). Therefore, the stock market plays a pivotal role in the 
growth of the economy and is an important foundation for firms to raise capital for 
future investments (Levine, 1991). Also, according to Levine and Zervos (1996), there 
is a positive relationship between stock market development and economic growth. 
One of the most noteworthy reforms in Turkey was the emergence of the Borsa 
Istanbul (BIST) (formerly Istanbul Stock Exchange) in 1986. BIST has grown rapidly 
in parallel with the economic recovery from 2001 crisis (Bayar et al., 2014). Figures 
for the Turkish stock market show that the number of publicly traded firms in BIST 
increased to 417 in 2013 from 20 in 1986 (BIST, 2013). Additionally, the market 
capitalisation in BIST increased to $322 billion in 2013 from $24 billion in 1986 
(BIST, 2013). Total market capitalisation of listed firms on the BIST represented 26% 
of GDP at the end of 2011 (OECD, 2013). In a study that examined the role of capital 
market in Turkey, Bayar et al. (2014) found that there was a positive relationship 
between stock market development and economic growth in Turkey. Therefore, 
policies for advancing the BIST will also contribute to the economic development of 
Turkish economy.  
 
Despite its relative success, the Turkish stock market displays the characteristic of an 
infant market, as this is also a case in many emerging market economies. The role of 
stock markets in capital allocation is rather limited, publicly traded firms‘ shares 
represent a relatively small portion of the industrial base, there is a weak geographical 
penetration, and primary and secondary markets lack institutional investors in Turkey 
(Gonenc and Aybar, 2006). Many firms in Turkish stock market exhibit highly 
concentrated ownership structure, as the majority of the larger firms operate in the 
form of business groups and these groups generally owns a bank, which enable them 
or their affiliated firms to reach necessary capital through these linkages. Therefore, 
―an active market for corporate control or monitoring shares does not exist given the 
limited openness and concentrated ownership of traded companies‖ (Ozcan and 
Cokgezen, 2003, pp. 2066). The adaptation of EU-related economic reforms has been 
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continuing in Turkey and EU membership will contribute to corporate environment 
and supports Turkey‘s economic development process. Regarding these issues, the 
Turkish stock market provides opportunities and is interesting to analyse. 
 
Other Indicators  
The size of the population of Turkey was close to 75 million in 2012, and is projected 
to reach 84 million by 2025. Unlike other countries in the Europe region, Turkey has 
a young population; the proportion of the population under the age of 24 is 44%, 
which might be a important contributor to the economic growth (Ararat et al., 2011). 
However, in a special report on Turkey, the Economist emphasised that 
unemployment in Turkey is distressingly high, especially among the young and 
women (The Economist, 2010). According to the Turkish Statistical Institute 
(TUIK)‘s data, the unemployment rate, a key indicator of sustainability in economic 
growth, has averaged around 10.5% during the last decade (TUIK, 2013).  
 
Although today‘s inflation rate of 9% is a problem for the Turkish economy, Turkey 
is experiencing the lowest inflation rate in 41 years. For many years, Turks had to 
struggle with two and even three-digit inflation rates, peaking at 138% in 1980, 
followed by 130% in 1995. On the other hand, according to the Economist, the 
current-account deficit is more worrying and a source of vulnerability (The 
Economist, 2013; Ararat et al., 2011). The 2011 figure for the deficit in Turkey was 
$77.2 billion, whereas the deficit narrowed to $49.5 billion in 2012, but surged back 
to $65 billion in 2013. (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 2013).  Turkey has 
been facing ups and downs with its account deficit due to dependence on short-term 
foreign capital inflows (The Economist, 2013).  
 
In short, Turkey is a functioning market economy and ―Turkey matters today in a way 
that few would have thought possible a decade ago‖ (The Economist, 2010). In 
addition, the EU accession process still remains a vital anchor for the Turkish 
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economy, which expectedly contributes to the economy by developing corporate 
standards and increasing export opportunities (Ararat and Suel, 2014). According to 
Ali Babacan, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, optimism for economic development 
is high due to the growth in the European Union, since the EU is Turkey‘s primary 
partner for the exports (Hurriyet Daily News, 2012). In order for Turkey to 
successfully complete negotiations with the EU and to gain full membership, Turkey 
has to conclude 35 chapters. Since 2005, Turkey has started negotiations with the EU 
on 13 policy chapters, but none have been opened in the past four years due to 
disagreements on political issues, such as Cyprus, and blockages by France and 
Germany.  
 
3.3 Corporate Governance in Turkey  
 
The legal tradition in Turkey originates from French civil law, and the corporate 
governance standards rest primarily upon codified laws and their enforcement 
(OECD, 2013). The Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMBT) is the main financial 
regulatory and supervisory agency of Turkey. From the Turkish Republic‘s 
establishment until relatively recently, the state played a dominant role in Turkey‘s 
economic development by acting as a significant producer or by subsidising private 
enterprises (OECD, 2006). Beginning in the 1980s, a trend toward liberalisation 
programmes started to expose Turkish firms to global competition, while some of 
them attracted foreign investment into the country. As mentioned in the previous 
section, following the establishment of a liberalisation framework in 1980, the stock 
exchange of Turkey opened in 1985 and activated in 1986.  
 
Economic conditions were difficult for publicly held companies until the Turkish 
stock exchange opened, but the situation has changed dramatically in the last decade. 
Inflation usually exceeded 60% each year, and there were high levels of government 
borrowing, these issues also increased the high nominal corporate tax rates and de-
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capitalised the companies. It was suggested by the OECD (2006, 2013) reports that an 
era of macro-economic instability occurred as the lack of a rule-based macro-
economic policy framework likely undermined the government‘s credibility in setting 
and enforcing corporate governance standards. Then, after the 2001 crisis in Turkey, 
the corporate governance framework started to function effectively and the CMBT 
began to play a leading role in setting corporate governance standards for publicly 
held firms by effectively exercising its supervisory power (Ararat et al., 2011). After 
responding to the economic crisis of 2001, the business environment has improved 
significantly, thanks to changes in the effectiveness of regulatory authorities, 
disclosure and transparency rules that have begun to apply to firms, and the 
enforcement of laws (Guelen, 2011). The CMBT, ISE, and the central bank of the 
Republic of Turkey have played important roles in this recovery (OECD, 2013). As a 
consequence of the improvements, in 2004, the European Commission recommended 
that the Turkey‘s accession negotiations to European Union (EU) could commence. 
Most recently, a comprehensive modernisation of the Turkish Commercial Code (new 
TCC) and the Capital Market Law (new CML) have come into effect, aimed at 
developing the corporate governance system in Turkey. The new TCC mainly covers 
equality, accountability, and transparency issues.  
 
There is extensive research on the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and macroeconomic performance. Considering the practices in Turkey, 
Ararat and Ugur (2006) examined the two different scenarios, namely the 
macroeconomic situation in Turkey before the 2001 crisis and the phases of 
improvement of the Turkish economy after the 2001 crisis. They asserted that the 
rule-based economic policy following the 2001 crisis had a substantial effect on 
economic performance, leading to the development of Turkey‘s corporate governance 
landscape (Ararat and Ugur, 2006).  
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3.3.1 The Corporate Environment 
 
The Turkish corporate sector is characterised by family-controlled, complex financial-
industrial business groups (OECD, 2013). Many firms in the BIST could be 
considered business groups, listed as either subsidiaries of a business group or as 
business groups themselves. These emerging market firms are multi-industrial, with a 
single family usually controlling them. Although the BIST is dominated by the 
business groups and their subsidiaries, there are a few state-owned enterprises, and 
some small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially the ―Anatolian Tigers‖ 
(others call the same phenomenon ―green capital‖ or ―Islamic capital‖ (Demir et al., 
2004)), which have been more active in the Turkish economy during the post-2001 
period, when the Muslim middle class took the centre point in Turkish politics. 
―These new middle classes are engaged in promoting Islam as a strategic resource in 
the class politics of Turkey and seek protection from the negative effects of market 
capitalism‖ (Ozcan and Turunc, 2011, pp. 82).  
 
More importantly, business groups in Turkey are the main players of the corporate 
governance structure. Therefore by taking account of the Turkish listed firms, I will 
also examine these business groups‘ behaviours at the firm level. The comprehensive 
picture of the business groups in Turkey used in this study is presented in Table 3.1, 
compiled from Colpan (2010) and companies‘ websites.  
 
Out of the 34 economic institutions on the list, 32 of them are family-based 
diversified groups. Of the remaining 2, ―Turkiye IS‖ is the Turkey‘s first public bank 
and 41.5% of its total shares are held by its own private pension fund, and 28.1% are 
held by Republican People‘s Party, and remaining shares are open to the public. 
―Oyak‖ is the biggest privately-owned pension fund and belongs to the Turkish 
Armed Forces Assistance fund. As shown in Table 3.1, business groups in Turkey in 
general are highly diversified in terms of 2-digit SIC code categorisation. Similarly, 
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after an analysis of the fifty largest groups in Turkey, Colpan et al. (2010) ended up 
with the same conclusion and reported that Turkish business groups function in a 
variety of industries with the peak being in twelve industries. 
 
A closer look at the business groups in Turkey reveals that these groups can be placed 
into two categories in terms of their formation and size. The first group of this 
categorisation includes the leading economic players in Turkey, founded in the mid-
twentieth century. The groups in this category have their own settled organisational 
structures and were usually founded by a single entrepreneur, and maintain their 
family ties in the top management of the group. Sabanci, Koc, Yildiz, Cukurova, 
Anadolu, Dogus, and Dogan are some examples of this category. For instance, the 
Koc group is active in finance, automotive, consumer durables, transportation, 
communication and other different sectors. Koc creates a differential competitive 
advantage in its operating sector. They are the 3rd in fuel distribution in Turkey with 
17% market share, they own 52% of Turkey‘s total automotive production, are the 
biggest household appliance company, and so on (Kap, 2013). Another category of 
business groups in Turkey represents a new breed of businesses amidst the rising 
prominence of the Turkish economy called ―Anatolian Tigers‖. An entrepreneurial 
mind-set and the pursuit of wealth form the core principals of these small and 
medium-sized groups in Turkey (Ozcan and Turunc, 2011). Characteristically these 
groups are more conservative and redefine the allocations of markets in Turkey while 
they seek opportunities for their subsidiaries at home and in cross-border markets 
(Ozcan and Turunc, 2011). These rising Anatolian entrepreneurs are very active 
members of the Turkish economy and help to stimulate urban growth and 
industrialisation in Anatolia (Ozcan and Turunc, 2011)11. Thus, these groups illustrate 
catch-up behaviour in terms of the extent of industrial diversification through 
acquisitions. Boydak, Sancak, Ihlas, Kibar, and Eti can also be named in this 
category, and they pursue opportunistic entrepreneurship to industrially diversify 
domestically or across-border 
                                                 
11 For more information about Islamic business groups, please refer to Ozcan and Turunc‘s (2011) 
paper. 
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Table 3.1: Business groups in Turkey, 2014  
Source: Colpan (2010) and companies‘ websites 
*Only business groups that were included in my dataset are presented in this table. Additional information gathered from 
companies‘ official websites. 
GROUP 
NAME 
YEAR OF 
FOUNDATION 
CONTROLLING 
OWNERSHIP 
MAJOR BUSINESS UNITS LISTED SUBSIDIARIES 
Anadolu 1949 Yazici and Ozilhan 
families 
Beverage, finance, automotive, energy, health, 
retail,  
5 
Acibadem 1991 Aydinlar family Healthcare, insurance 1 
Akfen 1967 Akin family Construction, transportation, real estate, energy 2 
Akkok  1952 Dinckok family Chemicals, energy, real estate, textiles, port 
operations, services 
2 
Alarko 1954 Alaton and Garih  Energy, industrials, tourism, real estate, food 2 
Anel 1986 Celikel family Energy, construction, telecommunication 2 
Banvit 1968 Gorener family Chicken and turkey products, and animal feed 1 
Borusan 1944 Kocabiyik famiy Energy, logistics, steel pipe manufacturer 2 
Celebi 1958 Celebioglu family Handling services, cargo services 1 
Ceylan 1965 Ceylan family Construction, energy, trade, tourism 1 
Ciner 1978 Ciner family  Energy and mining, media, industrials, services 4 
Cukurova 1923 Karamehmet family Industry, construction, communication and 
information, media, financial services  
1 
Dogan  1950 Dogan family Media, energy, retail, financial services, tourism, 
industrials 
9 
Dogus 1951 Sahenk family Banking and financial services, automotive, 
construction, media, food, real estate 
5 
Eczacibasi 1942 Eczacibasi family Healthcare, IT, financial services 4 
Enka 1957 Tara and Gulcelik 
families 
Engineering and construction, energy, real estate, 
manufacturing 
3 
Esas 2000 Sabanci and Kamisli 
families 
Aviation, food, healthcare, retail, real estate 1 
Fiba 1987 Ozyegin family Banking, financial services, aviation, real estate, 
energy 
3 
Global 2004 Kutman family Port operations, infrastructure, real estate, energy, 
financial services 
4 
Hedef 
Alliance 
1987 Sancak family 
(formerly) 
Healthcare, beauty services 1 
Ihlas 1970 Oren family Media, construction, tourism, manufacturing, 
healthcare,  services 
5 
Is Bankasi 1924 Is Bank employees fund, 
Republican People‘s 
Party 
Banking, financial services, real estate 11 
Isiklar 1964 Isik family Energy, construction, real estate, automotive, 
manufacturing 
1 
Kazanci 1950 Kazanci family Energy, agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, 
services 
1 
Koc 1926 Koc family Automotive, consumer durables, energy, banking, 
financial services, retail 
13 
Koza Ipek 1948 Ipek family Mining, publishing, media, energy, tourism, 
construction 
2 
Nuh 1971 Nuhoglu family Construction, chemical, insulation, machinery, 
energy, telecommunication 
1 
Oyak 1961 Armed forces pension 
fund 
Industrials, cement, energy, construction, 
automotive, financial services 
7 
Sabanci 1932 Sabanci family Banking, energy, cement, retail, industrials, 
financial services 
12 
Sinpas 1974 Celik family Real estate, construction, manufacturing,  1 
TAV 1997 Akfen and Tepe groups Handling services, transportation, construction 1 
Yasar 1945 Yasar family Food, beverage, paint, agriculture, services 3 
Yildiz 1944 Ulker family Food, financial services, packaging, real estate, 
retail, IT, personal care products 
7 
Zorlu 1953 Zorlu family Textiles, electronics, real estate, energy 4 
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3.3.2 Ownership Structure and Control  
 
The rise of diversified business groups in emerging markets has captured the interest 
of academics and policy-makers. The characteristics of emerging market business 
groups and their legally independent subsidiaries are being examined from different 
angles in management literature. 
 
Business groups are the dominant organisation structure in emerging markets. In 
general, a business group is an agglomeration of legally independent firms that 
operate in multiple industries and are bound by economic (such as ownership, 
financial, and commercial) and social (such as family, friendship) ties (Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007; Yiu et al., 2005). Similarly, in the case of the Turkish corporate sector, 
business groups are the major players of the large enterprise economy of Turkey. 
Even these groups are constituted of legally independent firms in terms of 
management approaches; a pyramidal formation is common in these business groups 
in emerging markets and there is a high degree of cross-ownership (Colpan and 
Hikino, 2010). Also, in Turkey‘s case, this pyramidal formation allows controlling 
shareholders, usually family members, to function at the top of the hierarchical 
structure to make strategic decisions about subsidiaries of the group. The founding 
family members essentially control the entire subsidiaries of the groups through 
various institutional arrangements for several generations (OECD, 2006). Controlling 
shareholders, usually families, often utilise control-enhancing mechanisms through 
multiple voting rights that allow them to continue their majority of management rights 
within the group (OECD, 2013).  
 
In most cases the functioning of the group‘s board still predominantly follows the 
voice of the founding family member because the family controls the majority stake 
of the subsidiary firm, thanks to the above 50% controlling stakes of family members 
on the board (Colpan, 2011). As for the management structure, rather than a formal 
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board member of a subsidiary, it was an unofficial family committee that made the 
strategies and decisions for the subsidiaries of the group. Remarkably, Colpan‘s 
(2010) interviews pointed out that in most cases, the functioning of the board of the 
business group and its subsidiaries predominantly followed the voice of the founding 
family. The board chairs behave like an ―invisible CEO‖ for the entire group, and the 
CEO of a group functions as a formal professional representative to the family 
(Colpan et al., 2010, pp. 520).  
 
Group subsidiaries are almost entirely managed by boards comprising members of the 
same families. Additionally, interlocking executives are used to achieve significant 
control over Koc‘s subsidiaries. Colpan et al. (2010) also revealed the organisational 
structure of Koc, where the family members established a pure holding firm, also 
called cross-shareholdings (Boyd and Hoskisson, 2010), as a legally independent 
entity to own and control operating units as subsidiaries. For instance, controlling 
shares of Koc‘s publicly listed subsidiaries, such as Beko and Arcelik, are held by the 
parent holding firm, and family members and other interlocked executives coordinate 
and manage the activities of those subsidiaries in order to maximise operational 
efficiency and avoid managerial conflicts within the group. Sabanci, Dogus, and 
Yildiz are other examples of this management structure. Thus, this collaborative 
coordination between groups‘ subsidiaries allows them to interact with and learn from 
each other through the direct influence of family members on subsidiaries‘ operations 
and strategies.  
 
Koc‘s case also demonstrates that the managerial similarity between individual 
subsidiaries of the group leads to collaborative coordination in the operations of 
individual subsidiaries. Experience in managing a variety of industries is likely to lead 
to the development of generalisability and adoptive skills by these groups 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). Once individual subsidiaries of the group have practiced 
a corporate activity, other individual subsidiaries of the group could then apply the 
same procedures or learn from the mistakes for their own benefit, thus further 
enhancing the management capability of the group (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). This 
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mechanism of learning from each other and increasing effectiveness in various 
strategic and operational choices that group subsidiaries can implement in their 
subsequent activities is a unique and key element of business groups in the dynamic 
environment of emerging markets. 
 
3.3.3 Entrepreneurial Approaches in Turkey 
 
The world is full of opportunities to employ the resources of others (Mathews, 2006). 
Madhok and Keyhani (2012) have argued that the focus of firms in emerging markets 
shifts away from exploitation and toward a bolder process of exploration, where the 
resources of others can be tapped in the search for a more robust and rent-bearing 
basis for competitive advantage. It is this forward-looking perspective that is 
embodied in the concept of opportunity in the entrepreneurship literature (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000), and is common sense for business groups in emerging markets, 
ones seeking opportunities to enlarge their activities in various industries. Business 
groups are also investigated from the resource-based perspective, namely that 
throughout related and unrelated diversification strategies business groups add value 
to subsidiary firms by pooling and distributing endowed resources (Guillen, 2000; 
Chang and Hong, 2000). While finding support for diversification strategies from the 
resource-based perspective, the strategic management literature has not clearly 
explored the role of acquisitions for these business groups, or has only studied 
Chinese firms in regards to state owned enterprises.  
 
The economic developments mentioned in the previous section can also be explained 
by the great entrepreneurial spirit of Turkish firms (Gonenc and Rawdanowicz, 2010), 
in that these business groups are pursuing entrepreneurial forms of behaviour in 
emerging markets, and aiming at industrial diversification through repeated 
acquisition activities. In general, these family-owned business groups are each active 
in many industries, functioning under some type of integrated entrepreneurial 
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guidance, and fall short of constituting a fully integrated institutional structure 
(Guillen, 2000). These diversified businesses are structurally different to the 
conglomerates in developed economies (Guillen, 2000) as they grow not in search of 
financial or economic development but as a result of their ability to seek new 
opportunities and expand their operations through corporate activities across a variety 
of industries quickly and at low cost. This entrepreneurial pattern is a striking 
characteristic of business groups in emerging markets as well as in Turkey.  
 
The entrepreneurial process is described as pursuing opportunities in a rapidly 
changing environment in order to create and manage resources appropriately (Baker 
and Nelson, 2005). In this context, industrial diversification is one key domain of 
strategic entrepreneurship, a field that combines entrepreneurship, more specifically in 
opportunity-seeking behaviour, with strategic management that seeks new business 
areas or develops existing ones through acquisitions followed by reconfiguring newly 
acquired resources effectively. Building on this, diversified business groups in 
emerging markets are a distinct case that explicitly brings strategic expansion 
activities into the heart of strategic entrepreneurship, aiming to exploit and develop 
others‘ resources. 
 
Prevailing strategic management theories suggest that firms should explore their key 
skills to stay competitive within the environment where they operate (Szulanski, 
1996). For instance, industrial diversification can be beneficial to stockholders if a 
firm has key resources that can be successfully and profitably organised outside the 
main industry in which it functions (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). On the other hand, 
according to agency theorists, diversification can destroy shareholder value due to 
managerial self-interest (e.g. Rajan et al., 2000). This notwithstanding, entrepreneurial 
skill is the main driver of this diversification in emerging markets. Predominantly, 
economists suggest that in the absence of market perfection, it may be possible to 
lower the risk through expanding activities into new industries (Khanna and Palepu, 
2010). Thus, diversified emerging market business groups exist where the corporate 
governance mechanism does not work well, or is not allowed to work, by 
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institutionalising an alternative allocation mechanism (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; 
Young et al., 2008). It can be said that this argument for the existence of these 
business groups might be true for Turkey. Despite the recent improvements in 
corporate governance in Turkey, it is still considered to be underdeveloped according 
to the most recent OECD report (OECD, 2013).  
 
Another factor that could be stimulating the entrepreneurial spirit in Turkey is the 
economic and political uncertainty. Emerging market countries tend to experience 
more political and economic uncertainties than developed countries (Cuadra and 
Sapriza, 2008). Governments in emerging markets can be less stable politically, and 
events such as internal tensions, especially during election periods and external 
conflicts between neighbours, can create a difficult environment for firms in emerging 
markets (Wright et al., 2005). Industrially diversified emerging market firms may 
respond to this political and economic instability by distributing risk across their 
markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000). More recently, according to the Thomson Reuters 
data, even as the lira slid 17% against the US dollar in 2013, interest in Turkish firms 
stayed strong and M&A activities increased (Retuters, 2014). W. Jackson, an 
emerging market economist from Capital Economics, noted that corporate Turkey had 
handled lira depreciation in 2008 that was even sharper than that of 2013 (Reuters, 
2014). Thus, firms in emerging markets are also learning from their unstable 
environment how to handle hard times and develop strategies according to its 
dynamic situation.  
 
Furthermore, given the importance for them of being active in a variety of industries, 
close relations with the government and society are an important factor for the growth 
of business groups in emerging markets. As is also happening in Turkey‘s case, the 
government encourages the development of many big firms through various economic 
incentives and sometimes directly pushes groups to operate in new sectors (Khanna 
and Yafeh, 2007; Colpan et al., 2010). In some cases, beyond a range of economic 
incentive reforms, development of an existing business or industrial diversification 
through acquisitions can be achieved through a government‘s direct 
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recommendations, or enticements. Privatisations and contracts are the main 
instruments for these relational behaviours (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Consistent 
with these arguments, personal networking with politicians and bureaucrats is vital, 
and insider information in regards to policy agendas plays a critical role in making the 
right decisions and maximising business opportunities in emerging markets (Colpan et 
al., 2010). Motivations for these relations between business groups and the 
government can vary, including nationalism, government-led improvement, and 
political concerns; it is also always hard to identify the reasons behind these relations, 
and so this subject is beyond the scope of this study. In short, one of the most 
important factors for these business groups in Turkey in order to stay competitive and 
profitable is to have good relations with the government. 
 
3.4 M&A in Turkey   
 
Up until the last decade, M&A activities in Turkey were scarce and Turkish firms did 
not have any noteworthy experiences with acquisitions. The undeniable effect of 
globalisation, as well as the monetary, fiscal and financial reforms which were 
implemented after 2001 as a result of the two major financial crises which Turkey had 
to survive (i.e. those which occurred in November 2000 and February 2001) made the 
Turkish economy more robust. These factors have helped build international 
confidence in the Turkish economy. Thus, in the period after the financial crisis of 
2001, M&A became a more popular strategic instrument in Turkey. 
 
According to the Deloitte report (2011), thanks to Turkey‘s strong growth 
performance and healthy financial system during the last decade, the Turkish 
domestic M&A market remained very strong. More importantly, considering the last 
decade, strong economic performance in Turkey has led domestic firms to grow and 
expand their activities internationally through cross-border acquisitions.  
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Additionally, one of the main factors behind the increase in the number of M&A was 
the process of privatisation which the country underwent. As a result of the economic 
liberalisation reforms, state-owned firms were privatised and the purchasing power of 
Turkish firms increased. In turn, Turkish M&A activities were strengthened (Oelger 
and Schiereck, 2011). In particular, privatisation programmes were more active in the 
energy and banking sectors. Usually, big business groups won the auctions. These 
groups employ domestic acquisitions as a way of developing their existing businesses 
or expanding into new markets.  
 
Certainly, most of the acquisition activities in the last decade have been carried out by 
these industrially diversified business groups, and they play a significant role in 
Turkey‘s economic growth. In fact, the majority of the firms in my dataset either 
operate as subsidiaries to business groups or as business groups themselves. The 
Turkish M&A market has been an active player in the global economy since the 
financial crisis in the beginning of the 21st century. However, a major challenge for 
business groups in emerging markets is successfully managing the post-acquisition 
integration to reach their acquisition goals, as high failure rates of acquisitions are 
common.  
 
This decade, we can observe that the acquisitions of business groups have increased in 
their domestic markets, and successful emerging market groups are no longer 
familiarised with low-cost manufacturing features, but they have started to compete 
with multinational western or US firms on level terms (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). 
Therefore, these family-run groups are expanding their activities internationally and 
effective management has become more important for the groups to be global 
companies. Interestingly, the received literature suggests that these emerging market 
firms are using different post-acquisition strategies in their cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions. But how do they really perform in the post-M&A process of cross-
border and domestic deals? 
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The M&A execution of firms in Turkey can be unique precisely because it is not 
industry-specific, and they are capable of executing appropriate strategies for the post-
acquisition process among a variety of different industry practices. This is in line with 
Guillen‘s (2000) argument that repeatedly entering and operating in a variety of 
industries gives these business groups a special learning capability as a whole. The 
combination of prior domestic and cross-border acquisition experiences within 
different industries can also strengthen the effect of this learning capability for the 
business groups in emerging markets, and this capability may facilitate carrying out 
more successful and effective post-acquisition integration in the focal acquisition. The 
main reason for this interaction might be the cross-shareholding ownership structure 
and informal ties, mentioned above, that affect the members of group subsidiaries in 
their strategic and operational decisions. Also, it might be the heterogeneity of 
acquisitions that leads to development of acquisition capability for business groups in 
emerging markets. Therefore, governmental ties, lack of corporate governance, and 
opportunity-driven entrepreneurial behaviours of these emerging market firms can be 
the important factors in the development of acquisition capability via expanding 
activities across industries (Chacar and Vissa, 2005).  
 
3.4.1 Cross-border Acquisition Strategies  
 
In a report in FT, Oakley (2011) stated that there comes a point when organic 
expansions begin to slow and emerging market groups have moved to the next level 
where they have to become more acquisitive, and sooner or later have to expand 
overseas. Lately, as we are witnessing, those on the business frontiers from emerging 
markets opt to acquire developed world brands and take steps to compete globally 
(Peng, 2012). The Yildiz group from Turkey is a telling story for cross-border post-
acquisition implementation of emerging market business groups. Recently, especially 
in 2007-2011, the Yildiz group was very active in terms of M&A transactions. They 
pursued an inorganic growth strategy through acquisitions to gain market leadership, 
expand their segments, and to develop their capabilities with cross-border acquisitions 
to grow both internally and globally, and achieve a sustainable competitive position.   
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The Yildiz holding‘s acquisition of Godiva is a good case for analysing the cross-
border strategies of business groups. Instead of assimilating Godiva and replacing its 
resources after the acquisition, Ulker pursued a softer approach so as to be able to 
manage it effectively. Their intention was not to replace the top management team of 
Godiva with their own executives, which would be consistent with the ―market for 
corporate control‖ view widely accepted in the US, where firms supposedly create 
value by replacing inefficient managers (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012), or replacing 
human resources, or the Godiva name. Instead, they retained almost all of the top 
management team; in addition, Ulker gave them freedom and autonomy in their 
operations and treated them like a partner. Jim Goldman, CEO of Godiva, stated to 
HBR (Kale et al., 2009, p.111) that ―one of the best things Ulker did after the takeover 
was to make it clear that they believed in Godiva‘s management. They wouldn‘t have 
bought Godiva if they hadn‘t liked what they saw in my team and our strategies. That 
created a foundation of trust and respect, which is critical for post-merger success‖.  
 
Apart from growth and entry into new markets, the main rationale behind this post-
acquisition approach was to seek unique capabilities by getting access to Godiva‘s 
managerial and technological know-how (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). Keeping the 
Godiva brand name and headquarters could be considered from the same direction. As 
Godiva already had a strong cachet with existing customers, replacing the name 
would make the process harder for Yildiz. According to an HBR study by Kale et al. 
(2009, pp. 111), CEO of Godiva Jim Goldman also added that ―Ulker thinks globally 
and is pushing us to think more globally. Mr Murat Ulker, the chairman of the Yildiz 
group, wants a return on their investment, but he‘s not looking for that to happen in an 
unreasonable time period. They have a burning desire to grow Godiva in a quality 
way. That‘s it. And then, Ulker knows, the returns will come‖.  
 
Moreover, Koc, the largest diversified business group in Turkey, achieved an average 
annual growth rate of 20% in revenues and 27% in operating profit between 2002 and 
 125 
2012 (Kap, 2013). Koc is an active player in M&A in Turkey and has leading 
positions in energy, automotive, consumer durables, and finance sectors. Arcelik is 
the main firm of the Koc group in the consumer durables sector and represents a 
Turkish group‘s successful internationalisation case through acquisitions. The Koc 
group is the market leader in Turkey with Arcelik, and is pursuing a cross-border 
expansion strategy through acquisitions. Beko, the best-selling home appliance brand 
in the UK, is controlled by Arcelik and continues to be in use for many Arcelik 
products. In its corporate history, Arcelik acquired Austria‘s Elektra Breganz and 
Romania‘s Arctic respectively. Following two years of acquisitions, Arctic domestic 
sales went up by 20% and the firm‘s market share also increased to 45% as compared 
to 40% before the acquisition. More recently, South Africa‘s Defy Appliances was 
acquired by Arcelik in 2011 and performance enhancement realised for Arcelik 
following this acquisition. Accumulation of acquisition experiences in a similar 
manner allowed the Turkish firms to improve their experience-based knowledge. 
Repetitive cross-border acquisitions by Arcelik enabled them to implement the same 
strategies in their cross-border post-M&A process. Following the acquisitions of 
Elektra Bregenz, Arctic, and Blomberg, Arcelik CEO Nedim Esgin commented to the 
OECD development centre that ―a known brand, new market share, competitive 
production cost, and the potential of additional capacity are not only great 
opportunities for our business goals, but also values that contribute to our target to 
become a global company‖ (Goldstein and Bonaglia, 2005, pp.18).  
 
3.4.2 Domestic Acquisition Strategies  
 
From the other side, one of the main driving factors of emerging market business 
groups is their dominant role in their home countries. As mentioned in the previous 
sections, emerging market business groups mainly follow acquisitive strategies to stay 
competitive in their industries. Therefore, competition at home is vital for business 
groups to survive and they need to meet domestic demand and grow through 
acquisitions (Manikutty, 2000). Shareholders of the acquirer firm also benefit from 
acquisition activities because the acquisition of a subsidiary of a group usually 
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enhances the value of other subsidiaries of the same group due to the pyramidal 
management structure of these business groups (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).  
 
Contrary to cross-border post-acquisition strategies, emerging market business groups 
are more likely to replace target firms‘ key resources in the post-acquisition period 
due to institutional voids and relational ties occurring in emerging markets (Yiu et al., 
2005). Although some studies on corporate governance in Turkey have suggested that 
the pyramidal management structure affects the economic performance of firms, 
including profitability and return on assets (Ararat and Ugur, 2003), the weak 
institutions and concentrated ownership in Turkey could be opportunities for business 
groups, and they have taken advantage of these voids. 
 
Beyond pure family ties, factors such as kinship relations and the dominance of 
insider executives within the group also play a role in shaping the top management 
teams of the subsidiaries (Colpan, 2010). These relational ties define not only the 
management of the subsidiaries‘ strategies, but also activeness in the operational 
decision-making process, consistently with Hoshino‘s (2009) study of business groups 
in Mexico, Aldrighi and Postali‘s (2010) study of the largest business groups in 
Brazil, and Sarkar‘s (2010) study of Indian business groups‘ conclusion that these 
groups had a family member in an executive role in each of their subsidiaries, Turkish 
business groups also employ family members for their subsidiaries‘ top management 
(Colpan, 2010). In the same way, these ties continue when a new firm is acquired, and 
a family member or an internal director is assigned as a new top manager of the target 
firm in domestic acquisitions. The main reason for this power-based approach to 
leadership in family business groups and its subsidiaries can be explained by Colpan 
et al.‘s (2010) assertion that a family owner possesses ―political unwillingness‖ to 
split their positions as a leader and they are likely to resist sharing their power to rule 
and manage with non-family managers or outsiders. Performance enhancement 
following a focal acquisition may depend on the continuity of such ties, and the 
unwillingness to include non-kin or outsider involvement at higher echelons, in the 
top position of target firm (Usdiken, 2010). Furthermore, apart from relational ties, 
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concerns about the group‘s secrecy might be another reason for this path-dependent 
approach and they may want to follow the keep-it-in-the-family approach. 
 
In addition to their approach to top management, emerging market business groups 
are also keen to pursue this path-dependent strategy for other resources of the target 
firm following a domestic acquisition. This may occur due to existing operational 
advantages of the emerging market acquirer with their own brand name in the 
domestic market (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). For instance, according to a Sabanci 
management presentation by the head of the cement sector, Kadri Ozgunes, about 
making deals, the ―Sabanci‖ brand name inflates the deal value itself (Ozgunes, 
2013). Having strong key resources in the market, such as the Sabanci name, signifies 
quality, trust, credibility and transparency for customers. Importantly, maintaining 
and developing group identity is a key skill for these business groups and an 
important factor for performance enhancement and growth. The Sabanci group shows 
considerable evidence of this skill, and the group is spreading its name across a 
variety of sectors it operates in with its rhyming subsidiary names (e.g. EnerjiSA, 
KordSA, BriSA, CimSA, etc.). Therefore they are likely to pursue this strategy in 
their subsequent acquisitions in order to make successful integrations and develop the 
acquisition capability of the firm. In addition, this common brand name strategy is 
more evidence for the collaborative coordination mechanism for subsidiaries of 
emerging market business groups.  
 
3.5 Summary  
 
The Turkish economy has been going through fundamental changes and shown 
remarkable progress in the period following the 2001 crisis. The improved economic 
conditions and development activities of the institutional setting for the financial 
system have led to an increase in scholarly attention towards Turkey. Many emerging 
market papers consider the BRIC countries as a case in their studies and ignore the 
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catching-up countries, as each emerging market country has its own culture. Turkey 
has been experiencing a major shift in its economy in the 21st century. As such, 
Turkey represents a still unexplored yet fascinating case of the emerging market 
context. The Turkish corporate environment is different from that of East Asia, which 
is typically taken as the region of dynamic business groups, and from that of Latin 
America, which is usually characterised by politically-connected group firms 
crowding out growing independent firms (Colpan, 2010).   
 
Characteristically, groups in Turkey are far more diversified than those in many 
emerging economies (e.g. Chile, South Korea and Taiwan) and more involved in 
financial services (Colpan et al., 2010). The ubiquity and industrial diversity of firms 
in Turkey puts these institutions in a central role for Turkish corporate structure. As in 
other emerging market countries, Turkish organisations are mainly family-owned 
group institutions (e.g. Dogus, Sabanci, Koc, Eczacibasi, Ulker, Anadolu and Yasar). 
These economic players act as the prime engine for industrial growth in the dynamic 
Turkish environment and make Turkey an interesting country to examine. 
 
Following the economic progress in the past decade, Turkey has experienced a 
significant rise in the number of M&A activities. But there is little academic work 
available on what may have brought about the large increase in number of M&A 
deals, or on the impact of M&A on acquirer performance. Therefore, one of the 
objectives of this research is to achieve greater understanding of M&A deals in the 
emerging market context of Turkey by uncovering information about their M&A 
experiences, and their post-acquisition management processes in particular. 
Ultimately, this chapter provides a historical examination of the economy, especially 
large-enterprise economy, in Turkey and its core actors, and M&A activities in the 
Turkish context.  
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In this chapter, I have presented the general economic and corporate background in 
Turkey. First, I discussed the economic conditions of Turkey with regard to the study 
period examined in this study. This was followed by the section entitled ―M&A in 
Turkey‖, in which I discussed the features of the post-M&A strategies of Turkish 
acquirers. Drawing on the review of received studies in Chapter 2, in the next chapter 
I will address the research gaps and present the hypotheses of this study. I will first 
conceptualise acquisition experiences to reflect the organisational learning processes 
that result in an increase of the acquirer‘s post-acquisition performance. Then, I will 
provide theoretical arguments for the performance implications of the post-acquisition 
integration decisions of emerging market acquirers.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Theory Development 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, I showed that acquisition studies have been examined from different 
perspectives by different schools of thought. In particular, as I argued in section 
2.2.4.1, studies on post-acquisition performance (Kroll et al., 1997; Franks et al., 
1991; King et al., 2004; Hayward, 2002) have commonly examined whether or not the 
acquirer firm learns from its prior acquisition experience, and whether this acquisition 
experience influences focal acquisition performance. Strategic management 
researchers have examined the post-acquisition consequences in light of several 
different perspectives, such as behavioural learning theory (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1999), the organisational learning perspective (Hayward, 2002), and the knowledge-
based view of the firm (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Despite these significant advances 
from different perspectives, important questions about firms‘ acquisition capability-
building mechanisms remain unanswered. I will draw upon multiple theoretical 
concepts, using the organisational learning process, behavioural learning, the 
knowledge-based view, and resource-based view arguments to enrich the existing 
literature on the dynamic capabilities of the firm. Furthermore, the critical assessment 
of the post-acquisition literature also showed that environmental influences remain 
unexplored and that studies on organisational learning originally attempted to 
understand developed world cases. Acquisition by emerging market firms is a 
prevalent phenomenon that has received little attention in the acquisition and 
organisational learning literatures. Taking account of the specified characteristics of 
emerging market firms (section 2.5.2), and their growing importance for the global 
economy – especially that of business groups and their subsidiaries – I will examine 
the effect of prior acquisition experiences and post-acquisition management decisions 
on the performance of acquisitions by emerging market acquirers.  
 
In this chapter, I will introduce the hypotheses of this research. First, I will begin my 
arguments by introducing the direct relationship between acquisition experience and 
acquisition performance (Section 4.2). Then, in Section 4.3, I will apply this notion of 
acquisition experience to the similarity of prior and subsequent acquisitions 
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perspectives. Next, by aggregating firm-level experiences I will extend the acquisition 
experience argument and examine the effects on these emerging market firms on the 
business group level (Section 4.4). Apart from the learning-by-doing arguments, I will 
also examine post-acquisition management issues, specifically development of 
integration capability within the acquirer firm. To do so, I will discuss the role of the 
degree of resource replacement on acquisition performance, and present my 
hypotheses (Section 4.5). Afterward, I will extend this resource replacement argument 
and introduce the analyses of three specific resource replacements, namely top 
manager, name, and headquarters. In each resource replacement section (Sections 4.5, 
4.6, 4.7, and 4.8), I will also make cross-border and domestic acquisition distinctions 
in order to capture the different effects of resource replacement in different 
acquisition characteristics.   
 
4.2 Organisational Learning in Emerging Markets and the Role of Prior 
Acquisition Experience  
 
Research on organisational learning has highlighted acquisition capability as a key 
element for completing acquisitions successfully (Voss, 2008). In this research, I 
intend to apply a theoretical understanding of the mechanism that might underlie this 
collective learning process in emerging market firms. I will examine whether the 
learning-by-doing process can exist in emerging market firms. To do so, I follow 
Laamanen and Keil‘s (2008) argument and I assume acquisition experience to be a 
proxy for a firm‘s acquisition capability. Thus, the arguments in Hypothesis 1 will 
examine the acquisition capability of emerging market firms.  
 
Organisational routines that derive from organisational experience are one of the main 
concepts in organisational learning literature (Levitt and March, 1988). Routines are 
sets of instructions that show an organisation‘s experience at performing a specific 
task (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Once organisational routines are developed based on 
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prior experiences, they are subject to practice. Routines are accepted as a source of 
competitive advantage in strategic management literature and usually play a vital role 
in the formulation of a firm‘s strategic actions by supplementing the strategic 
decision-making process (March, 1999). When a firm accumulates experience in a 
specific organisational task, it may achieve capability development in that routine. 
Studies on psychology literature show that when similar events proliferate, we can 
generalise prior event experiences, and this leads to positive outcomes (Kamin, 1969). 
For instance, a manufacturing company can generalise its prior experiences from one 
manufacturing activity to another. This company can accumulate manufacturing 
experience on its prior production processes and then generalise this experienced 
activity to subsequent production processes. This process of experiencing and then 
generalising prior activities leads to routinised procedure, and this develops 
experience-based knowledge (Lieberman, 1987). As such, this knowledge 
accumulation will be applied to subsequent activities, which will result in constantly 
improving positive outcomes. This is the common argument in the organisational 
learning literature for traditional learning-curve results. Moreover, within the 
literature, learning curves may be referred to as experience curves, progress curves, or 
learning by doing (Argote, 2012).  
 
Firms can acquire knowledge from both internal and external sources. Strategic 
management scholars have explicitly acknowledged dynamic corporate acquisition 
processes as an important way of gaining external knowledge (e.g., Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Iansiti 
and Clark, 1994; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Szulanski, 1996; Zander and Kogut, 1995). 
Through acquisition experiences, firms can also accumulate the experience of these 
past activities, and then by generalising from prior acquisition processes they can 
develop their experience-based knowledge. These learning-by-doing activities may 
lead to performance enhancement for the firms. However, although the learning-by-
doing pattern has been found in many firms, they differ noticeably in whether they 
learn and practice routines successfully (Argote, 2012). In particular, the dynamic 
capability construct, which refers to ―the firm‘s ability to integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing 
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environments‖ (Teece et al., 1997: 516) has been used to explain why firms vary and 
how they achieve and maintain competitive advantage in the market (Hoskisson et al., 
2000). At the beginning of the organisational literature era, Penrose (1959) asserted 
that heterogeneous capabilities give each firm its uniqueness and lead to competitive 
advantage. Therefore the effectiveness of the acquisition process is influenced by the 
degree to which the acquiring firm develops a specific capability to be successful in 
managing the post-acquisition process.  
 
From their previous acquisition activities, firms might be able to learn how to manage 
the post-acquisition process of subsequent acquisition activities by applying more of 
the same decisions, and in that way creating standard procedures and refining 
organisational routines that might directly impact the performance of subsequent 
acquisitions (Zollo and Singh, 2004). This can be further related to a ―learning-by-
doing‖ hypothesis. Organisational learning through acquisitions is thus a dynamic 
process in which firms accumulate experience and gain knowledge, and then draw 
inferences from their prior experiences, and use these inferences for their future 
acquisition activities.  
 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) argue that organisational memory, which can be 
gained from prior experiences, helps firms‘ decision-making processes and shapes 
their strategic actions through a range of standard operating procedures, systems, and 
routines. These routines are embedded in the firms, top management behaves 
consistently with the resulting routinised systems (Feldman, 1989), and it is difficult 
to change these routines over time (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Therefore, as argued 
in the literature, we can also say that ―the organisational knowledge resulting from 
acquisition experience is embedded in such rules and routines‖ (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999, pp. 36). These arguments are also in line with the dynamic 
capabilities view that companies gain experience and develop their acquisition 
capability in a repetitive and minimally satisfactory manner (Helfat and Winter, 
2011). This acquisition capability then in turn affects focal acquisition performance. 
Acquisition capability can be defined to include the knowledge, operational 
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procedures, structures, systems, and processes that a firm can take on when managing 
post-acquisitions (Laamanen and Keil, 2008). More generally, acquisition capability 
is a dynamic capability allowing the firm to change its resource base and capabilities 
in order to achieve competitive advantage in dynamic environments. In my theoretical 
interpretation, consistent with the works of many strategic management scholars (e.g. 
Day, 1984; Porter, 1985; Voss, 2008), I also consider post-acquisition performance 
enhancement of the firms as a proxy for achieving a competitive advantage12. For that 
reason, the post-acquisition management success is related to how the acquirer firm 
leverages its own and the target firms‘ resources to better manage the acquisition and 
learn from this process.  
 
Puranam et al. (2006) gave Cisco Systems as an example of practical implementation 
for structural post-acquisition management. They demonstrated that Cisco systems 
owns several key complementary assets which are necessary to provide products to 
the networking industry, such as its brand name, sales force, customer relationships, 
and a well-run outsourced manufacturing network. Furthermore, Cisco has a 
standardised acquisition process that enables relatively smooth integration of the 
target into the acquirer firm. Coordination has been defined as effective integration of 
activity within the firm. Empirical studies have found a relationship between 
coordination processes and organisational performance (Kale et al., 2002; Puranam 
and Srikanth, 2007). Thus, learning is a process whereby repetition and 
experimentation enable tasks to be performed better and quicker. 
 
Firms may be able to learn how to manage post-acquisition processes by doing more 
of the same, and thereby tacitly forming and refining organisational routines that can 
directly impact the performance of the focal acquisition. This is to say that doing more 
of the same and having experiences from previous transactions gives companies an 
                                                 
12 For a detailed overview, please refer to Section 2.3. 
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edge, allowing them to thrive in their focal acquisition and to be successful when it 
comes to better integrating target firms. 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.4.1, there are many acquisition studies that have tested 
whether learning processes exist within the acquirer firm (Zollo and Singh, 2004; 
Hayward, 2002; Barkema and Schijven, 2008; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Hayward, 2002; Lubatkin, 1983; Kusewitt, 1985). Researchers normally link 
accumulation of experience in prior acquisition deals with an increase in post-
acquisition firm performance, which has been measured by various measures either 
financially or conceptually (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Capron, 
1999; Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Zollo and Meier, 2008). It has been suggested that 
frequent acquirers are better able to develop systems, processes, and routines for 
managing post-acquisition processes than infrequent acquirers (Lubatkin, 1983; 
Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Laamanen and Keil, 
2008).  
 
However, the question of whether emerging market firms learn from their acquisition 
experience had not come up until recently. This is because the number of mergers and 
acquisitions activities in emerging markets has increased over the recent decades, 
leading to more analysable conditions. According to a report by analysts 
Rothenbuexher and Hoyningen-Huene (2008) from the consulting company 
A.T.Kearney, a paradigm shift is occurring between the developing and developed 
world in terms of mergers and acquisition activities. Since 2002, emerging market 
economies have expanded their cross-border acquisitions at an average rate of 17% 
per year and increasingly participate in global transactions. This further shows that 
how rapidly emerging market economies are catching up to developed world 
economies in terms of the number of M&A activities. These emerging market 
economies have been coming out of a financial crisis and, due to the effects of 
globalisation as well as liberalisation, the amount of acquisition activity has increased 
since the end of the 1990s. According to another report by A.T. Kearney (2011), 
M&A activities facilitate emerging market acquirers‘ expansion and capability 
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development strategies and are typically backed by governments with economic 
development plans. Thus, as latecomers, we are not sure whether these emerging 
market firms can learn from their prior acquisition experiences and develop their 
capabilities.  
 
Taking account of all these issues, in the first hypothesis, I examine the standard 
organisational learning hypothesis on acquisition performance in the emerging market 
context, while taking a different approach to previous organisational learning studies. 
Building on the findings of prior research, I expect that the increases in prior 
acquisition experiences will also increase the acquisition performance of focal 
acquisition, and this will build and develop acquisition capabilities. Thus, in my first 
―learning-by-doing‖ hypothesis, I argue that:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: For emerging market acquirers, the greater the acquirer‘s prior 
acquisition experience, the better the performance of the focal acquisition. 
 
In addition to the acquisition experience argument, I am also interested in the 
differences between experienced and inexperienced acquirers. As discussed above, 
learning begins with experience (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). Apart from focal 
organisational unit experience, firms can also develop their capabilities through 
experiences of resource transfer. This can be referred to as vicarious learning (Argote 
and Ingram, 2000). It is assumed that knowledge acquired by experience is embedded 
in the firm‘s routines and capabilities, and affects subsequent performance. Research 
shows that one of the dimensions of experience which has attracted much attention 
from strategic management scholars is its rarity. Hayward (2002) argued that its 
unavailability, inaccessibility, and inapplicability would prevent infrequent acquirers 
from using generated inferences from prior experience. This is because organisational 
memory could reside in routines as well as the managers who know how to perform 
these routines (Winter and Szulanski, 2001). Organisational forgetting may occur 
 138 
when too much time has passed since the acquisition event or after these managers 
have left the firm (Hayward, 2002). Some scholars suggest that firms might forget 
routines and capabilities gained from an acquisition experience more than five years 
in the past (Hayward, 2002; Laamanen and Keil, 2008).  
 
Following the previous discussion of recent increases in acquisition activities in 
emerging market economies, we can also characterise these emerging market firms as 
entrepreneurially-driven. Entrepreneurial spirit through pursuit of opportunities is one 
key domain in emerging market economies (Madhok and Keyhani, 2012). Where 
there is a highly unstable economic and political environment, firms should learn 
what is required to boost their economic performance. These unstable conditions are 
common in emerging economies (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Therefore these firms 
should seek opportunities and transform them into competitive advantages. We can 
conceptualise this argument in this study, as these firms follow an opportunity-driven 
approach; they carry out acquisitions and seek economic development. However, we 
are not sure whether this entrepreneurial dynamism helps them to gain knowledge 
from their prior acquisition and develop their capabilities for focal acquisition. In this 
case, these uncertainties in emerging economies serve as positives rather than 
negatives, since they trigger the entrepreneurial spirit.  
  
Using the logic discussed earlier, I will once again examine firms‘ organisational 
learning through acquisition experience, and assess this knowledge in terms of post-
acquisition performance. However, this time, I will not use the cumulative number of 
acquisition experiences in order to examine the routines generated through 
organisational learning. Instead, I will assess the issue of organisational forgetting by 
comparing experienced and inexperienced acquirers. Moreover, I will examine 
whether increased numbers of experiences are the only factor for organisational 
learning, or whether any acquisition experience affects it. Thus, I propose that 
experienced acquirers are better able to manage the post-acquisition integration 
process than inexperienced acquirers. Then: 
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Hypothesis 1b: For emerging market acquirers, having any prior acquisition 
experience will be positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
 
4.3 Organisational Learning in Emerging Markets and the Role of Similarity of 
Prior Acquisition 
 
After examining standard learning curve effects in the emerging market context, this 
section argues that the characteristics of a prior acquisition experience influence the 
subsequent acquisition performance of emerging market firms. If the characteristics of 
the prior acquisition are similar to those of the focal acquisition, the acquirer firm may 
either generalise relevant prior acquisition decisions or learn from prior acquisition 
mistakes, and not treat the focal acquisition the same as it would have previously. 
Therefore, by developing acquisition capabilities, acquirer firms make appropriate 
inferences and as a result increase their focal acquisition performance.   
 
It was also discussed in Section 2.2.1 that mergers and acquisitions are heterogeneous 
because they are carried out for various patterns of acquisition motives. Firms might 
consider entering a new market through acquisition. Firms may also consider 
acquisitions in order to make an existing market position stronger. For instance, Tata 
Group‘s acquisition of Brunner Mond in 2005 made the combined firm the largest 
producer of soda ash (Tombat, 2006). Moreover, firms might pursue acquisition in 
order to leverage capabilities in new markets. For example, Tata Group‘s acquisition 
of Tetley Tea in 2001 helped them in building considerable marketing power and 
global reach (Noronha, 2001). Furthermore, acquisitions can be a mechanism for 
adding new capabilities and technologies to an existing business unit. Land Rover and 
Jaguar‘s acquisition by the Tata Group in 2008 can be considered a case of capability 
and technology enhancement by the acquirer firm, as the Tata Group retains the 
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distinctive identities of both companies and continues to follow the target firms‘ 
business plans as before. 
 
Market strengthening-based acquisitions are common activities in global industries, 
and they are typically path-dependent because they exploit current resource bases and 
market positions (Hayward, 2002). Acquiring a series of similar businesses helps 
management to specialise in learning about this acquisition process. Furthermore, 
acquiring a series of similar businesses might eliminate competitors, and help firms to 
achieve economies of scale and scope by developing capabilities (Anand and Singh, 
1997; Ahuja and Katila, 2001). This is because, when a firm acquires two industrially 
similar targets in succession, they manage the post-acquisition process successfully 
and integrate the combined firms effectively because of knowledge gained from the 
experience. It is a similar logic to the earlier argument mentioned in Section 2.2.4.3 
that combined firms from related industries frequently exhibit the same set of 
resources, cultures, and operating procedures (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). These 
similarities between acquirer and target firms facilitate the post-acquisition integration 
process, and top management can integrate resources more easily and effectively, 
which leads to performance enhancement (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Going 
beyond this positive relatedness argument, it can be said that when both a prior and 
the focal acquisition‘s target firms are from the same industries, the top management 
of the acquirer firm can apply the same practices and routines associated with the 
prior acquisition, or they can learn from their earlier mistakes and manage the process 
appropriately (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002). Through a series of similar 
businesses acquisitions, the acquirer firm develops specialised routines (Szulanski, 
1999) so as to gain acquisition capability.  
 
On the other hand, acquiring a series of industrially dissimilar targets can cause 
negative outcomes. The acquirer firm may not make use of prior acquisition 
experience during the focal acquisition. Given the targets‘ industrial differences in 
consecutive acquisitions, there is little potential for positive resource transfer, and the 
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acquirer firm‘s top management may not make appropriate generalisations 
(Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002).   
 
Through the similarity of prior acquisitions, firms that acquire a series of similar 
businesses can gain skills for generalising their learning. Therefore, inferences from 
previous acquisitions differ in the extent to which they are relevant for a focal 
acquisition (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). From this, I can argue that firms that 
acquire targets in the same industrial environment perform better than firms that 
acquire targets from dissimilar industries. Based on the above arguments, I present the 
following hypothesis for empirical testing: 
 
Hypothesis 1c: For emerging market acquirers, having a similar prior acquisition in 
terms of industrial relatedness will be positively related with the performance of the 
focal acquisition. 
 
Building on the similarity argument, I would also argue that similarity in the 
geographic scope of a series of acquisitions, in domestic/cross-border terms, develops 
the acquisition capabilities of emerging market firms. A series of cross-border 
acquisitions enables emerging market firms to gain complementary capabilities, 
giving them firms a more complete set of resources, which enables them to tackle the 
subsequent acquisition process more maturely and better understand the nature of 
cross-border acquisitions (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013; Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). 
In a similar sense, a series of domestic acquisitions helps firms to generate a 
routinised mechanism for their post-acquisition integration process. They view this 
routinised integration mechanism as a gain from prior experience, and experience 
from similar contexts generates insights about the conditions under which the 
integration process is necessary for the focal acquisition.  
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Moreover, it is also important to know more about the role of institutional 
environment similarity in acquisition studies. This notion is particularly important for 
emerging market firms, where domestic markets can be characterised as relatively 
weak and capricious institutional environments (Madhok and Keyhani, 2012), 
whereas cross-border acquisitions can be associated with institutional distance, which 
might constitute a barrier for successful integration (Kostova, 1999). Firms with prior 
cross-border acquisition experience should be better able to cope with legitimacy 
issues and more likely to be successful in their integration process (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999).  
 
Thus, when a firm makes a series of cross-border or domestic acquisitions, decision 
makers‘ practices and routines associated with prior acquisitions may be applicable to 
the subsequent acquisition. In this vein, I focus on the influence of the similarity of a 
past acquisition context on subsequent acquisition contexts. Therefore, I propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1d: For emerging market acquirers, having a similar prior acquisition in 
terms of geographical relatedness will be positively related with the performance of 
the focal acquisition. 
 
4.4 Organisational Learning in Emerging Market Business Groups and the Role 
of Prior Acquisition Experience  
 
In the context of emerging markets, business groups characteristically ―consist of 
legally independent firms, operating in multiple (often unrelated) industries, which are 
bound together by persistent formal (e.g. equity) and informal (e.g. family) ties‖ 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007, pp. 331). These emerging market firms are active in many 
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industries, and we are seeing huge increases in the number of mergers and 
acquisitions performed by them. 
 
In management literature, emerging market economies are usually analysed through 
institutional theory (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005). Institutions affect the 
routines of the firm and help these firms in selecting their strategic moves (Peng et al., 
2005). But due to the unstable and weak governance environment in emerging market 
economies, it is always difficult to express effective institutional support (Peng et al., 
2003). This has resulted in the ―principal-principal (PP)‖ problem of corporate 
governance in emerging market economies, which focuses on conflicts between the 
firm‘s controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008). Given 
the concentrated ownership of these emerging market business groups by families, the 
main question here is whether these business groups learn from prior acquisition 
experiences carried out by their sub-firms.  
 
Each individual firm may have their own financial statements, their own top 
management team, and responsibility to its own stakeholders. However, in general, 
these emerging market firms are somehow related to a specific business group. These 
groups in emerging markets are different from their developed world counterparts 
(Peng et al., 2007). For instance, emerging market business groups derive from large 
family firms, with each member company run by various family members or branches 
(Peng et al., 2008). This is to say that in business groups, informal ties, such as cross 
holdings and coordinated actions, are strong (Chung, 2006).  
 
Industrial diversity in these emerging market firms may give them the capability to 
assess whether and which implementation processes are suitable to their acquisitions. 
Moreover, industrial diversity might yield rich inferences about the acquisition and 
allow them to make better generalisations. Taking the learning-by-doing perspective 
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discussed previously in this chapter, I illustrate Hypothesis 1a using acquisition 
activities in business groups, and reach the following conclusion: 
 
Hypothesis 1e: For emerging market business groups, the greater the acquirer‘s prior 
acquisition experience, the better the performance of the focal acquisition. 
 
4.5 Managing Post-acquisition Integration and the Degree of Resource 
Replacement 
 
Researchers have suggested that successful acquisitions include two major 
components: firstly, selecting the right target through strategic and financial analysis 
(Hitt et al., 2001) and secondly, integrating combined firms by managing the post-
acquisition integration process appropriately (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). During the post-acquisition integration period, prior 
acquisition experiences may enable acquirer firms to perform more effective 
integration processes for the focal acquisition by learning from prior experiences and 
making appropriate inferences, and not making the same mistakes. As a result, the 
probability of successful acquisition integration can increase for experienced 
acquirers.  
 
The literature on organisational learning through mergers and acquisitions explicitly 
examines the acquirers‘ experience and acquisition performance phenomena from 
different angles. Obviously, acquisition experience alone is not a sufficient condition 
for greater performance; the better performers are those that reconfigure and manage 
acquired resources in the right way (Capron and Anand, 2007; Hayward, 2002). Thus, 
another important dimension of the post-acquisition integration process involves the 
degree to which pre-existing resources within the target firm are replaced with the 
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equivalent resources of the acquirer, or are simply dismissed (Zollo and Winter, 
2002). 
 
Following this line of argument, it can be asserted that acquisition reconfiguration 
capability (Capron and Anand, 2007) is an important capacity for coordinating and 
transferring resources from the target firm to the acquirer. This capability also 
involves the capacity to replace unneeded resources, such as explicit knowledge of 
manuals, systems, and other mechanisms, in the target firm as a result of the post-
acquisition integration process. Finding the proper balance between achieving the 
required level of organisational integration and minimising the synergistic disruptions 
between combined resources is one of the main challenges for the acquirers‘ top 
management, and this affects the whole acquisition process (Zollo and Singh, 2004).   
 
Reconfiguration capability is not the only component that is needed to be successful 
in the acquisition. As previously discussed, there are some other acquisition-based 
dynamic capabilities, such as selection and identification capabilities (Capron and 
Anand, 2007). Nevertheless, the other acquisition-based dynamic capabilities are 
outside the scope of this research and I therefore only consider the post-acquisition 
integration process, and will treat reconfiguration capability as a crucial element for 
the acquisition capability-building mechanism and an essential foundation for the 
performance of the acquisition.  
 
Acquirers are confronted with conflicts between continuity and change when 
integrating and reconfiguring target firms (Meyer and Lieb Doczy, 2003). In this 
research, I operationalise resource replacement as the changes in the target firm‘s 
resources following an acquisition. I have determined three main resources for my 
arguments, which are top manager, firm name, and headquarters. In Hypothesis 2, the 
degree of resource replacement is the extent to which the predetermined target‘s 
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resources are replaced. The connection of these resources to this study will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
 
In the context of the corporate governance of emerging market firms, there is no 
effective and predictable rule of law, and this causes a weak governance environment 
within the emerging market context (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Of course, emerging 
markets have laws dealing with corporate governance, usually adopted from the 
Anglo-American system, but these laws and regulations, such as information 
disclosure, tender offer materials, and transparency requirements, are flexible and can 
be changed (Peng et al., 2007). Hence, there is a weak standard corporate governance 
mechanism in emerging markets (Peng, 2004). This results in network-based 
agreements on privatisation, increases relational ties, extends the path-dependent 
resource modifications, leads to family-connected changes in top management, and 
results in a less accountable and less transparent organisational structure (Yiu et al., 
2005; Peng et al., 2003; Peng et al., 2008).  
 
In essence, these emerging market firms still are under the control of the founding 
family. These family members, or someone close to them from their network or 
relations, often control the other businesses of these firms. Granted, publicly listed 
firms in emerging market firms have their boards of directors and certainly have 
outside directors as well. However, ―controlling shareholders (often a family or the 
state) usually have had too much concentrated ownership and control rights, which 
allow some of them to potentially expropriate minority shareholders‖ (Peng et al., 
2008, pp. 10). Therefore, due to concentrated ownership and other informal 
mechanisms I would expect that these emerging market firms pursue path-dependent 
change and follow the family-oriented relational tradition after an acquisition, 
replacing the target‘s resources with equivalent resources that already exist in their 
pre-existing businesses. Thus the baseline hypothesis should be proposed as: 
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Hypothesis 2a: For emerging market acquirers, the degree of resource replacement 
will be positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
 
4.5.1 The Role of Deal Characteristics in the Degree of Resource Replacement 
 
A major objective of this hypothesis is to analyse whether acquisition capability can 
explain variations between acquirers in handling post-acquisition management. 
Specifically, this is done by examining how they manage the resource replacement 
process and its effects on the acquisition performance of the acquiring emerging 
market firms. By integrating a resource-based view with the institutional perspective, 
I argue that the development of reconfiguration capability possessed by emerging 
market firms varies depending on the geographic context of the acquisition that the 
firms are able to obtain.  
 
In order to manage an acquisition, acquirer firms should develop their acquisition 
capabilities to be able to respond to specific kinds of acquisition processes. This is so 
because organisational knowledge has a system-dependent and causally ambiguous 
nature. An acquirer firm should be ―considered a novice, regardless of its accumulated 
experience in substantially different types of acquisitions‖ (Zollo and Singh, 2004, pp. 
1240). These firms have to gain new capabilities specific to the new situations they 
face. Thus, understanding the performance implications of post-acquisition resource 
replacement decisions in different contexts (Haspesladh and Jemison, 1991) and 
relating them to organisational learning is very important.  
 
When firms from the developed world make cross-border acquisitions, they usually 
change the target firm‘s resources, such as its top management team, company name, 
and headquarters and other business units (Clark and Soulsby, 2007; Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006). However, when emerging market firms make cross-border 
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acquisitions, rather than aiming to lower costs and create synergies at first, they buy 
foreign firms to learn to deploy assets and resources, and to develop their capabilities 
(Kumar, 2009). Emerging market firms retain the target firm‘s resources when they 
buy foreign firms. This is because many of the emerging market firms lack the skills 
to integrate and leverage international acquisitions (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). 
Managerial knowledge within the target firm plays an important role in successfully 
integrating capabilities and resources. Emerging market firms consider these cross-
border acquisitions to be strategic moves to develop capabilities that will help them 
compete more successfully both domestically and internationally (Yiu et al., 2005). 
Moreover, according to the international business literature, international acquirers 
may face the liability of foreignness (LOF), which exists because acquirer firms do 
not know the local environment, and its cultural and institutional differences (Zaheer, 
1995). Bearing in mind the LOF concept, emerging market acquirers are unlikely to 
reach and effectively use the resources available in the host country as easily as local 
competitors who are much more familiar with the local context (Madhok and 
Keyhani, 2012).  
 
Thus, the acquirer firm can more successfully manage the process if the pre-existing 
resources of the target firm remain in place. In accordance with this observation on 
emerging market international acquirers, I propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: For emerging market acquirers undertaking cross-border acquisition, 
the degree of resource replacement will be negatively related with the performance of 
the focal acquisition. 
 
On the other hand, when emerging market companies pursue domestic acquisition 
within their own geography, they prefer to structurally integrate the acquired company 
with themselves and change the resources of target firms in order to quickly realise 
synergies (Kumar, 2009). This hypothesis is in line with the baseline arguments of the 
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degree of resource replacement for emerging market acquirers. Moreover, the 
industrially-diversified characteristics of these emerging market firms and their 
familiarity with the geographic context enable them to make better inferences 
regarding domestic acquisition, and they can afford to drop the target firm‘s 
resources. If there is not a considerable difference in functional background, emerging 
market firms are less dependent upon these target firms‘ resources (Walsh, 1989). 
Thus, the characteristics of an acquisition are a determinant factor for emerging 
market firms during the post-acquisition management process. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: For emerging market acquirers undertaking domestic acquisition, the 
degree of resource replacement will be positively related with the performance of the 
focal acquisition. 
 
4.6 Managing Post-acquisition Integration and the Role of Top Manager 
Replacement 
 
In the third hypothesis of this study, I will consider the resource replacement 
argument by placing attention on the top manager of the target firm. In order to 
develop our understanding of how organisations learn from mergers and acquisitions, 
it is important to define the vital role of individuals in the context of organisational 
learning through acquisitions. It may be possible to consider top manager replacement 
as a proxy for the target firm‘s replacement of resources. However, given the 
significant impact of the coordination and integration role of top management in 
corporate development, the question arises of how top manager replacement affects 
the combined firm‘s subsequent acquisition performance. Thus, the role of an 
individual executive in learning in corporate development is emphasised in this 
section. 
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One issue that should not be ignored is the existing studies‘ use of the term ―top 
management replacement‖ to refer to a change in the target firm‘s top management 
team following an acquisition. However, in this study I only consider the departure of 
the highest ranking employee of the target firm, who had been in charge of the firm‘s 
overall management. This can be a CEO, or a general manager, or a director of the 
target firm. Because the highest-ranking manager is associated closely with the 
history and culture of the traditional firm, they are assumed to be a proxy for the top 
management team‘s continuity or change (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). Moreover, 
an important distinction can be made as to whether the pre-existing top manager 
leaves the firm or remains active in the firm in other roles than the top manager role. I 
only consider the replacement of a target firm‘s top manager after the acquisition 
takes place. Obviously, the former top manager may still take on some role within the 
combined firm, but this top manager has already been replaced with someone else and 
he/she is in no way the highest ranking employee in the firm.  
 
Organisational learning literature shows that learning occurs at many levels, such as 
individuals, teams, and firms (Crossan et al., 1999; Phillip-Meyer, 2012). The role of 
top management in the post-acquisition process is vital and requires specific attention 
(Teece et al., 2009; Helfat et al., 2007). One aspect that is crucial to the discovery 
process is the relationship between resource replacement, in particular the top 
management change of the target firm, and acquisition performance. For example, the 
CEO of the firm can be either retained and motivated to cooperate, or completely 
replaced with a new team sent from the acquiring firm to the acquired firm (Zollo and 
Singh, 2002).  
 
As discussed in Section 2.2.4.2.4, in a more traditional acquisition approach for 
developed world firms, managerial turnover has been harmful to acquisition 
performance, and the impact increased when more senior managers were replaced 
(Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Kale and Singh, 2004; Capron et al., 1999. More 
recently, Zollo and Singh (2004) reached a similar conclusion by identifying a 
moderating variable of pre-acquisition performance of the acquired firm in order to 
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examine the relationship between top manager replacement and acquisition 
performance.  
 
However, institutionally-based conflicts in corporate governance, such as network-
based strategy, informal relational ties, and a very small number of outside directors 
on the board, make it difficult for researchers who concentrate on the emerging 
market context to use theories that originally applied to developed world contexts. 
This characteristic of the network-based approach and relational ties appears to be 
common in emerging markets, and target firms‘ top managers are most likely to be 
changed after an acquisition. Emerging market acquirer firms assign a manager from 
their family members or a manager from their pre-existing businesses. Changing the 
target‘s top manager might be connected with performance enhancement in the 
acquirer firm. It might be more beneficial for the combined firm to change its pre-
existing top manager, as the benefits of forming a new managerial team might 
outweigh the possible disruptions to organisational routines within the target firm. 
The values and cultures of the acquirer and target firm might be different, and 
additionally the acquirer firm may already carry acquisition experience. Therefore the 
acquirer firm can more easily put forth the strategic decisions that they aim to 
implement within the target, and will not face destructive managerial conflicts.    
 
Thus, in the baseline hypothesis I propose the following for empirical analysis:   
  
Hypothesis 3a: For emerging market acquirers, replacing the top manager of the 
acquired firm will be positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
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4.6.1 The Role of Deal Characteristics in Top Manager Replacement 
 
Considering the baseline arguments on the degree of resource replacement, we can 
examine the replacement of the top manager in terms of the geographical context of 
the corporate acquisitions. By addressing under which conditions the top manager of 
the target firm is replaced within the combined firm, and how this affects acquisition 
performance, I will examine the role of dynamic capabilities in the emerging market 
context.  
 
Top management replacement can be observed in a binary distinction, namely cross-
border and domestic. In terms of cross-border acquisitions, compared to many 
developed world firms, who are now internationalising in order to seek lower costs 
and create value, emerging market business groups are already low-cost and are more 
likely seeking to learn and develop their capabilities to become more competitive 
globally (Madhok and Keyhani, 2012; Peng, 2012). For instance, during the 
acquisition of Novelis, Hindalco, an Indian company, avoided replacing the acquired 
company‘s top management people, and ensured smoother integration (Kumar, 2009). 
In cross-border acquisitions, the emergence of a skilled top management team who are 
more qualified and experienced is expected (Manikutty, 2000) for emerging market 
firms in order to compete in the open global environment. Keeping the target firm‘s 
top management may be a means for the acquirer to develop its capabilities, skills, 
and technologies in a foreign environment. This view is also consistent with the 
emerging market literature (Hitt et al., 1997; Yiu et al., 2005) where the 
complementarity between industrial diversification and international diversification 
offers a firm reach, and economy of scale and scope to degrees unavailable from 
either form of diversification alone.  
 
These emerging market firms view cross-border acquisitions from the perspective of 
international expansion and capability development. Given the strategic role of cross-
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border acquisitions, one might expect that these emerging market acquirers aim to 
impose home country practices and learn management practices from their locations 
(Chang et al., 2009). It is also argued that emerging market firms usually don‘t have 
enough skills to integrate and leverage international acquisitions of larger companies 
from the developed world (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). According to Khanna and 
Palepu (2010), due to the underdevelopment of institutions such as the patent or legal 
system, it is more difficult for these firms to keep and develop internationally 
acquired resources. Therefore, a strategy of replacing the top manager of the target 
firm not only influences individuals but affects the control mechanisms and 
management practices as well (Chen et al., 2005). This leads emerging market firms 
to focus on new business models, new strategies and organisational capabilities 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012).  
 
Therefore, I predict a negative relationship between the replacement of an 
internationally acquired firm‘s top manager and the emerging market acquirer‘s 
acquisition performance. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: For emerging market acquirers undertaking cross-border acquisition, 
replacing the top manager of the acquired firm will be negatively related with the 
performance of the focal acquisition. 
 
On the other hand, there have been fewer empirical studies still that have looked at 
top management replacement and acquisition experience relations from the domestic 
acquisition perspective. In the case of business groups in emerging markets, the 
majority of board members of the group often come from the same family (Yiu et al., 
2005). Often, relational ties and having previously worked at any of the member firms 
are required selection criteria to become a CEO or general manager of a member 
company (Khanna and Rivkin, 2006). This argument draws attention to the 
characteristics of entrepreneurial dynamism of emerging market firms, which relate to 
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a quick decision-making process, the ability to be flexible and resilient within a 
changing environment, and a path-dependent management structure (Madhok and 
Keyhani, 2012; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Acquirer firms may also use top 
management replacement to succeed in a quick transfer of control from the target firm 
to its own top management, thereby reducing resistance to the change (Finkelstein, 
1992). Thus, having an outside director or manager is not a common pattern during 
domestic acquisition, and could be obstructive to the post-acquisition integration 
process.  
 
If these are the scenarios, then I can propose the following hypothesis based on the 
geographical context:  
 
Hypothesis 3c: For emerging market acquirers undertaking domestic acquisition, 
replacing the top manager of the acquired firm will be positively related with the 
performance of the focal acquisition. 
 
4.7 Managing Post-Acquisition Integration and the Role of Name Replacement 
 
I will consider two proxies for resource replacement variable in order to examine 
whether replacement or retention of these resources, namely firm name and 
headquarters, leads us to similar conclusions as the previous arguments. I will keep 
the baseline arguments, which are hypotheses 4a and 5a, in the same directions as the 
resource replacement argument. I will build on my arguments by explaining the role 
of name replacement and headquarters replacement in cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions separately.  
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Similarly to the resource replacement argument in cross-border acquisitions, I expect 
a negative relationship between replacement of the target firm‘s name and acquisition 
performance. As reviewed in the previous section, emerging market firms usually face 
a recognition problem in foreign environments. The target firm may already have a 
cachet and recognition with existing customers and within its own environment. 
Therefore, retention of the target firm‘s name is a better strategy for emerging market 
firms in order to stay competitive abroad.  
 
Conceptualised this way, emerging market firms acquire cross-border firms, even 
more clearly than during developed world firm acquisition, in order to gain 
complementary assets such as products or brands (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013). 
When these emerging market firms take over cross-border targets, there might be a 
question of whether to retain the cross-border target firm‘s brand or simply replace it 
with the emerging market acquirer firm‘s brand. Generally, the acquirer firm would 
prefer to keep the target‘s name for reasons of the target‘s unique brand positioning 
and its acknowledgement in its home country. In the short run, it is important to 
pursue this retention strategy to avoid the loss of too many customers and of the 
target‘s positioning. One can anticipate that the driving issue of being multinational, 
especially through developed world firm acquisition, is not keenly at the leading edge 
for emerging market firms (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013). Instead, these cross-border 
investments often aim to competitively catch up global players by acquiring 
knowledge and developing their capabilities (Kumar, 2009). 
 
From the other side of the coin, I can predict that emerging market acquirers are more 
likely to replace the target firm‘s name when they practice domestic acquisitions. It is 
essential to note that recognition of the brand name is an important marketing 
capability (Keller et al., 1998). Changes in this marketing capability as a reputational 
asset may affect the acquisition performance of the acquirer firm. The brand name 
may impact directly on customer choice and preferences through diminishing 
cognitive dissonance and improving brand equity (Hooley et al., 2005; Keller and 
Lehmann, 2006). We can clearly say that these emerging market firms already possess 
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this reputational asset in their home country. There is already a worthy brand value for 
these emerging market firms in their home countries. By practising acquisition 
activities they generally seek market extension or industrial diversification with their 
own brands. Therefore replacement of the target firm‘s name is vital for acquirer 
firms‘ marketing capabilities, and it can be assumed as an important element for the 
reconfiguration capability of emerging market firms when they practice domestic 
acquisition. Thus, I can suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 4a:  For emerging market acquirers, replacing the name of the acquired 
firm will be positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: For emerging market acquirers undertaking cross-border acquisition, 
replacing the name of the acquired firm will be negatively related with the 
performance of the focal acquisition.  
 
Hypothesis 4c: For emerging market acquirers undertaking domestic acquisition, 
replacing the name of the acquired firm will be positively related with the 
performance of the focal acquisition.  
 
4.8 Managing Post-acquisition Integration and the Role of Headquarters 
Replacement 
 
Another proxy for the resource replacement variable is the replacement of 
headquarters (HQ) following the acquisition. Keeping the baseline argument in a 
similar direction to previous arguments, I suggest that emerging market firms‘ 
decision on replacing the headquarters of the target firm will vary depending on the 
context they are going to operate in. Following a study by Birkinshaw et al (2006), the 
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definition of ―HQ‖ should include two main elements. Firstly, the HQ functions as an 
official location at which an executive management team meets and fulfils the 
responsibilities of other business units, and secondly, the HQ serves as a legal 
domicile of the firm, and its legal registration names this location (Birkinshaw et al., 
2006).   
 
In order to appropriately and successfully manage the target‘s capabilities and take 
advantage of the combination of synergistic resources, the acquirer should be very 
careful in their decision when they acquire a cross-border firm. Certainly, the acquirer 
should benefit from these acquisitions by strengthening links between main 
headquarters in the home country and the pre-existing headquarters of the target firm 
(Ambos et al., 2006). However, this does not mean that the locus of acquisition shifts 
from the foreign country to the home country in emerging markets. The cross-border 
target firm may have already earned a reputation, built customer and supplier bases, 
obtained production skills and possessed a managerial capability in its own home 
environment. Allowing aggressive integration by replacing resources and changing 
target firms‘ corporate headquarters may be perceived incorrectly, and thus backfire 
on the post-acquisition management process. The acquirer should obtain a better 
understanding of the unique processes and home-based capabilities of the target firm. 
By using resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and institutional 
theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1978), Kostova (1999) has argued that the target firm‘s 
managers feel that their positioning is based at lower hierarchical levels in the 
combined firm relative to the acquirer firm‘s managers. Under this condition of 
dependency, the target firm‘s managers seek more internal legitimacy and try to gain 
favourable decisions on their strategies (Kostova, 1999). Therefore, perceptions of 
being flexible and dependent in one‘s judgements may provide an alternative source 
of motivation to target firm‘s managers. Through this strategy, the acquirer firm 
develops a positive attitude toward the acquisition by keeping the target‘s firm 
headquarters separate and applying softer integration.  
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From the domestic acquisition perspective, these emerging market firms 
characteristically follow a path-dependent approach and intend to use their own 
resources after the acquisition has been completed. The acquirer will install its pre-
existing key resources in the target firm, and these practices will inevitably lead to 
assimilation of the target firm. Because of the emerging market firm‘s strong desire to 
improve its own brands under the umbrella of its own resources, I predict a 
replacement of the target‘s corporate headquarters following a domestic acquisition.  
 
 These arguments lead to the following propositions:  
 
Hypothesis 5a: For emerging market acquirers, replacing the HQ of the acquired firm 
will be positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: For emerging market acquirers undertaking cross-border acquisition, 
replacing the HQ of the acquired firm will be negatively related with the performance 
of the focal acquisition. 
 
Hypothesis 5c: For emerging market acquirers undertaking domestic acquisition, 
replacing the HQ of the acquired firm will be positively related with the performance 
of the focal acquisition. 
  
 
 
 
 
 159 
4.9 Summary  
 
In sum, the aim of this study is to determine the influence of acquisition experience 
and post-acquisition integration strategies of emerging market acquirers on acquisition 
performance. In this chapter, I have advanced the testable hypotheses of this study. I 
argue that firms learn from their prior acquisition experiences by learning from their 
organisational memory, and adapt this for the focal acquisition. In addition, similarity 
between acquisitions is an important determinant of performance enhancement for the 
acquirer firms. Furthermore, strategies for resource replacement in the post-
acquisition integration period vary depending on the geographical context of the focal 
acquisition. I propose that emerging market acquirers that replace the target‘s 
resources in domestic acquisitions perform better, whereas it is the exact opposite for 
cross-border acquisitions, and acquirers which keep the target‘s resources enhance 
their acquisition performance. In the following chapter, I will outline the sample and 
methods used to test the hypotheses of this study.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Data and Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 161 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the influence of acquisition experience and post-
acquisition strategies on the acquisition performance of emerging market firms. To do 
so, I first investigate how emerging market firms learn from their acquisition 
experience and develop their acquisition capabilities. Secondly, and more specifically, 
I examine the acquisition-based integration capabilities of these emerging market 
firms and investigate how they develop their capabilities during the post-acquisition 
period. In this study, I test the post-acquisition management attributes and decisions 
of acquiring firms in Turkey by using the event study of acquiring firms‘ market 
returns (Cumulative Abnormal Returns – CAR). The relationship between stock 
market returns and post-M&A management decisions is investigated by assuming that 
investors act promptly to acquire firms‘ stocks. Hand-collected post-M&A integration 
data, obtained from firms‘ annual reports and the Borsa Istanbul‘s notifications, 
shows how the acquirer firms‘ management changed the target firms‘ resources 
(Capron and Shen, 2007). I also conducted seven unstructured interviews to check the 
validity of my theories and empirical findings. The interviewees were owners, CEOs, 
and professionals from M&A advisory and investment banking. These unstructured 
interviews provide me with confirmation that I am on the right track and help me in 
understanding and developing the theories of this study. Therefore, I will not report 
the results of the interviews in a formal way given their nature and purpose.  
 
Importantly, this chapter will be explicitly focused on the quantitative analyses I 
conducted to test the hypotheses derived in Chapter 4. Accordingly, this chapter is 
organised as follows. Firstly, I will describe the sample selection process and explain 
how I reached the resulting sample. Then, I will describe the sources which I used in 
order to obtain the data for this research and will explain the data collection process. 
Next, I will present the models for my research, which are used to test the hypotheses 
of this study. Finally, I will discuss the measurements of each variable which are 
applied to the analysis of the hypotheses.  
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5.2 Deal Selection  
 
I tested the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4 by investigating the acquisitions which 
took place in Turkey from 1998 to 2011. The population for this research included all 
Turkish M&A deals announced and recorded on the Mergermarket database between 
01 January 1998 and 31 December 2011. In general, the Mergermarket database 
covers global M&A deals announced from 01 January 2001; however, the database 
also includes M&A deals announced from 01 January 1998 where the bidder, target or 
seller is European or a subsidiary of a European firm and Turkey falls into the latter 
category. Thus, due to unavailability of information, I only examined focal 
acquisitions which were made from 1998 onwards. This also means that I included 
and investigated the whole population available to the public on the Mergermarket 
database. In what follows, I will explain how I reached the final set of data used in 
this research. 
 
The preliminary total number of merger and acquisition deals collected from the 
Mergermarket database for the period from 1998 to 2011 was 912 deals. These 912 
deals included both public and private firm deals within the given date period. 
Specifically, rather than considering extremely old time frames, such as the 1970s, 
1980s, or even the early 1990s, I examined a more recent time period for my research. 
The effects of the globalising world economies are changing very rapidly, not to 
mention the way the digital world has changed the institutional structure of companies 
as well. Thus, decision makers need more up-to-date and historically closer events to 
make inferences and learn from them. Therefore, this particular dataset allowed me to 
examine the most up-to-date mergers and acquisition activities in Turkey.  
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Figure: 5.1 – Deal Selection Process 
 
 
Since my research goal was to understand the drivers of M&A performance from the 
acquirer‘s perspective, I only selected deals from Turkish acquirers and excluded the 
deals if an acquirer was a non-Turkish firm. At the first stage, 351 deals that were 
acquired by non-Turkish acquirers were removed from the whole population. As such, 
the number of deals dropped to 561 acquisitions. With respect to the deals only by 
Turkish acquirers, since my analyses also aim to examine the business restructuring 
and its effect on acquirer‘s performance, I included the privatisation deals in my deal 
selection process. In theory, upon privatisation deals, effective restructuring activities 
by the acquirers would presumably follow (Peng et al., 2003). As far as this research 
seeks to identify what strategic resource replacement decisions differentiated firms 
that achieved greater performance improvements from firms that recorded 
performance deterioration following the deal, it is important to include these strategic 
transactions of ownership transfer. Moreover, in the case of acquisition of state owned 
enterprises, acquirers have the opportunity to learn to negotiate with the government 
and practice integration process of state owned targets. Thus, the capabilities gained 
through this practice can be counted as a valuable experience and may improve the 
Population = 912 deals 
1. Only deals from Turkish acquirers = 561 deals 
2. Only publicly traded firms = 363 deals 
3. Only completed acquisitions = 328 deals 
  
4. Only majority ownership = 298 
acquisitions 
5. Only whole firm 
acquisitions = 279 deals 
Final data = 279 DEALS 
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chances for a successful deal in the future (Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998). Figure 
5.1 depicts a visualisation of the deal selection process.   
 
Another variable which helped to narrow down the search was that the acquirer must 
be a publicly traded Turkish firm in the Borsa Istanbul on the day of the acquisition 
announcement. This was done in order to enable me to gather information more easily 
from publicly traded firms and measure their acquisition performance according to the 
stock exchange. After excluding deals which were conducted by private firms, I 
compiled a workable sample of 363 deals (as shown in the second stage of Figure 
5.1).  
 
At the next stage, among the whole of all workable acquisitions, 35 deals had been 
terminated prematurely without being completed and thus were dropped from the 
dataset. In this study, I focus solely on completed acquisitions, since I would only be 
able to examine the post-acquisition integration decisions and their performance 
implications through completed deals. Similar to Haleblian and Finkelstein‘s (1999) 
study, I also define completed acquisitions as those in which the acquirer firm goes 
beyond making an offer and pays cash or securities to obtain the shares or assets of 
the target firm. This is due to the fact that I focus only on the post-acquisition 
management of the acquirer firms and the performance implications of completed 
acquisitions. Hence, all abandoned deals were not considered in my dataset. 
Consequently, at the end of the third stage, 328 deals satisfied the criteria.   
 
Studying the majority stake-owned acquisitions, as I do here, seems appropriate 
because firms can only make substantial changes if they may be considered the 
majority in the decision-making process. In line with Haleblian and Finkelstein‘s 
(1999) sample data procedure, I only focused on majority-owned acquisitions. 
According to them, the majority of stake-owned acquisitions are those in which 
―target ownership by the acquiring firm exceeds 50 % voting stake in the board‖ (ibid, 
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pp. 40). After those deals with minority stake acquisitions were removed from the 
dataset (30), 298 deals were left.  
 
In the final stage of the deal selection process, I further separated from the remaining 
deals those which were only partial asset acquisitions. The information about the deal 
comes from the Mergermarket database, under the ‗Deal Description‘ column. I 
examined all of the deals and manually identified those which had been partial asset 
acquisitions. I excluded deals which were completed by acquiring only partial assets 
from the target firm, such as individual branches, power plants, etc. Such deals do not 
result in a change in the ownership of the target firm. Rather, they usually represent a 
strategic move of enlarging the firm‘s volume or expanding its activities rather than 
its significant firm behaviour (usually in an attempt to create value and develop the 
firm‘s management capabilities). At the end of this process, I identified 19 such deals 
and removed them from the dataset. Out of the 912 deals, the resulting dataset 
consisted of 279 acquisitions made by 106 acquirer Turkish firms. 
 
5.3 Data 
 
Most large sample research concerning acquisition experience examined publicly 
traded US firms or developed world firms (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Berkama 
and Schijven, 2008). This research typically relies on publicly available financial and 
organisational data and lacks fine-grained information or databases concerning the 
post-acquisition outcomes of emerging markets. This is due to the fact that 
determining the extent of resource replacement and knowledge transfer cannot be 
easily done within the emerging market context. Acquisition research which includes 
archival information concerning non-US firms and relatively small firms also lacks 
data on how these acquiring firms manage the acquisition process. To overcome these 
limits, wherever applicable, I examined the acquirer and target firms‘ annual reports 
and publicly available announcements to obtain the relevant data accurately. The 
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unique part of this study‘s data is that it is first-hand data, meaning that I have created 
this dataset – something which distinguishes this study not only from emerging 
market studies but also from many other acquisition studies.  
 
A major difficulty in the time series of acquisitions is the necessity of relatively long 
series. In the organisational learning literature, empirical studies for the developed 
world have merged series made by various associations. I investigate acquisitions in 
emerging markets and focus on the case of Turkey at the firm level by considering the 
longest consistent series available to the public.  
  
The data for this research was collected from multiple databases. Most notably, in 
order to conduct this study, I used a unique hand-collected dataset of acquisitions in 
Turkey culled from publicly available data, all of which were obtained directly from 
the annual reports of the firms, Turkey‘s Public Disclosure Platform (PDP) (which is 
operated by the Borsa Istanbul), and the Mergermarket database. The data source of 
the acquisition experience, announcements and completed dates, and the several 
control variables of this study came from the ―Mergermarket‖ database, which is a 
globally comprehensive database for viewing any potential or announced M&A 
activities. The ―deals‖ section of the Mergermarket database records the full 
acquisition histories, including announcements, completed dates, the names of the 
firms involved in the acquisition, deal value, the financial advisors used in the deal, 
the specified sector, the deal‘s description, domestic geography, level of control stake 
acquired by the bidder firm, and the other material terms and conditions of the deal. 
The Mergermarket database also includes information about the relevant firms‘ 
financial details. For the purpose of this study, I used Mergermarket‘s M&A data for 
Turkey.  
 
Alternative databases have also been utilised to examine the reliability of the obtained 
data. For this purpose, I looked at the Thomson Securities Data Corporation Platinum 
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(SDC – Thomson One) database. Mergermarket, which is owned by the Financial 
Times Group, and the SDC – Thomson One database are considered reliable and have 
been used previously in studies appearing in leading journals in other fields, such as 
economics and finance (e.g. Cohen et al., 2010; Laamanen and Keil, 2008). First, I 
extracted data from the Mergermarket database and listed the obtained deals. Then, if 
there were missing data in the Mergermarket database, I double-checked this 
information with the data obtained from SDC – Thomson One. To do this, I matched 
the same deals across the databases, and then compared the similarity of the 
announcements and the completed dates of the deals, firm names and other deal-
specific information across the Mergermarket and SDC databases.  
 
The challenge with combining multiple data sources is identifying the same firms 
across the datasets. While some standardised identifiers exist, such as stock tickers, 
they only exist for a limited number of firms, and are often incomplete or misspelled. 
To maximise the number of correct identifications and ensure correct data for the 
same firms across the data sources, I identified deals manually one-by-one and cross-
matched them across all databases.  
 
Acquisition experience data was collected from the Mergermarket database. After 
reaching the final dataset, I observed that many deals were conducted by the same 
firm within the database by using the database‘s filtering options. I sorted deals based 
on the similarity of firm names.  
 
Resource replacement data was obtained one-by-one from firms‘ annual reports, 
firms‘ official websites, publicly available documents and the Bloomberg database, as 
well as the Public Disclosure Platform (PDP) database, which is operated by the 
Borsa Istanbul. All publicly traded firms in Turkey have to disclose their financial 
details, explanatory notes related to their activities, material events and all other 
disclosures via the PDP. It enables one to obtain past notifications and general 
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information about all listed Turkish firms. The PDP database and firms‘ annual 
reports were screened especially carefully to identify the required information of the 
M&A deals to be used in this research. I also examined target firms‘ publicly 
available reports wherever accessible. If the target firm appeared as a publicly traded 
firm, I examined the target firm‘s annual reports both prior to and after the acquisition 
to capture the change.  
 
For instance, when considering top manager replacement, firstly, I searched the PDP 
database to capture any CEO replacement in the target firm. Then, I looked at the 
acquirer firm‘s annual reports or officially disclosed notifications from their websites. 
If the target was also a listed firm at the time of acquisition, I examined the target 
firm‘s annual reports as well. When I could not reach the intended data through 
publicly available sources, resource replacement was assessed by contacting the 
acquirer firm and requesting information about the post-acquisition decisions of the 
focal deal. At first, I contacted the relevant firm over the phone, though, in some 
instances, a written request was sent. If I did not reach the resource replacement 
decision after all these processes, the related observation appeared as a missing value 
in the dataset.  
 
Finally, in order to ascertain the acquisition performance of the firms, both market 
return data and accounting data were extracted from the Datastream International 
database. This data included information on the share prices of the sample firms and 
accounting items. For market return data, I used the default price code on the 
Datastream. This mnemonic represents the official closing price adjusted for stock 
splits and dividends for the case of Turkey. This is the default data type for all 
equities. I also used Datastream‘s market indices for Turkey, which can be attained 
with the indices of the Borsa Istanbul. Thus, for the accounting data which was 
obtained from the Datastream International database, the ―WC01751 Net Income 
Available to Common‖ code was utilised; likewise, for the denominator of the ROA 
calculation, the code ―WC02999 Total Assets‖ was used for the sake of this research.  
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5.4 Measures 
 
In this section, I will introduce the measures used in this study. I will discuss the way 
how I operationalised the constructs developed in the models. Firstly, I will start my 
discussion by introducing performance indicators in measuring post-acquisition 
success. Then, I will describe how I calculated acquisition experience measures. Next, 
I will introduce resource replacement indicators. Following these three discussions, I 
will present the controls for the models. A summary of description of the measures 
can be found in Appendix B.  
 
5.4.1 Acquisition Performance 
 
The choice of performance measures can be a difficult issue facing researchers in 
organisational studies. One reason for this is the lack of consistency in the M&A 
literature. There are many studies which use a variety of performance measures when 
investigating the outcomes of acquisition activity. Researchers of M&A studies tend 
to believe that no measure of acquisition performance can be considered to be the 
most reliable choice (Zollo, 2009; King et al., 2004; Zollo and Meier, 2008; Hayward, 
2002). Acquisition performance is used to assess the level of wealth which acquirers 
gain from their focal acquisition. The approach here is to explain whether changes in 
the pre- and post-acquisition performance of acquisitions of the observed firms can be 
explained by the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4.  
  
Following many acquisition studies (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; 
Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Zollo and Meier, 2008), firstly, I used the acquirer firm‘s 
short-term cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) following the acquisition. Then, an 
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alternative performance measure of accounting-based ROA was adopted. The short-
term importance of an acquisition can be assessed by the price change in the 
acquirer‘s stock during a period surrounding the event, which can be calculated as the 
difference between the observed and the predicted return for the same stock. 
Therefore, ―the short-term impact of an event is measured by the part of the return 
that is unanticipated by an economic model of anticipated‖ (Haleblian et al., 2006, pp. 
361). M&A scholars have largely relied on short-term stock market measure for 
evaluating M&A performance because changes in stock price can be attributed to the 
acquisition with relative confidence by reducing ‗noise‘ from other potentially 
confounding factors (Haleblian et al., 2009). On the other hand, an alternative 
measure of long-term accounting-based ROA may better serve in predicting the 
synergies obtained from an acquisition during the implementation of M&A following 
the completion of the deal. Because, in that case, the uses of an accounting approach 
in measuring acquisition performance is based on the comparison between pre- and 
post-acquisition financials of the acquirer firm in the long run. Thus, employing 
multiple focal acquisition performance measures of short-term CAR and long-term 
ROA are more appropriate for my dataset and for the purpose of the research. 
 
As discussed in the literature review (Section 2.2.5), in their meta-analysis study, 
King et al. (2004) cumulated research findings for both the stock market and 
accounting based on measures of post-acquisition performance. From the market data 
perspective, acquisition performance is mostly measured through the short-term 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) measure around the acquisition announcement 
based on event study methodology (see McWilliams and Siegel, 1997); this measure 
is the most widely accepted measure of acquisition performance (see King et al.‘s 
(2004) meta-analysis of 93 acquisition studies). Moreover, according to Zollo and 
Meier‘s (2008) review of the 88 M&A articles between 1970-2006, the largest group 
of acquisition performance studies used the short-term stock market approach, this 
being 36 studies (41 % of the examined sample) in their survey.  
 
 171 
Long-term accounting measures were also commonly used in acquisition studies, 
especially in strategic management and organisation studies journals, containing 28% 
of all M&A studies and coming as the second most-used measure with 25 studies 
(Zollo and Meier, 2008). In this study, consistent with the acquisition studies that 
examined acquisition performance, (e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Delong and 
Deyoung, 2007; Selcuk and Yilmaz, 2011; Harrison and Godfrey, 1997) I also used 
the long-term accounting measure known as Return on Assets (ROA) as an alternative 
analysis for this research. 
 
Thus, one of the strengths of this research is the combination of both market and 
accounting data to explore the study‘s hypotheses further, and to boost the robustness 
of the findings. In the following two sections, I will discuss these performance 
measures (including both stock market- and accounting-based approaches) in more 
detail.  
 
5.4.1.1 The Stock Market-Based Measurement (CAR) 
 
The acquisition performance of this study was measured by calculating the firm‘s 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) by using event study methodology 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; King et al., 2004).  
 
Performance measurement is always driven by a careful consideration of different 
trade-offs, and especially by the aim of the study (Zollo, 2009). First of all, the 
performance measurement should deal with the objectivity issue. Any possible bias 
which may arise from subjective assessments needs to be treated with caution if it is 
going to be used as a performance indicator for focal acquisitions (Saunders et al., 
2009). The performance indicator should be as objectively measurable as possible and 
avoid the issue of manipulability. Therefore, a researcher should be very careful in 
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using the subjective assessment of acquisition performance by an acquirer firm‘s 
managers, as it can be subject to manipulation (Bryman, 2008). This condition rules 
out the use of subjective assessment of acquisition performance. Thus, external 
assessment is required for objectivity.   
 
Moreover, given the aim of this study, and since financial and accounting reports are 
available only periodically, there is often a lengthy time gap between an acquisition 
and the next available financial results. I, however, am seeking an effect only from the 
focal acquisition. During this gap of time, many confounding factors apart from the 
acquisition activity may influence the reported excessive accounting results 
(Haleblian et al., 2006). In particular, some firms in my sample made more than one 
acquisition during a given year. Furthermore, accounting data from financial reports 
may not make an express distinction between the performance effects of single 
acquisitions made in the same financial reporting period and other organisational 
activities. Thus, it may be tricky to separate the effects of any focal acquisition effect 
precisely from the accounting measures.  
 
The CAR has been by far the most frequently used analytic approach for measuring 
acquisition performance in acquisition studies and in the strategic management 
literature (King et al., 2004; Zollo and Meier, 2008; Haleblian et al., 2009). Haleblian 
and Finkelstein (1999), Hayward (2002), Laamanen and Keil (2008) and McDonald et 
al. (2008) also used this method to assess whether acquirers learn from their 
experience. According to Hayward (2002, pp. 26), ―there is some evidence that this ex 
ante measure also predicts the ultimate performance of an acquisition‖. Utilisation of 
a market-based measure provides a market assessment of the changes in the future 
performance of the firm (Powell, 1997). I followed the same path as the received 
acquisition literature mentioned above, and used stock market measurement to predict 
acquisition performance.  
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Additionally, the CAR, which an acquirer firm is able to achieve in the focal 
acquisition, is a good proxy for the acquisition management performance of the firm 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Given the fact that firms must pursue many other 
organisational activities following an acquisition, coupled with a lack of objectively 
strong assumptions about which effects belong to which activity, we may miss the 
impact of managerial decisions in the post-acquisition period if we use longer period 
measures. Researchers assume that the CAR measure can evaluate the firm‘s ability to 
select the appropriate target and to implement the acquisition successfully through 
immediate market reactions (Anand et al., 2005; Hayward, 2002).  
 
Regarding the Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5, resource replacement decisions are put into 
action after the completion of the negotiation process and successful agreement 
between both parties. I chose the short-term stock market return measure CAR along 
with the long-term accounting measure ROA in order to assess the hypotheses. Events 
that happened during the post-M&A integration period were anticipated when using 
the short-term stock market return measure CAR. I re-assume that these resource 
replacement decisions were part of the negotiation at the time of the deal. Therefore, I 
carefully selected resource replacement proxies of top manager, headquarter, and 
brand name. I assume that integration decisions about these key resources are likely to 
be known at the time of the official announcement.  
 
Negotiation is a fundamental element of a pre-M&A deal process. Generally, firms 
deal with major resource replacement issues at the definitive agreement stage. Then, 
the deal officially announces to the public with the rationale, details, and terms and 
conditions of the deal. The main database of this research, Mergermarket, already 
includes some of this information. In other cases, I searched the firm‘s websites, their 
annual reports, and the public disclosure platform database. For instance, in the case 
of Teknosa‘s acquisition of Primex, the announcement explicitly revealed that during 
the post-M&A period, the former majority owner of Primex will become the general 
manager of Teknosa Romania. More recently, it is revealed by Yildiz Holding on the 
day of United Biscuits takeover announcement that they apply independent 
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management model that it‘s been successfully implementing at Godiva. These cases 
further prove that financial markets have information about resource replacement 
strategies at the time of the deal.  
 
Subsequently, the CAR in each acquisition can also be considered as the market‘s 
objective estimate of the firm‘s acquisition capability applied to a particular 
acquisition at a given point in time (e.g. Arikan and McGahan, 2010; Zollo and Singh, 
2004). Therefore, stock market measurements are an appropriate performance 
measure for this study. Moreover, scholars argued that this ex ante measure of 
acquisition performance could serve this study‘s goals by estimating ex post 
performance successfully (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).  
 
5.4.1.1.1 Event Study Methodology 
 
In this study, I used event study methodology in order to calculate CAR. The benefit 
of this methodology comes from the fact that the influence of a focal acquisition is 
assumed to reflect the market reaction immediately upon the arrival of new 
information (Campbell et al., 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). In this section, I 
will describe the process of conducting an event study to measure CAR for this 
research.  
 
Event study methodology provides a measure of value creation for investors. 
Theoretically, stock prices can be counted as the present value of expected future cash 
flows within the efficiency argument (Tuch and O‘Sullivan, 2007). If the markets 
were not efficient, the new information would get adjusted gradually. Given 
rationality in the marketplace, results from event studies assume that the market 
responds rapidly to the new information, and reaction to the stock price can be seen 
within a short time period following deal announcement (Campbell et al., 1997). 
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Therefore, using this method, researchers determine whether there is an abnormal 
stock price outcome related to the focal acquisitions. 
 
In this research, an event study methodology is employed to measure abnormal 
returns of the acquirer in public deals. The focus is the effect of an event on the price 
of the sampled firms. For the purpose of this study, I measured acquisition 
performance in terms of excess stock returns. The first part in conducting an event 
study is to describe the event of interest. In this case, I linked the event of interest 
with the announcement of the acquisition, which is   = 0. The next part is the 
identification of the event window, which covers the period in which the stock price 
of the firms was involved in the acquisition event. After determining this event 
window, it is examined to capture the effects of the event on stock prices. In this 
research, immediate acquisition returns are the abnormal returns of the acquirer firms 
as measured over a 3-day interval (the day of the acquisition announcement and the 
days immediately prior to and after the focal acquisition‘s announcement). Additional 
event windows around the announcement date were selected to capture some of the 
common CAR windows employed in the M&A literature for later comparison of the 
results, and for robustness. Small window intervals are more powerful in predicting 
accurate market reactions to an event while large window intervals may capture the 
effect of unrelated events to the acquisition. Thus, the window around an event should 
be set carefully (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).  
 
The event period is usually centred on the announcement date. To remove any bias 
due to changes in a firm‘s characteristics around the acquisition announcement date, I 
use short term windows, as this is consistent with previous studies (Capron and Shen, 
2007; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). In the supplementary analyses, I also 
measured immediate acquisition abnormal returns of the acquirer firms over 5-day 
(two days prior to the acquisition announcement and two days after the 
announcement), 7-day, 9-day, and 11-day intervals. These windows are (  = -2, 0… 
+2), (  = -3…0…+3), (  = -4…0…+4) and (  = -5…0…+5) day intervals for the 
short-term CAR analysis.  
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The announcement date, which is day 0 (     is the one given by the Mergermarket 
Database. These intervals are the most commonly used windows in both management 
and finance literatures (see King et al.‘s (2004) meta-analysis of 93 M&A studies), as 
the short time period ensures our estimates are not vulnerable to noise in the data, 
such as other important events. For instance, whereas Brown and Warner (1985), 
suggest the eleven-day window (  = -5…0…+5), most researchers (Campbell and 
Wasley, 1993; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999) use the 
commonly applied 5-day window intervals (  = -2…0…+2). Moreover, in order to be 
more accurate about the market reaction to the acquisition announcements and to 
portray the immediate lead effects, a 3-day window (  = -1, 0… +1) around the 
announcement date is also frequently used (Conn et al., 2005; Arnold and Parker, 
2007).  
 
Consistent with prior literature (Hayward, 2002; Meyer-Doyle, 2012; Capron and 
Shen, 2007), another reason for using different time intervals was to avoid bias that 
may derive from information leakage. Thus, longer intervals seek to take out the 
effect of acquisition news that could already be circulated in the market before the 
announcement and potentially affect stock prices.   
 
Subsequently, in order to evaluate the impact of focal acquisition in my dataset, I 
needed a measure for the predicted returns. This is the return expected in absence of 
any event, for each day   in the event window for each firm  . There are three 
methods that are often used in acquisition performance studies. These are the mean 
adjusted return, the market model, and the market adjusted return methods (Brown 
and Warner 1985). Consistent with the literature, the approach for this study is based 
on computing a market-adjusted model for each firm in my dataset and then 
calculating for abnormal returns. This is a preferred method for calculating abnormal 
returns designed by Brown and Warner (1980), and is practiced in both strategic 
management and finance literatures (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Walsh and 
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Kosnik, 1993). This method implicitly adopts the assumption that the acquisition 
event is exogenous with regards to changes in market value of the stock (Campbell et 
al., 1997). That is to say, the change in stock price of the firm is correlated with the 
acquisition event.  
 
Following Laamanen and Keil (2008), and Haleblain and Finkelstein (1999), I did not 
use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for calculating the CAR for the acquirer 
firms, due to potential problems of identifying the beta in previous studies (Fama and 
French, 1996). It was suggested by Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) that even though 
the market-adjusted model is very simple, it leads to deriving expected and abnormal 
returns in a more powerful way than the other more complex models. The market-
adjusted model assumes that the stocks‘ expected returns, in any period, are the same 
as the expected market returns in that period (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Thus, the 
expected return for a security in period   would be equal to the market return in 
period  . 
 
Moreover, it can be said that the market-adjusted model is an approximation of the 
capital asset pricing model and assumes that the ordinary least squares regression is 
set to 0 and 1 respectively for each stock (Campbell et al., 1997). As a result, the 
market model equation mutates into the market-adjusted returns model equation. 
Since the parameters are predefined, a separate estimation window is not necessary.  
 
The daily excess returns of a firm   for day    (      ) is thus estimated as:  
             -            (5.1) 
where: 
       = Abnormal return for firm   on day    . That is, the rate of return on the stock 
is adjusted by subtracting the normal return (      from the actual return (     ;  
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     = observed individual firm  ’s return for day    (Actual Return); 
and     = return on the Borsa Istanbul market index for the same day    (Normal 
Return). 
 
The actual return and the market return are computed with the continuously 
compounded return, which requires the use of natural logarithms of two successive 
daily prices. In this case, the returns are calculated by means of the following 
equations:  
                           (        (            ( ) 
                 (        (          (  ) 
 
where     the closing stock price for firm    on the day of the event  , and      
 the closing stock price for firm   one day before the acquisition announcement 
(    .  
 
Then, the abnormal return calculations are aggregated into the cross-section in order 
to draw overall inferences. I define     (   ,   ) as the cumulative abnormal return 
for firm   from day     to day    , where    <     <           (Campbell et al., 1997). 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) measure may be given as follows: 
       (   ,   )   ∑       
   
           (5.2). 
 
For example, the 3-day event period (  = -1, 0, +1) for firm    can be expressed as;  
       (-1, +1)   ∑                             (      
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To interpret the results clearly, a measure for statistical significance is required. This 
can be done by calculating the t-statistic of cumulative abnormal returns      (   ,   ) 
across all acquirers (         . Then, within a certain level of confidence, I 
can infer whether these abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns differ from 
zero. For this, I use the cross-sectional t-test method, which was used by Brown and 
Warner (1980) in order to make my interpretations. In this method, the estimation 
period estimates of variance are ignored and the event window cross-sectional 
standard deviation is used for its t-test.  
 
A statistical test of the cumulative abnormal returns are commonly based on the 
cumulative average abnormal return     (   ,   ) measurement. For a sample of N 
stocks, the cross-sectional means that the cumulative abnormal return is stated as a 
cumulative average abnormal return     (   ,   ). The equation may be defined as:  
      (   ,   )   
 
 
 ∑           (            (5.3). 
 
Under the null hypothesis, the cumulative average abnormal return is equal to zero. 
The standard deviation of the cumulative average abnormal return is calculated on the 
basis of the standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal return     (       ) of 
each sample security (Brown and Warner, 1980). The variance estimator of this 
statistic is based on the cross-section of cumulative average abnormal 
returns     (        , where:  
                         (           
 
 
 ∑      (             (               (5.4). 
 
Then, the cross-sectional t-test, which was used by Brown and Warner (1980) can be 
computed as: 
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                            (         
       
         (5.5). 
 
Brown and Warner (1980) show that the cross-sectional t-test is robust to an event-
induced variance increase.  
 
5.4.1.2 The Accounting-Based Measure (ROA) 
 
I also measured the long-run change of acquisition performance through Return on 
Assets (ROA) to examine the impact of the focal acquisition on firm performance, as 
well as to test the robustness of my results. Accounting data is an important formal 
source that informs internal and external stakeholders about the health of the firm 
through accounting reports. Therefore, as an alternative to the main stock market-
based approach, accounting measures allow us to estimate the difference in firm 
performance of the acquirer firm in pre- and post-M&A years, and are one of the main 
performance measures for M&A studies (Ramaswamy, 1997). 
 
Although the CAR is the most appropriate and practical measure of acquisition 
performance for this study, in organisational studies there is simply no perfect 
measure that captures the exact effect (Zollo, 2009). Given the fact that all 
measurements have their own drawbacks and limitations, the main performance 
measure of CAR may also have some downsides. It is the collective response of 
investors regarding the potential performance implications of an acquisition rather 
than the realised benefits of the acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). For this 
reason, I used short time windows. I also conducted a supplemental analysis in which 
I utilised an accounting measurement based on the acquiring firm‘s pre- and post-
acquisition performance via Return on Assets (ROA) for the robustness of the CAR.  
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There are some other compelling reasons for measuring the long-term acquisition 
effect based on an accounting measurement. Accounting measures are able to capture 
the actual financial performance of the firm over a period of time (Delong and 
Deyoung, 2007). Moreover, the accounting ratio allows me to analyse the overall 
financial performance of a firm following a focal acquisition. Additionally, as one of 
the aims of this study is to examine the firm‘s resource replacement decisions during 
the post-acquisition period, the long-term accounting-based measurement ROA can 
serve this purpose.  
 
Furthermore, Harrison and Godfrey (1997) and Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) 
found that the stock market-based event abnormal return method was positively 
associated with a change in ROA measurements, demonstrating that markets can 
predict the future profitability of an acquisition at the time of an announcement. 
Hence, acquirer abnormal returns, an ex-ante measure of acquisition performance, 
have been shown to predict ex post performance successfully. In this regard, prior 
research has shown that the CAR measure is highly convergent with other accounting 
measures of performance (e.g. Kale et al., 2002). 
 
Following the prior literature on acquisition studies (Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Akben-
Selcuk, 2008; Delong and Deyoung, 2007; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), I also 
defined acquisition performance of ROA as the change between pre-acquisition to 
post-acquisition.  
 
I also used the following method to assess changes in acquisition performance: 
                                
              
               
    (5.6). 
 where 
                                is the return on asset for acquirer firm   in year    
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               is the net income for acquirer firm   in year     
                 is the total assets for acquirer firm   in year    
 
ROA is the predominant measure of operating performance in M&A studies (King et 
al., 2004; Dickerson et al., 1997). ROA is calculated using the net income as a 
percentage of the average total assets. In order to assess the changes in the ROA of the 
acquirer firms, and as consistent with prior literature (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Selcuk 
and Yilmaz, 2011), I also employed the change model. In line with Zollo and Singh 
(2004) and Zollo and Reuer (2010), the post-acquisition performance of a firm was 
compared to its pre-acquisition performance. In this regard, I used a 3-year window 
and calculated change in the ROA of the acquirer firm as the difference between the 
ROA of the firm one year after the focal acquisition versus the same performance 
measure with one year before the acquisition and divided into the ROA one year 
before the acquisition year. Thus, 
                    =          -                     (5.7) 
 
where 
                                is the change in return on assets for acquirer firm 
  in year    
          is the return on assets for acquirer firm   in year    , 
         is the return on assets for acquiring firm   in years    . 
 
Following prior acquisition studies‘ method of using an accounting measurement to 
capture acquisition performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 
2004; Selcuk and Yilmaz, 2011; Barkeman and Schijven, 2008), the focal acquisition 
year is omitted from the comparison approach because it usually includes the 
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integration decisions of the acquirer firm when the acquirer and target firms merge. 
Acquisitions can happen at any time during the firms‘ accounting period. Given the 
importance of objective constructions for the acquisition of performance measures, in 
line with the studies mentioned above, I set a standard frame to calculate the sampled 
firms‘ ROA. Longer accounting periods after the acquisition represent a compromise 
in that long-term accounting approach and may introduce confounding decisions and 
events into the performance measure (Zollo and Reuer, 2010). That is to say, 
acquisition performance may recognise a number of typical events or other important 
organisational activities that may affect the performance and mislead comparisons. 
 
Consequently, the evidence of predictive validity mentioned above increases the 
confidence in using abnormal returns as a reasonable tool for ascertaining the firm‘s 
main acquisition performance, as well as in the accounting-based approach ROA as an 
alternative measure for this study. My interest in this research is the performance 
implications of organisational learning through acquisition experience and integration 
decisions in the acquiring firms; thus, it is appropriate to use a market-based 
performance measure to analyse the robustness of the accounting-based measurement. 
Even though each acquisition performance indicator has its own strengths and 
drawbacks, the performance measurements used in this study served the purpose of 
this study; furthermore, they were attractive options in terms of objectivity and were 
capable of examining multiple dimensions of performance. 
 
5.4.2 Acquisition Experience 
 
In the first part of this research, I examined the effect between acquisition experience 
and acquisition performance. In the first sub-hypothesis of the acquisition experience 
phenomenon (H1a), I predicted a positive relationship between the number of 
acquisition experiences and acquisition performance. In the second sub-hypothesis 
(H1b), I suggested a positive association between any prior acquisition experiences 
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and acquisition performance. Later, I suggested that similarity of prior relatedness 
positively influences acquisition performance (H1c). Similarly, I hypothesised that the 
similarity of the prior and the focal deal characteristics in terms of cross-border and 
domestic acquisitions has a positive effect on acquisition performance (H1d). Lastly, I 
proposed that at the group level any prior acquisition experience has a positive 
relationship with acquisition performance (H1e). A summary of the all measures used 
in this study can be found in Appendix B.  
 
Most strategic management scholars would define organisational learning as a change 
in the firm‘s knowledge that arises from experiencing a certain task (Fiol and Lyles, 
1985; Argote, 2012). This knowledge can appear as changes in organisational 
cognition or managerial behaviour, which contains tacit, explicit, and hard-to-
articulate mechanisms. On the other hand, it is difficult to conceptualise knowledge at 
the firm level of analysis. Some scholars have assessed firm-level knowledge by 
measuring of the thoughts and opinions of firm employees (Huff and Jenkins, 2002); 
while others have examined routines and practices in which the knowledge is 
embedded, observing changes within these routines and practices as reflections of 
changes in knowledge (Levitt and March, 1988). Current qualitative or subjective-
managerial approaches to measuring organisational learning by means of examining 
changes in cognitions are not able to capture tacit or hard-to-define knowledge; thus, 
they are not generalisable to organisational learning (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 
2011; Argote, 2012). In contrast, approaches evaluating knowledge acquisition by 
measuring changes in performance have the benefit of capturing knowledge gained 
through experience (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). Thus, given the difficulties of 
measuring firms‘ gained knowledge and organisational learning through qualitative 
research, and by following many strategic management scholars (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Zollo and Singh, 2004), I will also use a 
quantitative research method for examining the hypotheses of this research. This 
procedure may have advantages in terms of providing more objectivity to the study.  
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I examined acquisition experience by means of five different measures. The sub-
groups of acquisition experience that were computed for the purpose of testing the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are as follows: i) the number of acquisition 
experiences; ii) any prior acquisition experience dummies; iii) the similarity of prior 
industrial relatedness; iv) the similarity of prior geographical relatedness; and v) the 
group level of acquisition experience dummies. 
 
Some scholars (Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Hayward, 2002) have suggested using time 
windows of no more than 5 years due to diminishing organisational memory. These 
scholars have argued that firms may forget the knowledge that they gained from 
acquisitions and that the corporate learning curve declines after five years. Following 
their example, I also used 5-year time windows to examine firms‘ prior acquisition 
experiences. In order to supplement my analyses and make  my tests more robust, I re-
ran the models by using alternative time windows (2 years, 3 years, 4, years, 5 years, 
and 7 years) to accumulate acquisition experiences by taking account of all 
acquisitions made 2, 3, 5, and 7 years prior to the focal acquisition.  
 
The first predictor of acquisition performance is the traditional acquisition experience 
measure used by many strategic management researchers (Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hitt et al., 2001; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Ingram and Baum, 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Hayward, 2002). I computed 
acquisition experience as the number of acquisitions completed by the acquirer‘s firm 
in my sample prior to my window of observation and coded them as ‗acqexp‘ in the 
analysis.  
 
Secondly, I created the firm-level acquisition experience dummy, which I coded as 
‗firmexpdummy‘. The dummy receives a score of 1 if the firm had any prior 
acquisition experience within the past 5 years, a 0 otherwise.  
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Thirdly, consistent with prior research (Hayward, 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1999; Laamanen and Keil 2008), I determined the similarity of prior relatedness as the 
similarity of businesses across targets. In other words, this measure examines the 
similarity between all of the businesses prior to the focal acquisition. According to 
some studies, this measure is referred to as a ―target-to-target similarity‖ (Haleblian 
and Finkelstein, 1999; Laamanen and Keil, 2008). I employed a similar method to 
these previous studies, but rather taking a series of prior acquisitions, I only 
considered two consecutive acquisitions—the focal acquisition and the preceding 
acquisition—for the purpose of constructing the ―priorrelated‖ measure. In other 
words, firms are better able to adapt more recent knowledge. According to this 
measure, if the prior acquisition is within the same SIC code as the focal acquisition, 
the dummy is given a 1; otherwise, a 0. 
 
Fourthly, I extended the similarity argument and created a new proxy to predict the 
impact of acquisition experience on acquisition performance. In this acquisition 
experience sub-group, I measured the similarity of the prior acquisition in terms of its 
geographical relatedness. Thus, the ―priorcrossborder‖ measure compares the focal 
acquisition with the prior acquisition in terms of being made in the same geographic 
area. For instance, if both the focal and the preceding acquisitions were either made 
domestically or were both cross-border acquisitions, the measurement assumes that 
they possess similar deal characteristics. Consequently, if the focal and the preceding 
acquisitions are characterised as being domestic or cross-border acquisitions then the 
―priorcrossborder‖ dummy takes a 1; otherwise, a 0.  
 
Lastly, the previous literature usually assessed the acquisition experience 
phenomenon at the firm level and in some cases at the transaction and individual 
levels. I created a new acquisition performance measure in order to assess learning at 
the group level. Given the nature of Turkish corporate structure, where many 
publicly-traded firms operate as subsidiaries to business groups or as business groups 
themselves, I extended the acquisition experience argument and examined the 
phenomenon at the group level as well. In this study, the group level dummy measure 
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is coded as ―groupexpdummy‖. According to the ―groupexpdummy‖, if the business 
group or its subsidiary had any prior deals in the past 5 years before the focal 
acquisition, the dummy receives a 1; otherwise, a 0.  
 
Zollo and Meier (2008, pp. 56) argued that, at the deal level, ―the performance of the 
entire acquisition encompasses all the phases of the acquisition process and focuses 
on the actual value creation eventually generated by the acquisition‖. At the same 
time, the value created through the acquisition will have a positive effect on overall 
firm performance (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). In line with the prior acquisition 
literature mentioned in Section 2.2.4.1, acquisition experience was defined at the firm 
level. In such cases, the unit of analysis for this research is the acquisition that the 
sampled firms completed at the firm level. This measure directly taps into the 
accumulation of prior experiences, thereby providing a more accurate picture of 
which firms develop acquisition capabilities through organisational learning and how.  
 
5.4.3 Resource Replacement  
 
I measured acquirers‘ post-acquisition management decisions by examining their 
resource replacement after the focal acquisition. In the sub-groups of resource 
replacement hypotheses, I predicted a positive relationship between acquisition 
performance and degree of resource replacement (Hypothesis 2a), top manager 
replacement (Hypothesis 3a), name replacement (Hypothesis 4a), and headquarter 
replacement (Hypothesis 4b) respectively. Then, I divided each of my resource 
replacement arguments into two: namely, cross-border and domestic acquisitions. I 
expected a negative relationship between the sub-groups of the resource replacement 
arguments in cross-border acquisitions and acquisition performance, but a positive 
relationship between the same arguments in domestic acquisitions and acquisition 
performance. In order to investigate the resource replacement measures associated 
during the post-acquisition period, I drew on existing research to construct variables 
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(Anand et al., 2005; Zollo and Singh, 2004). I identified three main resources which 
examine post-acquisition resource transfer and which could be important indicators of 
the reconfiguration capability of building mechanisms. These resources were top 
manager change, firm name change, and headquarters change. These three resource 
replacement decisions are coded as ―CEOchange‖, ―namechange‖, and ―hqchange‖, 
respectively. These measures are proxies for the assessment of post-acquisition 
strategies and the development of integration capability mechanisms as discussed in 
Chapter 4. For the purpose of this research, I examined the effect of these resource 
changes on acquisition performance by using the short-term market model. I use four 
different sub-groups of resource replacement variables: namely, degree of ―resource 
replacement‖, ―CEOchange‖, ―hqchange‖, and ―namechange‖.  
 
In the first group of resource replacement, I associate degree of resource replacement 
with the number of resource changes in the target firm. This measurement is coded as 
―degree‖. Therefore, out of the 3 identified resources, if an acquirer‘s firm replaces all 
of the target firm‘s resources, the ―degree‖ scores 3; if they changed any two of these 
resources, the ―degree‖ receives a score of 2; if only one resource is replaced, the 
―degree‖ measure gets 1; and if none of them are replaced, the ―degree‖ obtained is 0. 
Measuring the extent of these resource replacements following the focal acquisition 
allows me to capture not only the degree of resource replacement but also the patterns 
of their being able to reconfigure the building mechanism and develop their 
integration capability.  
 
Secondly, in order to capture the replacement of CEOs in the target firm, I included a 
dummy indicating whether a CEO replacement occurred within a year‘s time (i.e. 12 
months) following the announcement date of the acquisition. These CEO changes 
were mainly identified via firms‘ annual reports and publicly available data. Publicly 
traded firms reveal their reports both periodically and annually. These reports include 
those firms‘ organisational activities. For example, if a deal occurred in 2007, in order 
to identify the CEO replacement trends of the target firm, I examined both the 2007 
and 2008 annual reports of the acquiring firm. In this case, the post-acquisition period 
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started with the announcement date of the deal. If there was a change in the top 
managers of the target firm following the focal acquisition, the ―CEOchange‖ dummy 
took the value 1; otherwise, 0.  
 
Top managers are the people in charge of the target firm. This person could be a 
chairman, a president, a CEO, or a general manager of the firm. Thus, I qualified top 
managers as individuals who hold the highest ranking position in the firm. According 
to previous studies (Barkema and Schijven, 2008; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993), top 
manager change in the target firm triggers major organisational change and is a 
significant determinant of post-acquisition performance. I refer to this as 
―CEOchange‖ in this research. In some cases, the change of the target firm‘s top 
manager, or other resource replacement measures, cannot be determined due to a lack 
of information. When it could not be accurately be determined whether there was a 
change or not, I contacted the related firm. Where I could not reach the firm, the 
resource replacement dummy appears as a missing value in the dataset.  
 
Thirdly, the process of measuring name change in target firms is roughly similar to 
the process of determining the aforementioned resource replacement measures. In 
order to find this data, I researched the firms‘ annual reports, their official websites, 
and their public disclosure platform (PDP) data. This hand-collected data appears as 
―namechange‖ in the analysis. I then attempted to find out whether a name change 
occurred in the target firm during the one-year post-acquisition period after the 
announcement date. Thus, the ―namechange‖ dummy received a score of 1 if the 
target firm‘s name was replaced with another name after the completion of the 
acquisition and 0 otherwise.  
 
Finally, according to the literature, there is no certain way of measuring headquarters 
(HQ) location (Birkinshaw et al., 2006). Prior research considered three relevant 
indicators: the legal domicile, the location of the top management team, and the 
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location of the various HQ functions. In this study, my approach for choosing HQ 
location is consistent with Birkinshaw et al. (2006). In this regard, HQ location is 
determined based on the firm‘s address as stated in the firm‘s annual report. Annual 
reports contain the HQ addresses of the firms and their addresses. Therefore, as the 
same as other resource replacement measures, ―hqchange‖ refers to the unique hand-
collected data which was obtained from the firm‘s annual reports, PDP database, their 
official websites, and other publicly available data.  
 
I operationalised the headquarters replacement of the target firm as a dummy variable. 
Likewise, I also measured the headquarters change variable, ‗hqchange‘, by creating a 
dummy which is given the value of 1 if a target firm‘s headquarters is replaced within 
1 year‘s (12 months‘) time after the announcement date of the deal, and 0 otherwise.  
 
5.4.4 Controls 
Cross-border: In this research, I used a traditional domestic versus cross-border 
measure on focal acquisition in order to investigate whether acquiring a domestic 
versus a cross-border firm changes acquisition performance. I assessed domestic 
versus cross-border acquisition with a dummy measure named ―crossborder‖. It 
received the value 1 if a Turkish firm acquired a foreign firm and a 0 if it acquired 
another firm from Turkey. I define cross-border deals as acquisitions of foreign firms 
only by firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul. 
 
Geography, in relation to a firm, is defined by the dominant geography of the target 
and the acquirer firms. The dominant geography is the location of the headquarters of 
the firm in question. Geographic scope tends to affect firm performance (Barkema and 
Schijven, 2008; Hitt et al., 1997). There is a large body of literature (commonly 
known as internalisation theory) which argues that cross-border acquisitions are 
mainly determined by the willingness of the acquirer to divert its excess resources and 
to make use of the target‘s location-specific resources – something which is necessary 
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in order to make the redeployment of other resources practicable (Capron, 1999; 
Hennart, 1982; Morck and Yeung, 1992).  
 
As mentioned earlier in the literature review section, I also investigated whether the 
fact of acquiring a domestic versus a cross-border firm increases the market 
performance of the firm, as well as how these firms manage their acquired resources. I 
argued that emerging market firms are more likely to apply a smoother integration 
process and to keep the target‘s resources in cross-border deals. By employing 
domestic versus cross-border measurements, I tested the third, fourth, and fifth 
hypotheses; they predicted that the effects of acquisition performance and resource 
replacement measurements depend on the contextual characteristics of the deal. I also 
controlled the ‗cross-border‘ measure in all models.  
 
Relatedness: Following the precedent set by other acquisition studies (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Anand et al., 2005; Zollo and Singh, 2004), I employed the target-
to-acquirer business similarity measure for the sake of this research. This traditional 
control measure aims to analyse industrial relatedness between the acquirer and the 
target in the focal acquisition. This measure has been viewed as being a key 
antecedent to acquisition performance, even though empirical evidence on the 
industrial relatedness-performance relationship has been mixed (Stahl and Voigt 
2008, King et al. 2008). Given the importance of the choice in diversification 
measures, I was concerned with the nature of the relationship of the acquiring firm 
with the target firm. 
 
Following many prior studies‘ approaches (Rumelt, 1974; Porter, 1987; Harrison et 
al., 1991), I compared the target and acquirer two-digit SIC codes. If the deal falls into 
the same two-digit SIC code, the ―related‖ dummy takes the value 1, and 0 otherwise. 
If the deal aims to diversify acquirer firms‘ businesses, it takes a different SIC code 
and the ―relatedness‖ score is 0. The data required making the distinction between 
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related and unrelated acquisitions. The deals‘ two-digit SIC codes were collected from 
the Mergermarket database.  
 
Cash: Payment (cash, stock, or mixed) may influence post-acquisition performance 
(Muehlfeld et al., 2012; Capron and Shen, 2007). Cash generates more wealth for 
target shareholders. Moreover, cash facilitates appraisal, reducing the scope for 
disagreement throughout the public takeover period. I included a ―cash‖ dummy 
where 1 signified that the predominant mode of payment was cash. 0, on the other 
hand, denoted stock payments or a combination of cash and stock. Data about the 
method of payment was obtained from the Mergermarket database.  
 
Advisory: Similar to Hayward (2002), ‗advisory‘ is a dummy for when external 
advisors have been engaged during the M&A process. If advisors were used during 
the acquisition process, the dummy takes 1; otherwise, it takes 0. In this case, an 
acquirer may lack acquisition skills and thus use an advisor to assist with the deal 
financially, legally, or with the decision-making process.  
 
Hostile: The attitude of an M&A may vary from friendly to hostile. In hostile M&A, 
targets take actions to make it less likely for acquirers to succeed (Haleblian and 
Fineklstein, 1999). Hostile acquisitions may negatively affect acquirer returns by 
attracting multiple bidders who lead to premium increases in the deal. Attitude data 
were collected from the Mergermarket database. I coded hostile acquisitions as 1 and 
friendly or neutral acquisitions as 0. 
 
Maturity: Older firms often have more resources, management skills and legitimacy, 
all of which are helpful in executing successful acquisitions (Yiu et al., 2005). I 
created a firm maturity proxy which measured the difference between the 
establishment years of the acquirer and target firms. This was included in the model in 
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order to identify the older firm in terms of the years and control for these potential 
effects. The ―maturity‖ dummy takes 1 if the acquirer firm‘s establishment date was 
older than the target firms and 0 if not.  
 
Stake: ‗Stake‘ is a dummy which indicates that the acquiring firm controls stakes in 
the acquired firm. Wholly-owned deals get 1; otherwise, they receive a 0. Whole 
acquisition deals were defined as those in which the acquiring firm gained majority 
ownership of the target firm. Bigger controlling stakes lead to more power over the 
decision-making process and increase the firm‘s performance.  
 
5.5 Determinants of Acquisition Performance  
 
In this section, I will present the models which are used in this study to test the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. I will start by explaining the methods used in this 
study. Then, I will introduce the tests and models utilised. 
 
The first general hypothesis tested in this study is whether firms with acquisition 
experience tend to enjoy better acquisition performance when compared with firms 
without acquisition experience (Hypothesis 1). For the second main hypothesis, I 
examined whether post-acquisition integration decisions lead to better performance in 
the acquirer firm, as presented in hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. Since the comparison 
between the firms that replaced the target‘s resources and those without any changes 
were tested in terms of their acquisition performance, I investigated whether any 
improvements in the post-acquisition market performance of firms could be explained 
by the acquisition experience or resource replacement measures using a multiple 
regression analysis.  
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I employed two approaches for the purpose of testing these hypotheses. One way to 
test the hypotheses is to compare whether the mean levels of the acquisition 
performance variables of the same firm are higher than the expected levels using an 
independent samples t-test. Thus, the first thing which was done was to conduct a t-
test. Secondly, the estimation method used was ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. Regression is a tool frequently used by researchers to test the validity of 
hypothesised functional relationships relating to M&A performance. The OLS 
regression was considered suitable for the present study as it is a technique that can 
measure the effects of several independent, as well as dependent, variables of post-
M&A performance.  
 
5.5.1 Univariate Analysis  
 
A statistical hypothesis is a proposition about one or more parameters of population 
distribution, one which requires formulation and which can test the relationship 
between variables (Blumberg et al., 2005). In particular, hypotheses guide the 
direction of the research by indicating whether the relationship between variables is 
statistically significant. This allows one to identify which factors are relevant, as well 
as what the most appropriate research design and framework for the research is. The 
main hypotheses are tested to find the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables.  
 
I argue that the post-acquisition performance of firms is not a homogenous 
phenomenon. Rather, it is a complex, dynamic phenomenon that has diverse rates of 
stock market returns depending on the firm‘s choice of post-M&A management, how 
it manages its resources, the industry it is active in, and other deal-related factors, as 
well as the choice of target. The main aim of this study is to test the deductive model 
in order to examine the relationship between post-M&A management decisions and 
post-M&A organisational stock market performance. It is also worth considering 
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whether acquisitions are structurally heterogeneous; therefore, this relationship can 
also be investigated under different research conditions.  
 
For the first method for testing the hypotheses of this study, I conducted a t-test with 
the sub-samples in order to test Hypotheses 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 3, 4, and 5. All t-tests were 
conducted on the basis of a 95% confidence interval. There are two main independent 
variables in this research, namely acquisition experience and resource replacement. 
The main tool used for the independent sample t-test method is the mean score of the 
variables, which is defined as the sum of data divided by the number of sub-pieces 
(Hamilton, 2008). In this part, the independent sample t-test was the technique used 
for assessing univariate statistics. It is used to determine whether there is a significant 
difference between the mean values of the same measurement, including two different 
conditions. This condition can only be provided when the acquisition experience or 
resource replacement measure is used as a dummy, since the independent samples t-
test is used in situations in which there are two experimental groups and in which 
different participants have been used for each condition (Baum, 2006; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). If I am testing the ‗CEOchange‘ hypothesis, for example, I would look 
for a comparison between the CAR of firms which replaced the target‘s CEO and the 
CAR values of those without a CEO replacement. Through this process, I would be 
able to determine the difference between groups. In some cases, the measurement 
includes more than two groups. For instance, the number of acquisition experiences 
(acqexp) and the degree of resource replacement (degree) hypotheses (H2) were not 
tested through the independent samples t-test method due to their including more than 
two groups. By focusing on completed acquisitions from publicly traded Turkish 
firms, I was able to test my hypotheses (i.e. whether those acquisitions were likely to 
make a noticeable influence on stock market valuation). 
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5.5.2 Multivariate Analysis  
 
Multiple regression analysis is one of the most recognised and widely used methods 
of quantitative study (Wooldridge, 2012). A typical regression model attempts to 
explain variation as a quantitative dependent variable (symbolised as Y) by mapping 
the relationship of Y to a specified set of independent variables as an additive, linear 
function. Observing the least squares estimation techniques could help in 
understanding a prediction equation and allows one to estimate conditional means on 
the dependent variable-expected values of Y. Special combinations of values are 
assessable as quantitative variables for which it can be supposed that there are equal 
intervals relative to an arbitrary zero point; the number of feasible predicted values for 
Y is unlimited (Wooldridge, 2012). Additionally, the set of relationships can be 
captured geometrically when both dependent and independent variables are 
quantitative variables. Moreover, in a multiple regression, the dependent variables are 
referred to as the criterion variables, where the independent variables are referred to 
as predictor variables. As a result, the dependent and independent variables in this 
study are continuous and binary data respectively, and are appropriate for application 
of the multiple regression method. 
 
The estimation technique of this research is an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model 
applied to acquisition performance as the continuous, dependent variable. The 
announcements were made by a publicly traded ﬁrms which had made multiple 
acquisitions over the study period. Thus, my data makes up an unbalanced panel, as 
the number of acquisition activities differs by ﬁrm. However, my data is not 
technically a panel dataset, which means I do not follow ﬁrms over time, and observe 
these ﬁrms only when they engage in M&A activity. 
 
In the following sections, I will introduce the models for acquisition experience and 
resource replacement hypotheses respectively. I will first introduce the independent 
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sample t-tests for each group. I will then present the multiple regression models. In 
each hypothesis, I will also include the models that were used for supplementary 
analysis. 
 
5.5.3 The Relationship between Acquisition Experience and Acquisition 
Performance 
 
The ideal way of testing the theories developed in this study would be to estimate the 
direct effect of acquisition experience and resource replacement measures. This 
section shows the models for examining the impact of acquisition experience on 
acquisition performance in the emerging market. First, I test the sub-hypotheses of 
Hypothesis 1 by using the independent samples t-test technique. As explained in 
Section 5.4.2, I have five different definitions for measuring acquisition experience.  
They are as follows: 
x number of acquisition experiences (acqexp); 
x any prior acquisition experiences (firmexpdummy); 
x similarity of prior relatedness (priorrelated); 
x similarity of prior cross-border (priorcrossborder); 
x And any prior acquisition experience at the group level (groupexpdummy). 
 
Given the fact that ‗acqexp‘ is neither a dummy nor a categorical measure, I could not 
examine the number of acquisition experiences (i.e. Hypothesis 1a) through a 
univariate analysis. For the other acquisition experience definitions, however, I used 
the univariate analysis technique to estimate the association between acquisition 
experience and acquisition performance.   
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In that case, the base model for the t-test for acquisition experience is described as 
follows: 
              (      (                                (      (                           
             (      (                                (      (                           
 
Where:  
     is the null hypothesis of the t-test for acquisition experience measure  ;  
      is the alternative hypothesis for the t-test for acquisition experience measure  ; 
   = 1,….5 is the acquisition experience index that refers to different definitions of 
acquisition experience;  
    = firm index; 
     (       is the acquisition performance measure and is defined as the 
cumulative abnormal return for firm   between the day before and the day after the 
acquisition;   
                          refers to the firms   that had any prior acquisition 
experience with the measure  ; 
and                           indicates the firms   that had no prior acquisition 
experience with the measure  . 
 
To statistically test for the multivariate analysis of acquisition experience hypotheses, 
I estimated OLS regression models. Modelling the acquisition experience arguments 
developed in Chapter 3 through multivariate analysis is not only important for 
supplementing the univariate analysis, but also for obtaining more accurate estimates 
of the effect of acquisition experience on acquisition performance. I modelled the 
    (5.8a) 
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acquirer‘s acquisition experience in equation 5.8b. I used five different explanations 
for the acquisition experience measure. Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 1e were 
estimated through models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Therefore, the next step was 
to determine whether cumulative abnormal returns can be explained by the acquisition 
experience of the firms. I controlled the cross-border, related, cash, advisory, hostile, 
maturity, and stake variables in order to examine the acquisition experience‘s direct 
effect.  
 
The baseline model being tested in Hypothesis 1 is specified as follows: 
     (                                                          
                                                                      
   
In equation 5.8b: 
The acquisition performance     (     ) stands for the cumulative abnormal return 
for firm   from the day before to the day after of the acquisition announcement; 
                         is the acquisition experience definition   for firm  ;  
               = geographic focus;  
             = industrial relatedness between the acquirer and the target; 
      = method of payment;  
          = external advisory used in the acquisition;  
         = attitude of the acquisition;  
         = comparison between the acquirer and the target‘s ages 
       = controlled stake; 
 (5.8b) 
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 and     = error term.  
 
Additionally, the acquisition performance measure ROA, which I adopted as a 
supplementary means of analysis, is applicable in this study and estimated through 
univariate and multivariate techniques. This is similar to using the stock market-based 
measure CAR above, and includes both univariate analysis (equation 5.8c) and 
multivariate analysis (equation 5.8d). 
                 (                                   (                           
                 (                                   (                           
 
Following equation 5.7, an alternative acquisition performance,        , indicates the 
change in return on assets for the acquirer firm   in year    It is given as follows: 
 
                                                                         
                                                         
 
 
5.5.4 The Relationship between Resource Replacement and Acquisition 
Performance 
 
In order to examine resource replacement‘s effect on acquisition performance, firstly, 
I formulated a t-test. Equation 5.9a allows me to test Hypotheses 3a (top manager 
change), 4a (name change), and 5a (headquarters change). I could not test the degree 
of resource replacement (Hypothesis 2a) through an independent samples t-test due to 
the inclusion of more than two groups. Therefore, only considering the t-test analysis, 
 (5.8d). 
    (4.8c). 
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the resource replacement measure represents three definitions of resource 
replacement, which are CEOchange, namechange, and hqchange.  
 
In that case, the t-test for the resource replacement hypotheses is described as follows: 
              (      (                              (      (                         
             (      (                              (      (                         
 
where:  
     is the null hypothesis of the t-test for resource replacement measure  ;  
       is the alternative hypothesis for the t-test for resource replacement measure  ; 
   = 1,….4 refers to the different definitions of the resource replacement measure;  
     (       is the acquisition performance measure and is defined as the 
cumulative abnormal return for firm   between the day before and the day after the 
acquisition;   
                          refers to the firms   that replaced the target firm‘s 
resource  ; 
and                          indicates the firms   that did not replace the target 
firm‘s resource  . 
 
Secondly, I tested Hypotheses 2a, 3a, 4a, and 5a using a multivariate analysis. The 
baseline model which I tested for resource replacement is specified as: 
     (                                                        
                                                                      
    (5.9a) 
 (5.9b) 
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As discussed in Chapter 3 (Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5), the acquirer firm‘s decisions on 
post-acquisition integration depend on the geographical context of the target firm. I 
assumed that the emerging market acquirer firms which replaced the target‘s 
resources in the domestic acquisition would perform better, whereas in cross-border 
acquisitions, the emerging market firms which kept the target‘s resources would 
perform better. In order to test Hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b, and 5b, I only examined cross-
border acquisition in my sample. On the other hand, Hypotheses 2c, 3c, 4c, and 5c 
were tested by examining the domestic acquisitions of the sample. Thus, I partitioned 
the sample on the basis of whether it was cross-border or domestic. After this process, 
I followed the same method as explained above.  
 
Following the main analyses of the hypotheses with the stock market acquisition 
performance CAR, I further tested the hypotheses through the accounting-based 
performance ROA in order to examine the robustness of the results. Equation 5.9c 
shows the independent samples t-test model in testing the resource replacement 
hypotheses by ROA, while equation 5.9d illustrates the baseline regression model of 
the resource replacement hypotheses which used ROA as an acquisition performance 
measure.  
  
                 (                                 (                         
                 (                                 (                         
 
                                                                        
                                                         
 
 (5.9d). 
    (5.9c). 
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In addition, these analyses were identical to the main analyses which were carried out 
with CAR test techniques. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have described the quantitative research design adopted for this 
study. In the first section, I outlined the data selection procedure, which was followed 
by an explanation of the databases used and of the unique hand-collected data of this 
study. Then, I described the operatinalisation of the theoretical constructs. Finally, I 
concluded this chapter by describing the quantitative approaches used in this study to 
test the hypotheses. It should be borne in mind that the informal unstructured 
interviews were not presented formally in this chapter, since their purpose was to gain 
a deeper understanding of the hypotheses being tested. In the next chapter, I will 
present the initial univariate results of this study. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
M&A Patterns in Turkey 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the initial analysis of this study‘s dataset. I will begin the 
chapter by presenting the characteristics of acquisitions in Turkey, in which I will 
present the trends and descriptive analysis of the Turkish M&A activities in my 
dataset (Section 6.2). This will be followed by Section 6.3, entitled ―properties of 
acquisitions in Turkey‖, in which I will analyse the descriptive statistics of the 
measures used in study. I will first present the properties of the acquisition 
performance measures in Section 6.3.1. Then, I will analyse these acquisition 
experience measures (Section 6.3.2). Subsequently, an analysis of the resource 
replacement measures will be exhibited in Section 6.3.3. I will then describe the 
control measures of this study in Section 6.3.4. Finally, in the last section, I will 
present a correlation analysis of the measures (Section 6.4).  
 
6.2 Characteristics of M&A in Turkey  
 
In this section, I will present the trends of the Turkish M&A throughout the study 
period. In my dataset, the Turkish market includes 279 acquisitions made only by 
firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul. In the dataset, there were 79 cross-border and 200 
domestic deals. In order to describe the peculiarities of my dataset, some figures about 
the deal type will be presented below, such as the deal volume, top five deals in terms 
of deal value, whether the deal was domestic or cross-border and whether the deal is 
industrially related or unrelated. 
 
First, I examined 279 acquisitions of the 106 publicly traded Turkish firms between 
1998 and 2011. Figure 6.1 shows the acquisition frequencies of the firms sampled for 
this study during the study period. This figure only presents the big picture of the 
M&A deals in Turkey. On the other hand, it does not carry the same meaning as the 
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acquisition experience proxies that will be mentioned in Section 6.3.2. Figure 6.1 
considers the whole study period between 1998 and 2011 – not only 5 years prior to 
the focal acquisition.  
 
Figure 6.1: Acquisition frequencies of Turkish firms (1998-2012) 
 
Source: Mergermarket Database 
 
Of the 106 publicly traded Turkish firms who had prior acquisitions, 36 firms, the 
largest group, made only 1 acquisition each during the study period. 29 firms 
completed two acquisitions each (Figure 6.1). In the third largest group in the dataset, 
21 firms made three acquisitions each. Interestingly, only one firm (Haci Omer 
Sabanci) made more than 8 acquisitions. The Sabanci holding, the largest Turkish 
firm in terms of industrial activeness, acted very differently to the other inexperienced 
acquirer firms in my dataset, gaining the highest number of acquisition experiences 
with 15 acquisitions being conducted during the 1998-2011 period.  
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Figure 6.2: Share of the total number of M&A deals in Turkey by region 
 
Source: Mergermarket Database 
 
Second, Figure 6.2 shows the share of the total number of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions, grouped by region. As can be seen from the figure, domestic acquisitions 
dominated the Turkish M&A market during the period, with 73% of the total 
completed M&A being domestic. The cross-border acquisitions of Turkish firms 
accounted for 27% of the M&A market. Turkish acquirers mostly targeted European 
firms, which might have been the case due to their capability development strategies. 
Beyond that, Turkish firms considered Asian firms as being the next most attractive 
investment opportunity, with cross-border acquisitions towards Asia constituting 8% 
of total acquisitions. Lastly, the remaining 6% of acquisitions were carried out in the 
US, Australia and Israel.  
 
Third, in Figure 6.3, I considered the number of annual cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions during the study period. According to Figure 6.3, we can make an 
inference about which lessons were learnt by Turkish firms from the 2001 Turkish 
financial crisis, in that the number of acquisitions increased following the crisis, 
peaking during the 2007-08 period.  
Domestic 
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Figure 6.3: Overall M&A Trends in Turkey by cross-border - domestic 
 
Source: Mergermarket Database 
 
Increases in the practice of privatisation after 2005 led to increases in the number of 
acquisitions in Turkey. With privatisation activities, Turkish government targeted the 
minimisation of state roles in industrial and commercial sectors, and aimed to 
strengthen regulatory and supervisory mechanisms. As being one of the essential tools 
of the free market economy, these privatisation activities encouraged Turkish firms to 
expand their businesses. Therefore, the weight of the domestic interest in acquisitions 
was obvious in 2005 and 2006. Out of 16 privatisation activities in total in my sample, 
15 of them were achieved after 2005. Besides, not only did the domestic acquisitions 
increase, but we also saw a rise in the number of cross-border acquisitions during this 
period. This might have been triggered by political stabilisation in Turkey and a 
global upsurge in emerging market economies. Almost half of the total cross-border 
acquisitions were completed during the 2005-2008 period. More recently, the number 
of cross-border acquisitions peaked in 2011. Notably, the number of acquisition 
activities declined significantly following both Turkey‘s financial crisis in 2001 and 
the global financial crisis of 2008-09. 
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Fourth, Figure 6.4 exhibits the KPMG‘s report (KPMG, 2011) on the number and deal 
value of yearly acquisitions in Turkey. This evidence is consistent with my dataset, 
further proving the latter‘s reliability. The liberalisation of the Turkish economy and 
the growing global trend of emerging markets have resulted in a more active M&A 
environment in Turkey. 
 
Figure 6.4: Overall M&A Trends in Turkey 
Source: KPMG report in Turkey‘s M&A outlook (2011), pp.22 
 
Fifth, Figure 6.5 presents the M&A trend in Turkey in relation to the annual total deal 
value ($m). The total deal value of the acquisitions from 1999 to 2011 was around US 
$35.61 billion, with a mean of US $161.4 million and a median of US $30 million. 
The M&A activity in Turkey was obviously dominated by a small number of large 
transactions which is expressed by the skewness of the deal value distribution. This 
amount of deal value was relatively small compared with the M&A trend in the 
developed world or in BRIC countries. The entire deal value was computed with 222 
out of 279 deals. For the remaining 57 acquisitions, deal values were not disclosed to 
the public and not available in the Mergermarket database. 
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Figure 6.5: Annual M&A trend in Turkey by total deal value ($m) 
 
Source: Mergermarket Database 
 
After the 2001 financial crisis, there was a rapid rise in the total deal values during the 
period of 2001-2005 (Figure 6.5). Parallel to the 8.4% and 6.9% annual GDP growth 
rates in 2005 and 2006 respectively, and thanks to the many practice of privatisation, 
the annual total deal value of acquisitions reached its peak during the period 2005-06. 
Turkish M&A activity totalled US $9.6 billion in 2005, up almost quadruple in deal 
value compared to 2004 (US $1.5 billion), and this was the highest period after the 
2001 financial crisis. With US $9.74 billion-worth of deals in 2006, Turkey achieved 
its highest annual M&A deal value, allowing Turkey to remain one of the world‘s 
most rapidly growing markets.  
 
Sixth, in Figure 6.6, I examined the annual total deal value in terms of a comparison 
between domestic and cross-border acquisitions. According to the Figure 6.6, 
domestic deals in Turkey represented 74% of total deal values of all Turkish M&A 
with a worth of US $25.6 billion. Cross-border activity amounted to US $8.95 billion 
with 55 deals (as represented in the data). 
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Figure 6.6: Cross-border and domestic M&A distribution by total deal value ($m) 
 
Source: Mergermarket Database   
 
The total deal value of annual cross-border acquisitions by Turkish acquirers reached 
its highest level in 2007 with US $2.8 billion, whereas domestic acquisitions reached 
a peak in 2006, nearly triple that of 2007‘s annual cross-border acquisitions‘ total deal 
values, with US $9.6 billion (Figure 6.6). The total deal value of annual M&A 
activities considerably dwindled after 2006. After 2006, the total value of cross-border 
and domestic deals remained steady until 2011. According to the Deloitte Annual 
Turkish M&A Review report this can be explained with the notion that the majority of 
acquisitions occurred in the small and mid-size segments, with a scarcity of large-
sized deals (Deloitte, 2011). In 2011, Turkey saw a growth in GDP of 8.58%; 
therefore, the total annual deal values rose slightly for both domestic and cross-border 
deals.  
 
Seventh, Figure 6.7 characterises a sectoral overview of the number of M&A deals in 
Turkey during the study period. The Energy, Mining, and Utilities (EMU), consumer, 
and financial service sectors stand out in terms of the number of deals and in that 
these sectors alone represent 67% of the total number of M&A deals. The size and 
scope of the Turkish government‘s privatisation programme is reflected in the sector-
specific distribution of M&A trends, which show Energy, Mining, and Utilities 
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(EMU) accounting for 29% of the aggregate deal value of the study period. A closer 
look at the sectoral M&A trend in Turkey suggests that the consumer sector, which 
ranges from food and beverage to retail firms and supermarkets, has also become 
increasingly attractive to firms in general, with 20% of the whole sectoral pie. M&A 
volume was more evenly scattered across a range of sectors, including Industrials & 
Chemicals, Technology, Media, and Telecommunications (TMT), and Transportation. 
In terms of deal volume, the leisure and real estate sectors received almost equal 
shares (2%) of the overall M&A volume in Turkey. The deals in each of business 
services, health care, and the other remaining sectors attracted only 1% of the total 
volume of M&A deals.  
 
Figure 6.7: Sectoral Share of M&A in Turkey by number of deals 
 
Source: Mergermarket Database   
 
Eighth, Figure 6.8 provides a snapshot of the sectoral composition of M&A in Turkey 
when considering total deal values. The total deal value of the Turkish M&A market 
was highly concentrated in the financial services sector thanks to massive transactions 
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from Turkish business groups. The EMU sector alone comprised US $9.9 billion of 
the total deal value given the vast practices of privatisation (e.g. deals of Enerjisa, 
Aksa Enerji, and AkEnerji). Activity in the consumer sector, one of the busiest sectors 
over the study period, had a US $6.7 billion total deal value, whereas the total deal 
value for financial services dropped slightly, to US $6.3 billion. Financial investors, 
private equities, and business groups were also active in a wide range of sectors, with 
a special focus on e-commerce, retail, services, manufacturing and internet & mobile 
services. In terms of deal value, altogether real estate, leisure, business services, and 
health care sectors only generated US $6.7 billion worth of M&A activities in the 
dataset. 
 
Figure 6.8: Sectoral Composition of M&A in Turkey by deal value ($m) 
 
Source: Mergermarket Database   
 
Ninth, Figure 6.9 displays the sectoral composition of the total number of domestic 
and cross-border acquisition deals in Turkey. Interestingly, in terms of the number of 
deals, the consumer sector took the lead with 49 domestic and 23 cross-border deals. 
Consumer services, along with the EMU, received the highest sectoral share 
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altogether, with 127 of the total number of M&A deals in Turkey. In addition, EMU, 
financial services, Industrials & Chemicals, and TMT were among the most M&A-
active sectors, while the real estate, leisure, business services, transportation, and 
health care sectors were not as active M&A-wise as the others. The numbers of cross-
border and domestic deals in Industrials & Chemicals were almost the same.  
 
Figure 6.9: Sectoral composition of domestic and cross-border acquisitions in Turkey by number 
of deals 
 
Source: Mergermarket Database   
 
Lastly, Table 6.1 displays the top five deals in Turkey based on my dataset. The top 
deal in terms of deal value ($) in the analysed sample was realised by the Koc 
Holding company – the largest conglomerate based in Istanbul, comprising 98 
consolidated firms focusing their operations on four core industries: energy, 
automotive, durable goods, and finances. The firm was founded in 1938. Koc 
acquired the Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS) after its being 
auctioned in 2005 by the Privatisation Administration for the block sale of 51% of 
state-owned Tupras shares for US $4.14 billion. The second biggest deal which 
occurred in Turkey was the Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Fund‘s (OYAK) 
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acquisition of the Erdemir Group, which was founded in 1960 in order to meet 
Turkey‘s need for flat-rolled iron and steel, and was the 8th biggest steelmaker in 
Europe. OYAK paid US $2.9 billion for the deal and this was the biggest investment 
in OYAK‘s corporate history.  
 
Table 6.1: Top Five Deals in the dataset by deal value ($m) 
Rank Deal 
Year 
Target Name Acquirer 
Name 
Sector Deal 
Value 
($m) 
1. 2006 Turkish Petroleum Refineries 
Corporation (TUPRAS)  
KOC 
Holding AS 
Energy, Mining, and 
Utilities 
4140 
2. 2006 Eregli Demir Celik 
Fabrikalari T.A.S. (Erdemir) 
OYAK Industrials  & 
Chemicals 
2960 
3. 2010 Fortis Bank AS TEB Holding 
AS 
Financial Services 1600 
4. 2011 SabMiller PLC - Russian 
Ukranian Operations 
Anadolu Efes 
Biracilik ve 
Malt Sanayii 
AS 
Consumer 1582 
5. 2005 Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS KOC 
Holding AS 
Financial Services 1543 
Source: Mergermarket Database   
 
The third and largest deal in the financial services sector in Turkey was the merging 
of Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS (TEB) with Fortis Bank AS under the TEB umbrella, 
with a total deal value of US $1.6 billion. The fourth greatest acquisition in terms of 
deal value was that closed by Anadolu Efes through a cross-border acquisition of 
SAB Miller PLC‘s Russian and Ukrainian operations. Anadolu Efes Biracilik and 
Malt Sanayii AS paid US $1.9 billion for the deal, making Anadolu Efes the second-
largest beer maker in Russia. Anadolu Efes is the largest brewer in the Middle East 
and 5th largest firm in Europe in terms of sales volume. Finally, the fifth largest deal 
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in terms of deal value in Turkey was the acquisition of 57.42% of Yapi ve Kredi 
Bankasi AS by Koc with US $1.5 billion. In addition, this deal also represented the 
second largest acquisition conducted in the Turkish financial services sector. 
 
6.3 Properties of Acquisitions in Turkey 
 
Descriptive analyses are frequently used in quantitative studies. Descriptive research 
deals with questions of what things are like rather than why they are the way they are 
(De Vaus, 2005). It provides essential information about the measures investigated in 
the study. It also lays the foundations for all initial knowledge about the features of 
the dataset. The most frequently used descriptive technique is the mean score of the 
data in a sample. In this chapter, by grouping each measure together, I will be able to 
analyse the size characteristics (mean, median, standard deviation, and minimum and 
maximum observations), as well as the skewness and kurtosis, of all of the measures 
used in this study. 
 
6.3.1 Acquisition Performance 
 
This section deals with the size and distribution characteristics of the acquisition 
performances of Turkish firms. As discussed in Section 2.2.5, the most significant 
stock market changes for acquirer firms occur on the day after the announcement is 
made. I will use the stock market based ―CAR1‖ (t= -1, 0, +1) as a main acquisition 
performance predictor for acquisitions in Turkey. In this study, ―CAR5‖ (t = -
5…0…+5) is used as a measure of the robustness stock markets by measuring the 
acquisition performance of firms. Additionally, a long term accounting performance 
measure, ―ROA1‖ (t = -1y, 0, +1y), also provides supplementary analysis for the 
robustness tests. Table 6.2 reports the analysis of the acquisition performances of 
firms using the abovementioned measures. 
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Table 6.2: Summary Statistics of Acquisition Performance Measures 
 
According to Table 6.2, the average stock market-based acquisition performance, 
CAR1 (t = -1, 0, +1), the gain of Turkish firms in response to the acquisition‘s 
announcement is 1.3%. This means that, on average, investor reactions to an 
acquisition announcement generate an annualised CAR1 of 39% (assuming 256 
trading days). The range that the measure yields is wide: negative daily market returns 
(CAR1) to acquisitions can be as low as -26.6% in the Turkish M&A market, whereas 
positive market returns can go up to 25.4%. This result implies that anticipated 
acquisition activities may be realised by the market and, on the average, it creates 
superior post-acquisition performance for acquirer firms. Table 6.2 also shows the 
distributions of the acquisition performance CAR1 via skewness and kurtosis. The 
normality of CAR1 is tested in both ways; viz., graphical and numerical methods. Its 
skewness and kurtosis are 0.783 and 6.619, respectively, indicating that the CAR1 is 
highly skewed to the right with a high peak with thin tails. The skewness/kurtosis 
normality test performed in Stata also implies that the distribution is normal. 
Additionally, it can also be seen from Figure 6.10 that the distribution of the market 
return acquisition performance measure, CAR1, has a huge spike on the positive side 
of ―0‖, indicating that most acquirer firms do improve their market performance 
following an acquisition. The right-skewed histogram (Figure 6.10) for CAR1 is 
almost perfectly bell-shaped. This also proves that the acquisition performance of 
Turkish firms is normally distributed.  
 
 
               
 
ACQUISITION 
PERFORMANCE 
Code Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
CAR  
(-1,+1)    
CAR1 279 0.013 0.004 0.064 -0.266 0.254 0.783 6.619 
CAR  
(-5, +5) 
CAR5 279 0.016 0.001 0.110 -0.353 0.574 1.163 8.423 
ROA 
 (-1y,+1y)    
ROA1 279 0.003 -0.001 0.119 -0.999 1.168 1.269 52.551 
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Figure 6.10 Histogram (Cumulative Abnormal Return, “CAR1”, Normal distribution) 
 
 
The supplementary acquisition performance measures for robustness analyses, when 
compared to the CAR1, yield two contradictory results. Firstly, Table 6.2 illustrates 
that all 279 firms reached a mean market return of 1.6% between the five days before 
and the five days after ―CAR5‖ (t = -5…0…+5), the focal acquisition announcement. 
On an annual basis (256 trading days), the CAR5 yielded 50.5%. The results for the 
CAR5 are highly similar with the mean market return of the main acquisition 
performance CAR1. I cannot, however, make the same inference for accounting 
performance ROA1. On average, the long-term acquisition performance, ROA1, was 
relatively low, with 0.3% for the Turkish acquirer firms following an acquisition. As 
shown in Table 6.2, there is a huge gap between the minimum and the maximum 
ROA observations, and the ROA gains of Turkish acquirers ranged between 116% 
and -99%. Assuming no acquisition performance measures are perfect, these 
extremely long-term returns can be treated as outliers. In addition, Figure 6.11 shows 
that there is only one observation for each of these minimum and maximum points. 
The mean and median of the ROA1 are quite close (0.3% and -0.1, respectively). 
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Besides, Figure 6.11 also exhibits a huge spike at 0; this indicates that Turkish firms, 
on average, neither improve nor worsen their long-term accounting performance 
following an acquisition.   
 
Figure 6.11-Histogram (Cumulative Abnormal Return, “ROA”, Normal distribution)  
 
 
Notice that Table 6.3 includes the analyses of additional event windows for acquirer 
firms in Turkey. Notably, the difference between the mean of the cumulative 
abnormal returns of acquirer firms at the announcement date, which is day 0 (t=0) and 
other event windows is substantial. As shown, the average market return for Turkish 
acquirers on the day of announcement is 0.6%, whereas market returns start to 
increase after the announcement date and range, on average, from 1.3% to 1.7%. 
Therefore, CAR0 does not supply better inputs for acquisition performance analysis. 
Thus, Turkey has positive CAR returns following focal acquisitions.  
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Furthermore, in order to determine whether there is a significant difference between 
the mean values of the cumulative abnormal returns measures and zero, I used a one 
sample t-test. As mentioned in the methods section of Chapter 5, this technique is a 
univariate analysis which is often applied when testing for the mean value of a sample 
distribution under the assumption of a normal distribution. The main acquisition 
performance measure of this study, CAR1, and other market return event windows for 
the robustness tests are shown in Table 6.3. The total number of acquisitions in my 
dataset for the acquisition performance measures is 279. In order to calculate t-tests 
for the CARs, I used the equation which was given in the last chapter within the event 
study methodology section. I also used the Stata statistical software program in order 
to calculate a t-test for the CARs. To do that, I entered the ‗ttest‘ Stata command with 
the specific CAR measure, whereupon it stated that ‗ttest CAR1 == 0‘. In this case, 
using the stock market data, I tested whether the average CAR0, CAR1, CAR2, 
CAR3, CAR4, and CAR5 market-based acquisition performances differ significantly 
from zero.  
 
Table 6.3, which depicts the market return acquisition performance measures, reveals 
that all of the CAR measures following an acquisition announcement are significantly 
(statistically speaking) different from zero. Each market return measure resulted in 
significantly positive returns. According to Table 6.3, the t-value of CAR1 is 3.27 
with a ρ < 0.001. Such a p-value indicates that the mean value of the CAR1 of the 
market performance of Turkish acquisitions is significantly different from zero. 
Moreover, other mean CAR measures for acquirers in Turkey, such as CAR0, CAR2, 
 
Table 6.3: Significance of CARs 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. t-value P>0 
CAR0 279 0.006 0.035 2.782 0.003 
CAR1 279 0.013 0.064 3.270 0.001 
CAR2 279 0.014 0.088 2.654 0.004 
CAR3 279 0.016 0.099 2.762 0.003 
CAR4 279 0.017 0.107 2.639 0.004 
CAR5 279 0.016 0.110 2.461 0.007 
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CAR3, CAR4, CAR5, are statistically significantly distinguishable from zero with t-
values of 2.78, 2.6, 2.76, 2.63, and 2.46, respectively (ρ  < 0.01).  
 
6.3.2 Acquisition Experience  
 
This section provides background on the prior acquisition activities of the sampled 
firms in Turkey. Table 6.4 shows that, on average, publicly traded Turkish firms 
achieved 1.6 acquisitions before each focal acquisition (acqexp) (with as standard 
deviation of 2.2). In consideration of the 5-year acquisition observation window of 
this study, the number of minimum and maximum acquisition experiences achieved 
by firms ranged from 0 to 11 respectively. Moreover, the skewness and kurtosis 
coefficients are 2.13 and 8.06 respectively, and this shows an asymmetrical and a 
heavy-tailed distribution for the acqexp measure.  
 
 
Table 6.4: Summary Statistics of Acquisition Experience 
 
Table 6.4 also demonstrates that, for any acquisition experience measure, 59% of the 
firms in the dataset undertook at least one acquisition activity prior to the focal 
acquisition, with a standard deviation of 49%. Another proxy for acquisition 
experience shows that 57% of the firms in my dataset made industrially similar 
ACQUISITION 
EXPERIENCE 
Code Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Number of M&A Experience acqexp 279 1.609 2.161 0 11 2.134 8.060 
Any M&A Experience firmexpdummy 279 0.591 0.492 0 1 -0.372 1.138 
Similarity of Prior Industrial 
Relatedness 
priorrelated 188 0.574 0.496 0 1 -0.301 1.091 
Similarity of Prior Geographic 
Relatedness 
priorcrossborder 187 0.77 0.422 0 1 -1.283 2.647 
Any group M&A Experience 
dummy 
groupexpdummy 279 0.712 0.454 0 1 -0.938 1.879 
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acquisitions prior to the focal acquisition. Interestingly, this proportion increased 
when I considered geographic relatedness, with 77% of the firms in Turkey making 
consecutively similar acquisitions (i.e. in relation to the focal and the previous ones) 
in their organisational history, with a standard deviation of 49% (Table 6.4). This 
means that Turkish firms are more inclined to follow previous deal characteristics 
during their focal acquisition. Put another way, if a firm undertook an acquisition 
domestically, their next strategic move would most likely be to acquire another 
domestic firm.  
 
Importantly, the number of observations for similarity in prior industrial relatedness 
and prior geographic relatedness decreases due to the testing procedures of these 
measures. I simply omitted the firm‘s first acquisition in order to avoid having a test 
bias or making wrong inferences. Also, according to the last proxy of the acquisition 
experience (groupexpdummy), 71% of the business groups in Turkey completed a 
prior acquisition before the focal deal. I will discuss business groups in Turkey and 
their organisational learning process later on in this study. Finally, these proxies for 
acquisition experience in Turkey, which are firmexpdummy, priorrelated, 
priorcrossborder, and groupexpdummy, are normally distributed, as the skewness is 
within ±1.96 and the kurtosis is within ±3. 
 
6.3.3 Resource Replacement  
 
I measured post-acquisition outcomes by examining resource replacement within the 
target firms. To investigate the resource replacement associated with acquisitions, I 
drew on existing research in order to construct appropriate proxies (Anand et al., 
2005; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Hayward, 2002). As discussed in the previous chapter, I 
identified three resources for examining the acquirer firm‘s post-acquisition decisions; 
namely, top management, firm name, and the headquarters of the target firm. For the 
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purpose of this research, in this section, I will present the initial univariate analysis 
associated with the resource replacement decisions of the acquirer firms.  
 
Table 6.5: Summary Statistics of Resource Replacement 
 
Table 6.5 presents the descriptive analysis for the resource replacement attributes of 
Turkish firms following an acquisition. Firstly, on average, of the three main resource 
replacement proxies of this study, acquirer firms replaced just over half of the target‘s 
resources following an acquisition, with a standard deviation of 1.1% (Table 6.5). 
Secondly, Table 6.5 reports that 64.5% of publicly traded firms in Turkey changed the 
target firm‘s CEO during the post-acquisition period. As discussed in Section 4.6, the 
reason for this tendency towards replacing the CEO of the target firm during the post-
acquisition period might come from the institutional voids in emerging markets. Thus, 
relational ties are pursued in the structure of the newly acquired firm‘s top 
management. 34% of the firms, on the other hand, retained the target firms‘ CEOs. 11 
deals appeared as missing values in the dataset due to unavailability of information. 
 
Thirdly, on average, 45% of the emerging market firms in my dataset replaced the 
target firm‘s name following an acquisition. As discussed in Section 3.7, a 
characteristic of emerging market firms‘ marketing strategies is to pursue the 
development of their own brands; thus, I expected that more firms would change 
target firms‘ names upon acquisition. Only in the 123 deals does the acquirer firm 
replace the target firm‘s name during the post-acquisition period. There were 5 
observations recorded as missing values due to unavailability of information. Lastly, 
RESOURCE 
REPLACEMENT 
Code Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Degree of Resource 
Replacement 
degree 277 1.52 1.144 0 3 0.024 1.584 
CEO Change CEOchange 273 0.645 0.479 0 1 -0.604 1.366 
Name Change namechange 274 0.452 0.499 0 1 0.191 1.036 
HQ change hqchange 274 0.442 0.497 0 1 0.235 1.055 
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and not unlike name replacement, only 44% of Turkish acquirers replaced the 
headquarters of the target firm following a focal acquisition. There were 148 instances 
where the acquirer firm did not replace the target firm‘s name; and, for 5 deals, no 
information was recorded.   
 
6.3.4 Controls 
 
I will present the initial analyses of the control measures in this section. Table 6.6 
presents the distribution of the sample over some of the deal characteristics; these 
characteristics include: the cross-border or domestic type of the focal deal, acquirer-
to-target industrial relatedness, the payment method, external advisors used during the 
deal process, attitude towards the deal, maturity of the acquirer, and the controlling 
stake of the acquirer in the target.  
 
Table 6.6: Summary Statistics of Controls 
 
 
 
The first measure of the deal characteristics in this section is provided in Table 6.6, 
which breaks down the acquisitions into two parts – i.e. according to whether the 
target was a domestic or a cross-border firm during the study period. Consistent with 
this study‘s predictions, domestic targets are more numerous than those cross-border 
targets (i.e. almost threefold). Of these 279 acquisitions between 1998 and 2011, 
CONTROLS Code Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Cross-
border/domestic 
crossborder 279 0.254 0.436 0 1 1.127 2.271 
Industrial 
Relatedness 
related 279 0.588 0.493 0 1 -0.357 1.127 
Method of Payment cash 260 0.765 0.425 0 1 -1.250 2.562 
External Advisors advisory 244 0.451 0.499 0 1 0.198 1.039 
Deal Attitude hostile 252 0.083 0.277 0 1 3.015 10.091 
Acquirer maturity maturity 279 0.742 0.438 0 1 -1.106 2.223 
Controlling stake stake 279 0.480 0.501 0 1 0.079 1.006 
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approximately one-fourth of them were cross-border acquisitions, whereas domestic 
acquisitions formed 75% of the Turkish firms‘ total acquisitions.  
 
Furthermore, considering industrial relatedness, acquisitions are defined as related 
when acquirer and target firms have the same 2-digit SIC code for the focal 
acquisition. As presented in Table 6.6, the number of industrially related acquisitions 
is greater than the number of industrially unrelated acquisitions. The table also shows 
that, in 58.8% of the acquisitions in Turkey, the acquirer and target firms were in the 
same industry when the focal acquisition occurred. In such cases, it is hard to make 
concrete inferences. Given the entrepreneurial characteristics of emerging market 
firms, they seek new investment areas and new opportunities to invest in. Thus, 
industrially unrelated acquisitions are also common in emerging markets.  
 
Next, with regard to the method of payment, the acquisitions are classified into two 
groups: pure cash (transactions made solely in cash) or mixed payment (transactions 
made neither purely in cash nor purely in stocks). It is clear from Table 6.6 that the 
vast majority (76.5%) of firms pay with cash, indicating that cash is the main method 
of payment for Turkish acquisitions. The greater use of cash by acquirers suggests 
that the firms prefer internal over external financing (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007).  
Moreover, this cash payment may have a positive impact on the acquisition 
performance of acquirer firms according to a hypothesis posited by Myers and Majluf 
(1984), who asserted that cash payments show a signal that the acquiring firm‘s 
management is expecting a rise in the value of the target firm during the post-
acquisition process.  
 
Subsequently, in terms of the external advisory used during the post-acquisition 
process, the results indicate that Turkish acquirers used advisors for 45% of their 
transactions on average (Table 6.6). As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is widely 
accepted that advisory firms (consulting firms, investment banks, accountants, etc.) 
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are beginning to play a more significant role in global acquisition activities, to the 
extent of facilitating the acquisition process and maximising the value of the deal. 
Therefore, almost half of Turkish acquirers obtained help from external specialists in 
dealing with the acquisition, since they expected greater benefits from being advised 
than from not being advised. On the other hand, it is also common to maintain an in-
house department – especially consisting of major players and frequent acquirers – in 
emerging market firms. Perhaps not all of the remaining proportion of 55% of the 
acquisitions in Turkey should be associated with the practice of in-house departments 
via an acquisition team or sufficient employees within the firm, but the majority of 
them should.  
 
Furthermore, Table 6.6 implies that there is almost no role for hostile acquisitions and 
that they are uncommon in the Turkish business landscape. In practice, most deals in 
Turkey were made on a friendly basis. There were 27 deals, though, for which I could 
not obtain any data through the Mergermarket database. Moreover, I also examined 
the acquisitions of relatively mature firms during the deals. According to Table 6.6, 
for around 74% of the acquisitions in Turkey, the acquirers were older than the target 
firms in terms of when they were founded. In the previous chapter, I predicted that 
more mature firms were more likely to manage the post-acquisition process due to the 
accumulated skills that they had gained over time. Lastly, in almost half of the 
acquisitions in Turkey, acquirers gained 100% control over the target. In the 
remaining half (52%), even though acquirers gained a majority of the ownership of 
the target firms, they did not achieve full control over them.  
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6.4 Correlation Analysis 
 
As suggested by Cohen et al. (2013), it is of great salience to consider whether there 
exists any association between any pair of test measures. In this study, I included a 
correlation analysis, which is used to measure the linear association between metric 
variables (Cohen et al, 2013). The number representing the correlation is referred to as 
the correlation coefficient. It ranges from -1.00 to +1.00, with zero representing 
absolutely no association between the variables in the dataset. We can make initial 
inferences when a correlation analysis is conducted. In the equation, the larger the 
coefficient is, the stronger the correlation between the variables. Correlation 
coefficients can either be positive or negative, depending upon the direction of the 
relationship between the variables. In some cases, one of the study‘s predictor 
measurements is very nearly a linear combination of the other predictor measures and 
this is called multicollinearity (Albright et al., 2010). In a multivariate analysis, 
including highly correlated predictor measures is a definite indicator of 
multicollinearity (Cramer, 1985).   
 
Table 6.7 presents the pairwise correlation matrix of all of the measures used in this 
study. This correlation matrix displays the initial relationships between all measures 
in the dataset. In the table, the bold numbers are significantly correlated at 5% level or 
lower. Importantly, the correlation matrix indicates that the groups are highly 
correlated with each other, and this will be further explained in the next chapter. In 
addition, according to Table 6.7, within-group variables are highly correlated with 
each other as well.  
 
The correlation matrix (Table 6.7) indicates that the acquisition experience measures 
(acqexp, firmexpdummy, and groupexpdummy) are correlated with one another. 
There is a high correlation between the ―acqexp‖ and ―firmexpdummy‖ measures, 
with a value of 0.59. Also, ―priorrelated‖ and ―priorcrossborder‖ are highly correlated 
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(0.25). Since these acquisition experience measures are correlated with each other, in 
order to avoid multicollinearity bias, only one of the acquisition experience variables 
will be entered in the regression model. Similarly, as shown in Table 6.7, the 
magnitude of the correlations among the resource replacement measures is relatively 
high, indicating that multicollinearity is likely to bias the regression of the 
coefficients. Thus, each resource replacement variable will be included in the 
regression analysis one by one.  
 
Lastly, considering the acquisition performance measures, the stock market measures 
CAR1 and CAR5 are highly correlated with each other (65%). Furthermore, the 
accounting measure ROA1 is also correlated with CAR1 and CAR5 with 0.15 and 
0.18, respectively.  
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x Pearson‘s correlation -   bold numbers are significant at the ρ < 0.05 level.  
 
 
Table 6.7: Correlation Table 
                
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. CAR1    1                  
2. CAR5 0.65 1                 
3. ROA1 0.15 0.18 1                
4. acqexp 0.00 0.03 -0.04 1               
5. firmexpdummy -0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.59 1              
6. priorrelated 0.37 0.19 -0.02 0.06 -0.15 1             
7. priorcrossborder 0.27 0.18 0.11 -0.00 -0.17 0.25 1            
8. groupexpdummy -0.03 0.03 -0.10 0.44 0.69 -0.08 -0.04 1           
9. degree 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.05 -0.07 1          
10. CEOchange 0.19 0.13 0.09 -0.01 -0.07 0.12 0.16 -0.07 0.72 1         
11. namechange 0.07 0.13 -0.04 0.05 0.07 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.78 0.29 1        
12. hqchange 0.05 0.09 -0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.81 0.39 0.49 1       
13. crossborder -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.32 0.09 -0.15 -0.25 -0.01 -0.23 1      
14. related 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.20 0.08 0.30 -0.01 0.21 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.25 1     
15. cash 0.26 0.23 0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.18 -0.11 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.21 0.08 0.09 1    
16. advisory -0.17 -0.19 -0.00 -0.21 -0.11 -0.17 -0.11 -0.11 -0.16 -0.10 -0.13 -0.13 0.13 -0.07 -0.03 1   
17. hostile -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.15 -0.11 -0.13 -0.16 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.15 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.08 1  
18. maturity -0.09 -0.06 -0.17 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.10 -0.08 0.11 -0.10 0.05 0.07 1 
19. stake  0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.23 0.04 -0.08 0.08 -0.01 -0.18 -0.04 
 230 
6.5 Summary  
 
In this chapter, I have provided a general outline of acquisition activities in Turkey 
during the study period. Through it, I aim to contribute to the understanding of the 
general trends in the Turkish corporate context by showing the trends and 
composition of M&A in Turkey from 1998 to 2011. I have also introduced the 
descriptive summaries of this study. The first part of this chapter implies that M&A 
became a popular corporate activity in Turkey and in recent years, and that there has 
been a rapid growth of Turkish acquirers. It can be inferred that Turkish firms enjoy 
Turkey‘s high economic growth rates and attempt to grow in both domestic and 
global markets. Therefore, the Turkish context provides a good case to test the 
influence of acquisition performance and post-acquisition strategies on the 
performance of emerging market acquirers. In the next chapter, I will describe the 
results of this study. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Determinants of 
Acquisition Performance 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
Following the discussion of the data and methodological issues of this research, as 
well as the descriptive analysis of the study, in this chapter I will present the results of 
the hypotheses‘ analyses. In Section 7.2, I will examine the organisational learning 
argument in two sub-sections. First, I will present the results for the influence of prior 
acquisition experience on post-acquisition performance in Section 7.2.1. Then, I will 
go on to present the association between learning from the similarity of prior 
acquisitions and post-acquisition performance.  
 
I will examine post-acquisition integration decisions and their effects in Section 7.3. 
First, I will present the results for the association between the degree of post-
acquisition resource replacement and post-acquisition performance in Section 7.3.1. 
This section will be followed by the findings on top manager replacement and then on 
name and headquarters replacement. Next, I will present the findings from the control 
measures of the regression tests. After displaying the results of this study, in Section 
7.4, I will present its supplementary analyses and robustness checks. I will conclude 
this chapter with a summary.  
 
I will start this chapter by presenting organisational learning first, and then I will go 
through the findings on post-acquisition integration decisions. In each section I will 
present univariate analysis through an independent samples t-test first, then 
multivariate analysis via regression analysis. 
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7.2 Organisational Learning  
 
In general, the first hypothesis of this research concerns the impact of prior 
acquisition experience on the acquisition performance of firms in Turkey. In Chapter 
4, I divided this argument into five sub-hypotheses. According to the first sub-
hypothesis, an increase in the number of acquisition experiences leads to greater 
acquisition experience (H1a). The second sub-hypothesis suggests that firms with any 
acquisition experience outperform those without any acquisition experience (H1b). 
Thirdly, I tested whether firms with similar related acquisition experiences achieve 
higher acquisition performance than firms with unrelated acquisition experiences 
(H1c). In the fourth sub-hypothesis, I looked at the issue of learning from similar prior 
acquisitions considering the domestic/cross-border perspective (H1d). In the last sub-
hypothesis, I examined group-level organisational learning through group-level 
acquisition experiences (H1e). Learning-from-similarity hypotheses suggest that if 
firms have deals with similar characteristics, they reach higher acquisition 
performance due to the ―learning-by-doing‖ mechanism (Zollo and Singh, 2004), 
which means that firms improve their understanding and application of the ways 
acquisitions should be managed.   
 
The results of the independent samples t-test and the regression analysis of the model 
described in this section are reported in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 respectively. Table 
7.1 shows the independent sample t-test comparing acquisitions by firms with 
experience with those without acquisition experience. The independent samples t-test 
is one of the most commonly used hypothesis tests, which is applied to compare 
whether the means of sub-groups are statistically different from each other. Means 
and standard error differences between firms without acquisition experience (0) and 
with acquisition experience (1) groups are presented in Table 7.1. Finally, the t-
statistic, which must be compared with the critical value of t in order to judge the null 
hypothesis, and the p-value which is a tool to test whether data reaches a specified 
significance level, are presented in Table 7.1. This is while bearing in mind that the 
effects of independent samples t-test analysis in some cases do not support the 
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regression analysis results. The difference between these two empirical methods 
occurs due to controlling the other determinants of acquisition performance variables 
in the regression analysis. The output of Stata for an independent sample t-test 
compares whether the group means are significantly different to each other. That is to 
say, it is a tool for univariate analysis. Given the nature of acquisition experience 
dummy measures (0-1), as well as, according to the Stata standard output procedure, 
the t-test results obtained as the difference between the group of no acquisition 
experience (0) and with acquisition experience (1), at the end of the test we only 
interpret how the group without acquisition experience (0) is different from that with 
acquisition experience (1), not the other way round, (1)-(0). 
 
Table 7.2 shows a regression analysis of the organisational learning hypotheses. For 
each specific variable, coefficient and standard error are presented. As mentioned in 
the methods section, I enter each acquisition experience variable into models 
separately because of their relatively high correlation scores. The five separate models 
presented in Table 7.2 allow each group of acquisition experience variables on 
acquisition performance to be identified.  
 
Table 7.1: Independent Samples t-test results of Hypothesis 1 
 
CAR1 
 
Without experience (0) 
 
 
With experience (1) 
 
 
Difference of Means (0)-(1) 
 
Outcome 
 
 OBS MEAN 
STD 
ERR OBS MEAN 
STD 
ERR OBS MEAN 
STD 
ERROR t-stat ρ 
 
firmexpdummy 114 0.0133 0.0073 165 0.0120 0.0040 279 0.0013 0.0078 0.1655 <0.565 
 
priorrelated 80 
-
0.0074 0.0047 108 0.0326 0.0054 188 -0.0400 -0.0007 -5.3625*** < 0.000 
 
priorcrossborder 43 
-
0.0102 0.0070 144 0.0254 0.0046 187 -0.0356 0.0093 -3.8416*** < 0.001 
 
groupexpdummy 80 0.0154 0.0086 198 0.0115 0.0041 278 0.004 0.0085 0.4671 < 0.32 
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7.2.1 Does Learning From Prior Acquisition Experience Affect Acquisition 
Performance? 
 
The first sub-hypothesis predicted that firms learn from acquisition experience, so that 
prior acquisitions lead to better acquisition performance. The descriptive analysis in 
Chapter 6 associated with the correlation table (Table 6.7) showed that there is no 
correlation between the number of prior acquisitions and acquisition performance (r= 
0.00). In Hypothesis 1a, I predicted a positive relationship between the number of 
acquisition experiences (acqexp) and acquisition performance (CAR1). 
 
The independent samples t-test technique is limited to comparing the means of two 
sub-groups only. For Hypothesis 1a, as a continuous variable, the number of 
acquisition experiences (acqexp) included more than two groups. For that reason, I 
could not examine Hypothesis 1a with the independent samples t-test method and I 
only used multivariate regression technique to test it. It can be seen from the 
regression results (Table 7.2) that in order to test Hypothesis 1a, I entered the number 
of prior acquisition experiences and all the control variables into Model 1. One of the 
organisational learning measures, the number of prior acquisitions five-year prior to 
focal acquisition, turns out to be an insignificant predictor of acquisition performance, 
and failed to support Hypothesis 1a. Thus, my analysis has provided a clarification for 
the mixed results of the organisational learning literature on the performance 
implications of accumulating acquisition experience (Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
 
In the second sub-hypothesis I tested whether firms with any acquisition experience 
gain higher market returns compared to firms without acquisition experience (H1b). 
Table 6.7 presents the correlation between the dependent variable, CAR, and all other 
variables. The early correlation process shows that there is no correlation (r= -0.00) 
between whether a firm had conducted any prior acquisitions in the last five years and 
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acquisition performance. Next, I tested the relationship between the acquisition 
experience dummy (firmexpdummy) and acquisition performance using an 
independent samples t-test. Linear analysis results (Table 7.1) report that the 114 
firms without any prior acquisition experience achieved a mean market return of 1.3% 
between the day before and the day after a new acquisition announcement, compared 
with a mean return of 1.2% for the 165 firms that do have any prior acquisition 
experience. Since the p-value is 0.57, it can be concluded that there is no difference 
between the means. Therefore, the retrieved t-value of 0.1655 is smaller than the 
critical value of 2.093, so Hypothesis 1b is rejected in the univariate analysis.  
 
Further, I tested Hypothesis 1b on the basis of multivariate analysis in Model 2 of 
Table 7.2. In Hypothesis 1b I predicted a positive relationship between having any 
acquisition experience and acquisition performance. Due to the multicollinearity 
discussed in section 5.4, I only entered ‗firmexpdummy‘ as a predictor variable, and 
all other control variables into the regression. According to Model 2 reported in Table 
7.2, the coefficient for focal acquisition performance was negative and insignificant, 
failing to support Hypothesis 1b. Comparing the prediction of my arguments in 
Chapter 4, these results do not support organisational learning via acquisition 
experience in emerging markets. However, given the inconsistent results in the 
strategic management literature, my analysis brings further clarification to 
organisational learning literature and can be seen as a contribution to the mixed 
results. Taken together, these results suggest that emerging market acquirers do not 
learn directly from their prior acquisition experiences.  
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Table 7.2: Regression results for the Hypothesis 1  
 
*   < 0.10; **   < 0.05; ***   < 0.01 
Coefficients with standard errors are listed under coefficients in parentheses 
 
Dependent 
variable: CAR1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.013 0.014 0.002 -0.023 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) 
M&A 
Experience 
     
Acqexp -0.001 
    
 (0.002)     
Firmexpdummy  -0.004    
  (0.009)    
Priorrelated 
  
0.033***  
   (0.010)  
Priorcrossborder 
  
 0.037*** 
 
    (0.013)  
Groupexpdummy  
  
 
 
-0.017 
     (0.010) 
Controls      
Crossborder -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 0.004 -0.009 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.010) 
Relatedness -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012 -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Cash 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.018 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
Advisory -0.023** -0.022** -0.012 -0.015 -0.024*** 
 (-0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Hostile 0.006 -0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.007) 
Maturity -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 -0.000 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Stake 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
N 203 203 140 141 203 
F-statistic 3.15 3.13 3.11 3.06 3.57 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.13 
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7.2.2 Does Learning From the Similarity of Prior Acquisitions Affect Acquisition 
Performance? 
 
Hypothesis 1c predicted a positive relationship between the similarity of prior related 
acquisitions and acquisition performance. I argued that the deals similar to those 
previously completed by a firm would outperform deals that were different. In order 
to test this prior acquisition experience similarity hypothesis (H1c), I only used firms 
that had acquired more than one firm in the sample. Hence, firms with only one deal 
were ignored and the sample decreased to 188 firms for this analysis. 
 
Initially, the correlation table (Table 6.7) indicates that prior acquisition experience 
similarity in terms of targets‘ businesses has a positive correlation with acquisition 
performance (r= 0.37). Then, we seek further analysis for this correlation to identify 
the relationship between ―priorrelated‖ and ―CAR1‖. The independent samples t-test 
result (Table 7.1) shows that the 80 firms without any prior related experience reached 
a mean market return of -0.7% between the day before and the day after a new 
acquisition announcement, compared with a mean return of 3.3% for the 108 firms 
with any similar related acquisition experience. Different mean values were evident in 
the prior related experience hypothesis and support Hypothesis 1c. This indicated that 
firms with prior related experience outperform those firms without prior related 
experience with a t-statistic of -5.3625 and with a ρ < 0.01. 
 
 The regression analysis in Model 3 (Table 7.2) also confirms this positive and 
significant relationship between prior related experience and acquisition performance 
(ρ < 0.01). I also reran the regression by omitting control variable relatedness 
(acquirer-to-target relatedness in the focal acquisition) from the regression, which 
may decrease the strength of the relationship between similar related experiences 
(target-to-target relatedness between two consecutive acquisitions) and acquisition 
performance in the regression in Model 3 (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). When 
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omitting the control variable relatedness (relatedness) from the regression model, 
coefficients stayed almost the same, and only the F-statistic increased. Both the 
independent samples t-test and regression analysis results support Hypothesis 1c in an 
emerging market context, consistently with expectations, and with the literature 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), which proposes a statistically significant and 
positive relationship between prior related experience (priorrelated) and acquisition 
performance (CAR1).  
  
Subsequently, as already explained in Chapter 4, I extended the theory of the 
similarity effect of subsequent acquisitions. In this sub-hypothesis, I assessed the 
similarity of acquisition experiences in the context of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. The theory suggests that exploiting learning from prior acquisitions of 
the same pattern, domestic-domestic or cross-border-cross-border, leads to greater 
subsequent acquisition performance than learning from dissimilar acquisition 
experiences. As anticipated, preliminary results from the correlation table (Table 6.7) 
demonstrate that there is a positive correlation between similar cross-border 
experiences and acquisition performance, and this is significant at the 5% level (r= 
0.27). An independent samples t-test compares the acquisition performance (CAR1) 
of acquisitions geographically similar to those previously made by a firm and those 
from dissimilar conditions. Again firms with a single acquisition activity were 
dropped from the analysis, which resulted in 187 firms in total for this analysis. The 
independent samples t-test (Table 7.1) demonstrates that the 43 firms without any 
geographically similar prior acquisition experiences achieved an average market 
return of -1% between the day before and the day after a new acquisition 
announcement, compared with an average market return of 2.5% for the 144 firms 
with any similar cross-border or domestic acquisition experiences.  
 
In this analysis the t-statistic is -3.8416 and ρ < 0.01. This means that firms with 
similar cross-border experiences outperform those with dissimilar ones. In the 
regression analysis (Table 7.2), Model 4 examines the effects of similar cross-border 
experience and whether it explains the changes in acquisition performance. The 
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coefficient of similar cross-border experience is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. This supports Hypothesis 1d that geographically similar acquisition positively 
drives the firm‘s subsequent acquisition performance, and is consistent with the idea 
that an emerging market firm‘s focal acquisition performance is positively associated 
with prior acquisition deal characteristics that are similar to the focal acquisition deal 
characteristic in terms of geographical similarity. This acquisition behaviour plays an 
important role in organisational learning through applying similar routine operations 
during the post-acquisition process of the focal acquisition.  
 
Notably, it can be seen from Tables 7.1 and 7.2 that there are differences between the 
sample sizes of the univariate and multivariate models. This is simply because of 
missing values in the dataset, and Stata ignores the observation as a whole if there is 
any missing value within the variable of an observation. As a default procedure, the 
statistical software Stata, which I adopted for my analyses, ignores observations with 
missing values in order for a statistical mechanism to produce meaningful results. 
Usually, most statistical software programs (e.g. SAS and SPSS) also automatically 
identify the problem and delete the observations if there are any missing values. 
Moreover, different measures have different numbers of missing observations. That is 
the reason why the sample size varies between univariate analysis and multivariate 
analysis. Due to the risk of misleading information and the possibility of bias, I did 
not pursue further methods to avoid the missing values in the multivariate analysis.  
   
7.2.3 Does a Business Group’s Learning from Acquisition Experience Affect 
Acquisition Performance? 
 
The dominant organisational structure in most emerging economies is the business 
group. Many studies in organisational learning have investigated the learning 
perspective from the firm level, and thus ignored the relationship between acquisition 
experience and acquisition performance at the group level. In this part, I expand the 
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understanding of business groups‘ learning by testing the relationship between group 
level acquisition experience and acquisition performance. I expected that business 
groups with any prior acquisitions would have higher acquisition performance 
compared to those without any acquisition experience. Initially, linear association via 
a correlation matrix (Table 6.7) reveals that there is a very weak negative correlation 
between group-level acquisition experience and acquisition performance (r= -0.03).    
 
Table 7.1 shows that the 80 firms without any group-level prior acquisition 
experience achieved a mean market return of 1.5% between the day before and the 
day after a new acquisition announcement, compared with a mean return of 1.1% for 
the 198 firms which did have any prior acquisition experience. That is to say, there is 
no significant difference between the two groups. This finding does not support my 
prediction that any group level acquisition experience within the five year period prior 
to focal acquisition will not lead to greater acquisition experience. To test Hypothesis 
1e via regression analysis, control variables were first entered into Model 5, with the 
independent variable group level for any prior acquisition experience inserted into 
Model 5 as well. Interestingly, as shown in Model 5, when controlling for other 
determinants of performance, group-level acquisition experience has a negative effect 
on the performance of a business group. However, the findings show that the 
coefficient of the group-level acquisition experience does not reach the significance 
level. Thus, Hypothesis 1e is not supported by regression analysis.  
 
7.2.4 Effects of the Control Measures 
 
In Table 7.2, analyses for several of the control variables yielded a variety of results. 
Consistent with expectations, the method of payment was positively and significantly 
related to acquisition performance for the all models utilising the full sample, apart 
from Model 3 in regards to similarity of prior relatedness. Acquisitions paid for in 
cash were positively associated with market returns (ρ < 0.01), in line with Muehlfeld 
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et al.‘s (1997) results. Moreover, consistent with Hayward (2002), the use of an 
external advisor was negatively correlated with market returns (ρ < 0.01). This 
significant negative result for the advisory measure was achieved in all models other 
than Models 3 and 4. Overall, these insignificant control variables for Model 3 and 
Model 4 further suggest that the similarity of prior relatedness and similarity of prior 
cross-border measures considered in my theoretical discussion are meaningful and 
relevant to the prediction of direct effects of acquisition performance.  
 
None of the other variables entered as controls in the regression analyses, which were 
cross-border, relatedness, hostile, maturity, and controlling stake, significantly 
influenced acquisition performance. Contrary to my predictions, acquiring a domestic 
target versus a foreign firm or vice versa does not add extra explanatory performance 
to the acquirer firm in focal acquisition. Another outcome indicates that industrial 
relatedness, the measure of the relatedness of the focal acquisition‘s line of business 
to the acquirer‘s line of business, is not positively related to market returns. 
Researchers have made much progress in uncovering the unknown side of related and 
unrelated acquisitions. However, the results are contradictory. According to my 
results, acquirer-to-target similarity, in terms of industry, does not affect acquisition 
performance.  
 
Table 7.2 shows that models in the acquisition experience section‘s R-squares range 
from 0.13 to 0.16. This means that those acquisition experience variables could 
explain the dependent variable, CAR1, approximately between 13% and 16%. Even 
though reported R-squares may appear relatively low, some strategy studies (Lubatkin 
and Chatterjee 1991; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999) may also yield low R-squares. 
For instance, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) reported R-squares between 
acquisition experience and acquisition performance ranging from 0.071 to 0.109. As a 
consequence, such low R-squares are typical in the results of this study in which 
cumulative abnormal return is the dependent variable. 
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7.3 Post-Acquisition Integration Decisions  
 
Several studies (Anand et al., 2005; Datta, 1991; Birkinshaw et al., 2000) document 
the difficulties of integrating acquired firm resources. As discussed in the ―Theory 
Development‖ section, there are two key dimensions to the integration process, which 
are the degree of organisational integration between two firms in the acquisition, and 
the extent to which acquired firm‘s resources are replaced. It is the acquirer firm‘s 
responsibility to decide whether to keep or replace the resources of the acquired firm. 
This section shows the results of the analysis of the post-acquisition integration 
decisions‘ effect on post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. Similarly to the 
acquisition experience test procedures, this section also presents two different 
approaches to test the sub-groups of Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. The t-test and 
regression results of testing resource replacement hypotheses are displayed in Tables 
7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7. 
 
In order to measure the degree of post-acquisition replacement, I identified three 
resources that indicate post-acquisition resource transfer, which are CEO change, 
name change, and headquarters change. Identifying these changes during the post-
acquisition process allowed me to capture not only how firms‘ decisions influence 
their post-acquisition performance but also the capability of the acquirer firms to 
implement the reorganisation of newly acquired resources into businesses.  
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7.3.1 Does the Degree of Resource Replacement Affect Acquisition Performance? 
 
As discussed in the theory development section for H2, where some strategic 
management scholars (Krishnan et al. 1997; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993) propose 
that the replacement of resources in the target firm is harmful to post-acquisition 
performance, I conversely asserted that replacement of resources boosts the 
subsequent economic performance of the focal acquisition. Furthermore, in this 
section, I am interested in identifying the association between the degree of resource 
replacement and subsequent acquisition performance in the focal acquisition. In 
Hypothesis 2a, I predict that when more extensive resource replacement is pursued 
due to the characteristics of emerging market firms, better economic performance of 
the focal acquisition will be gained. As mentioned in Chapter 4‘s ‖Data and Methods‖ 
section, I included three resources, namely CEO change, name change, and 
headquarters change, in order to measure the degree of resource replacement for each 
acquisition. I tested Hypothesis 2a through regression analysis only, because the 
degree of replacement includes more than two sub-groups. In Model 6 (Table 7.3), 
regarding the performance implications of the degree of resource replacement, I first 
note that the direct effect is positive; however, it is not significant, and fails to support 
Hypothesis 2a (Table 7.3). This result could be explained by having undervalued or 
underexploited assets, such as brand name change or headquarters change (Zollo and 
Singh, 2004), as primarily motivated resources for the degree of replacement 
measurement. The decision on the replacement of the CEO is only loosely connected 
to the one on the degree of replacement of productive assets (Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
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*   < 0.10; **   < 0.05; ***   < 0.01 
Coefficients with standard errors are listed under coefficients in parentheses 
Table 7.3: Regression results for the Hypotheses 2 and 3 
Dependent 
variable: CAR1 Model 6 
Model 7 
(Cross-
border 
M&As) 
Model 8 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Model 9 
Model 10 
(Cross-
border 
M&As) 
Model 11 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Constant 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.016) (0.015) (0.029) (0.017) 
Resource 
Replacement 
      
Degree  0.004      
 (0.004)      
Degree 
(Crossborder)  -0.007 
    
  (0.006)     
Degree 
(Domestic)   0.011** 
   
   (0.005)    
CEO change    0.018*   
    (0.009)   
CEO change 
(Crossborder) 
  
 
 
-0.004 
 
     (0.015)  
CEO change 
(Domestic) 
     0.030** 
      (0.012) 
Controls       
Crossborder -0.007   -0.004   
 (0.004)   (0.01)   
Relatedness -0.007 -0.009 -0.012 -0.007 -0.01 -0.011 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020) (0.010) 
Cash 0.033*** 0.035 0.027** 0.032*** 0.035 0.028** 
 (0.01) (0.021) (0.012) (0.01) (0.021) (0.012) 
Advisory -0.027** -0.013 -0.02 -0.019** -0.013 -0.018 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) 
Hostile -0.004 -0.011 -0.002 0.005 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.02) (0.016) (0.029) (0.020) 
Maturity -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 -0.013 -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.01) (0.016) (0.012) 
Stake 0.004 0.01 -0.002 0.005 0.008 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.01) (0.008) (0.017) (0.01) 
N 203 59 144 202 59 143 
F-statistic 3.28 1.25 3.10 3.59 1.06 3.21 
R-squared 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 
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Additionally, in cross-border deals, replacing the resources of target firms is likely to 
be harmful to the subsequent performance of the focal acquisition. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, emerging market firms tend to retain acquired firms‘ resources in order to 
have a home-country-specific advantage through possession of valuable resources, as 
a way of compensating for the disadvantage of being a foreign firm in the local 
market (Madhok and Keyhani, 2012). If this is the case, then in Hypothesis 2b, I can 
propose that the higher the degree of resource replacement in cross-border 
acquisitions, the lower the subsequent acquisition performance. Model 7 in Table 7.3 
displays the results of this argument, and I predicted a negative relationship. In order 
to test the hypothesis, at this time I only entered cross-border acquisitions into the 
regression model. However, Model 7‘s result is not consistent with Hypothesis 2b and 
fails to support my argument. Although the direction is right, the effect is not 
statistically significant. This weak effect size occurred due to controlling for other 
determinants of acquisition performance in the regression analysis. Additionally, the 
low sample size of 59 observations might be a factor for the insignificant weak effect. 
Consequently, the result for resource replacement in cross-border acquisitions does 
not support the received literature discussed in the theory development chapter, and 
fails to statistically support Hypothesis 2b. 
 
Conversely to Hypothesis 2b, replacing the target firm‘s resources might be positively 
connected with enhanced performance if the focal acquisition is domestic in character. 
The advantages of familiarity with the home market, and common network-based 
behaviours from emerging market firms as well as relational ties, might drive the 
post-acquisition decisions of the acquirer firm and serve as the main motivations 
behind resource replacement within the target firm. Model 8 in Table 7.3 tests 
Hypothesis 2c, focusing on the context-specificity of focal acquisition. I only used a 
sample of the domestic acquisition panel to test Hypothesis 2c in order to examine the 
effects of resource replacement decisions on acquisition performance. Interestingly, 
while Model 6 revealed that the coefficient of the firm‘s degree of resource 
replacement is not statistically significant, Model 8 shows that when selecting only 
domestic acquisitions for regression, the degree of resource replacement becomes 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Cross-border acquisitions in Model 6 lower 
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the effect size for the degree of resource replacement. When considering only 
domestic acquisitions, this effect becomes clearer and a relationship between degree 
of resource replacement and acquisition performance is observed. Importantly, these 
results suggest that including the contextual factors (domestic/cross-border) is 
important when examining post-acquisition decisions in emerging markets. Only in 
domestic acquisitions does the degree of resource replacement affect focal acquisition 
performance. Thus, this paper clarifies the literature on emerging markets‘ post-
acquisition integration decisions.   
 
7.3.2 Does Top Manager Replacement Affect Acquisition Performance? 
 
Apart from learning from prior experiences on how to develop certain characteristics 
of organisational development, firms also learn from their top management, especially 
from their top manager or CEO. As discussed in Chapter 4, network-based behaviours 
are common in emerging market firms, and these firms are more likely to change the 
acquired firm‘s management and appoint someone from their network. Due to social 
traditions, these relational ties do affect the firms‘ choices. In Hypothesis 3a, I argued 
that emerging market firms who changed their CEO would enhance their economic 
performance of the focal acquisition.  
 
Firstly, the correlation table (Table 6.7) shows that CEO change during the post-
acquisition period has a positive correlation with acquisition performance (r= 0.19). 
Second, I pursue further analysis to discover the association between CEO change and 
acquisition performance via an independent samples t-test method. This univariate 
analysis (Table 7.4) demonstrates that the 97 firms without CEO change after focal 
acquisition reached a mean market return of -0.2% between the day before and the 
day after a new acquisition announcement, compared with a mean return of 2.3% for 
those 176 firms with CEO change after focal acquisition. The difference between 
mean values was evident in the CEO change hypothesis and supports Hypothesis 3a, 
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which specified that emerging market firms that change their CEO would outperform 
those firms without any CEO change, with a t-statistic of -3.3026 and with a ρ < 0.01. 
 
 
 Table 7.4: Independent Samples t-test results of the Hypothesis 3 
 
Lastly, in Model 9, I included the CEO replacement measure to test Hypothesis 3a 
through regression analysis (Table 7.3). When cumulative abnormal return (CAR1) 
was the acquisition performance measure, the main effect yielded a positive and 
significant coefficient for the ―CEOchange‖ measure as well. The coefficient of the 
CEO replacement measure is positive and significant at the 5% level. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 3a that replacement of target‘s CEO during the post-
acquisition period increases economic performance of the focal acquisition in 
emerging economies and is an important determinant of subsequent acquisition 
performance.  
 
One of the important factors in this study is the difference between the characteristics 
of emerging market economies and of economies in the developed world. These 
features (specified in Section 2.5) indicate that some of the assumptions of existing 
theories are less applicable for emerging market firms (Xu and Meyer, 2013). In order 
to cope with new and dynamic environments, emerging market firms act differently in 
diverse conditions. For instance, the learning perspective, which explores how firms 
improve capabilities and seek corporate development, differs in emerging market 
economies.  
CAR1 
Without Replacement (0) 
 
 
With Replacement (1) 
 
 
Difference of Means (0)-(1) 
 
Outcome 
 
  OBS MEAN 
STD 
ERR OBS MEAN 
STD 
ERR OBS MEAN 
STD 
ERR t-stat   
 
CEO change 97 -0.0023 0.0043 176 0.0232 0.0052 273 -0.0255 0.0077 -3.3026*** < 0.005 
CEO change 
(Crossborder) 40 0.0085 0.0081 31 0.0047 0.0100 71 0.0037 0.0128 0.2939 < 0.615 
CEO change 
(Domestic) 57 -0.0098 0.0044 145 0.0272 0.0059 202 -0.037 0.0098 -3.7630*** < 0.000 
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Therefore, I further extended the resource replacement theory and investigated the 
impact of domestic and cross-border acquisitions on the relationship between CEO 
change and subsequent acquisition performance. Importantly, I did not combine all 
variables into a full model by using cross-border/domestic measure as a moderate 
variable. Instead, to test the impact of cross-border/domestic acquisitions, I created 
two panels based on splitting acquisitions into cross-border (Model 10) and domestic 
(Model 11) deals. This method helps me to make accurate comparisons between 
geographically identical acquisitions, which are domestic-domestic, and cross-border-
cross-border deals.  
 
Interestingly, the results of Hypothesis 3b suggest that cross-border acquisitions had 
no impact on resource replacement and acquirers did not gain the economic benefits 
of global diversity predicted by the resource replacement theory. I expected that 
emerging market firms would retain acquired firms‘ resources in a cross-border 
acquisition, leading to better economic performance of the focal acquisition. This is 
because emerging market firms have some disadvantages when they move abroad 
from their home country and these reduce their acquisition performance. When going 
abroad ―emerging market firms need to learn how to operate in new economic, legal, 
administrative and cultural environments‖ (Bertrand and Betschinger, 2011, pp. 3). So 
these emerging market firms prefer smoother integration and retain acquired firms‘ 
resources.  
 
First of all, I tested the relationship between CEO change in cross-border deals and 
acquisition performance using an independent samples t-test. Table 7.4 reports that 
the 40 firms without change of acquired firms‘ CEO in cross-border acquisitions 
achieved a mean market return of 0.8% between the day before and the day after a 
new acquisition announcement, compared with a mean return of 0.4% for the 31 firms 
with CEO change. This result suggests that CEO change in cross-border acquisitions 
has a negative effect on acquisition performance; however, it is not significant and 
 250 
does not support Hypothesis 3b. Contrary to the resource replacement analysis in 
domestic acquisitions, regression analysis (Table 7.3) also showed that cross-border 
acquisitions do not support my hypothesis. Model 10 showed that the coefficient for 
CEO change for focal acquisition performance in cross-border deals was negative but 
insignificant, failing to support Hypothesis 3b. This finding fails to reach statistical 
significance and does not support the received literature on the performance 
implications of emerging market economies‘ post-acquisition decisions in cross-
border deals, even if the effect is in the right direction.  
 
In the third sub-hypothesis (H3c), I predicted that when emerging market firms 
perform domestic acquisitions, they achieve greater acquisition performance if they 
change the acquired firm‘s CEO. This is because these emerging market firms are 
familiar with their own markets and prefer to employ their own people or someone 
closer to them due to relational ties. According to Table 7.4, 57 firms without CEO 
change after domestic acquisition achieved a mean market return of 0.1% between the 
day before and the day after a new acquisition announcement, compared with a mean 
return of 2.7% for the 145 firms which did have CEO change after domestic 
acquisition. This is important evidence in support of Hypothesis 3c, which assumed 
that emerging market firms that change their CEO in domestic acquisitions 
outperform firms which did not, with a t-statistic of -3.7630 and with a ρ < 0.01. 
Hence, when adding all control variables into the regression, I obtain further support 
for Hypothesis 3c. In model 11, I find that there is a strong and significant positive 
effect (significant at the 1% level) of the change of CEO in domestic acquisitions on 
acquisition performance (Table 7.4). Therefore, both univariate and multivariate 
analyses support Hypothesis 3c. 
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7.3.3 Do Name and Headquarters Replacements Affect Acquisition 
Performance? 
 
In this study, I also adopt two alternative measures to capture the resource 
replacement effect in the target firms. As presented in the data and methods section, 
my first alternative measure focuses on the role of name change in the post-
acquisition period. My baseline analysis, Hypothesis 4a, regarding this measure 
suggests that the target firm‘s name change positively impacts the acquirer‘s post-
acquisition performance. Similarly, in regard to the second alternative measure, 
Hypothesis 5a expects a positive relationship between the target‘s headquarters 
replacement and the acquirer‘s acquisition performance during the post-acquisition 
period. 
 
 Table 7.5: Independent Samples t-test results of the Hypothesis 4 
 
Initially, Table 6.7 shows that name change (r= 0.07) and headquarters change (r= 
0.05) have very low correlations with acquisition performance CAR1. After I looked 
at the correlation analysis, I conducted independent samples t-tests for these 
alternative measures. Table 7.5 shows that the 150 emerging market firms, which did 
not change the target firms‘ names almost reached a mean market return of 0.1% 
between the day before and the day after a focal acquisition announcement, compared 
with a mean return of 1.8% for the 124 emerging market firms that changed the target 
firms‘ names. 
 
CAR1 
Without Replacement (0) 
 
 
With Replacement (1) 
 
 
Difference of Means (0)-(1) 
 
Outcome 
 
  OBS MEAN STD ERR OBS MEAN STD ERR OBS MEAN 
STD 
ERR t-stat   
Name change 
150 0.0097 0.0045 124 0.0187 0.0063 274 -0.0090 0.0075 -1.1867 < 0.118 
Name change 
(Crossborder) 37 0.0156 0.0095 33 -0.0023 0.0083 70 0.0179 0.0127 1.4066 < 0.918 
Name change 
(Domestic) 113 0.0078 0.0051 91 0.0263 0.0079 204 -0.0185 0.0091 -2.0379** < 0.021 
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 Table 7.6: Independent Samples t-test results of the Hypothesis 5 
 
According to Table 7.6, the independent samples t-test for headquarters replacement 
indicates that the 153 emerging market firms which did not change target firms‘ 
headquarters achieved a mean market return of 1% between the day before and the 
day after a focal acquisition announcement, compared with a mean return of 1.7% for 
the 121 emerging market firms that changed the headquarters. Thus, the result from 
the univariate analysis shows that the relationship between corporate headquarters 
replacement of the target firm and acquisition performance is not statistically 
significant.   
  
Regarding regression analysis of Hypotheses 4 and 5, the direct effects of name 
replacement and headquarters replacement are positive, but statistically not significant 
in Models 12 and 15 respectively, suggesting that acquirer firms were not affected 
directly by name or headquarters replacement of the target firm. As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, I entered the two alternative resource replacement measures separately 
in different models because of their relatively high correlation ratio and to avoid 
multicollinearity. These results failed to support the baseline arguments, which are 
Hypotheses 4a and 5a, and indicate that name change and headquarters change did not 
have any direct influence on acquisition performance.  
 
 
 
CAR1 
Without Replacement (0) 
 
 
With Replacement (1) 
 
 
Difference of Means (0)-
(1) 
 
Outcome 
 
  OBS MEAN STD ERR OBS MEAN 
STD 
ERR OBS MEAN 
STD 
ERR t-stat   
HQ change 153 0.0105 0.0046 121 0.0175 0.0062 274 -0.0070 0.0076 -0.9217 < 0.179 
HQ change 
(Crossborder) 48 0.0146 0.0075 23 -0.0093 0.0112 71 0.0238 0.0133 1.7957* < 0.038 
HQ change 
(Domestic) 105 0.0087 0.0058 98 0.0238 0.0071 203 -0.0151 0.0091 -1.6614* < 0.049 
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Table 7.7: Regression Results for Hypotheses 4 and 5 
*   < 0.10; **   < 0.05; ***   < 0.01 
Coefficients with standard errors are listed under coefficients in parentheses 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: CAR1 Model 12 
Model 13 
(Cross-
border 
M&As) 
Model 14 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Model 15 
Model 16 
(Cross-border 
M&As) 
Model 17 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Constant 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.010 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.017) (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) 
Resource 
Replacement 
      
Name Change  0.004      
 (0.009)      
Name Change 
(Crossborder)  -0.015 
    
  (0.017)     
Name Change 
(Domestic)   0.013 
   
   (0.011)    
HQ change    0.002   
    (0.009)   
HQ change 
(Crossborder) 
  
 
 
-0.028* 
 
     (0.016)  
HQ change 
(Domestic) 
     0.016 
      (0.012) 
Controls       
Crossborder -0.009   -0.009   
 (0.010)   (0.01)   
Relatedness -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.08 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.02) (0.011) (0.009) (0.020) (0.011) 
Cash 0.035*** 0.035 0.032** 0.035*** 0.032 0.031** 
 (0.01) (0.021) (0.012) (0.01) (0.021) (0.012) 
Advisory -0.022** -0.016 -0.025** -0.022** -0.013 -0.024 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) 
Hostile -0.002 -0.008 -0.000 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.032) (0.02) (0.016) (0.028) (0.021) 
Maturity -0.008 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.012) (0.01) (0.017) (0.012) 
Stake 0.005 0.008 -0.001 0.005 0.016 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.01) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011) 
N 202 58 144 203 59 144 
F-statistic 3.12 1.16 2.54 3.10 1.52 2.58 
R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.12 
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Following the previous resource replacement test procedures, I also created two sets 
of clusters for name change and headquarters change measures by grouping them into 
domestic acquirers and cross-border acquirers. The results for emerging market cross-
border acquirers suggest that the resource replacement argument is supported for 
headquarters replacement. However, they failed to support the name change measure 
in an independent sample t-test. According to Table 7.6, the 48 emerging market 
cross-border acquirers which did not change target firms‘ headquarters achieved a 
mean market return of 1.4% between the day before and the day after a focal 
acquisition announcement, compared with a mean market return of -0.9% for the 23 
emerging market cross-border acquirers that did change target firms‘ headquarters. 
This result indicates that emerging market cross-border acquirers that keep the target 
firm‘s headquarters outperform those firms that replace the target‘s headquarters, with 
a t-statistic of -1.7957 and with a ρ < 0.05. This finding is also consistent with the 
regression analysis (Table 7.7). In Model 16, I only include the headquarters change 
in the cross-border acquisitions as a predictor variable to test Hypothesis 5b. When 
controls are added to the model, the coefficient of the headquarters change is negative 
and significant at the 5% level and supports Hypothesis 5b. By contrast, name change 
as an alternative resource replacement measure turns out to be a non-significant 
predictor of acquisition performance, failing to support Hypothesis 4b.  
 
Finally, in order to test Hypotheses 4c and 5c, that the emerging market acquirers that 
replace the target firm‘s resource achieve better acquisition performance in domestic 
acquisitions, I followed a similar procedure with the other resource replacement 
measures. The independent sample t-test results for both name replacement and 
headquarters replacement measures support Hypotheses 4c and 5c. According to 
Table 7.5, 113 emerging market domestic acquirers that did not change the target‘s 
name after domestic acquisition reached a mean market return of 0.7% between the 
day before and the day after a focal acquisition announcement, compared with a mean 
return of 2.6% for the 91 emerging market domestic acquirers that changed the 
target‘s name. Similarly, Table 7.6 shows that the 105 emerging market domestic 
acquirers that did not change the target firms‘ headquarters achieved a mean market 
return of 0.8% between the day before and the day after a focal acquisition 
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announcement, compared with a mean market return of 2.3% for the 98 emerging 
market domestic acquirers that did. These independent t-tests yield significant 
differences in the sub-groups of name change (t-stat = 2.0379, ρ < 0.05) and 
headquarters change (t-stat = -1.6614, ρ < 0.05). However, the regression analysis did 
not support these results. According to Table 7.7, both Model 14 and Model 17 were 
not statistically significant and failed to support Hypotheses 4c and 5c for domestic 
clusters, implying that, once controlled for other determinants of acquisition 
performance, the effects have changed from univariate analyses to multivariate 
analyses.  
 
These results show that these proxies, namely corporate name change and 
headquarters change, are less likely to be determinants of acquisition performance 
compared to top manager change. Surprisingly, in terms of the performance 
implications of these alternative resource replacement measures, the strength of the 
results was too low. Given the theoretical arguments for both Hypothesis 4 and 
Hypothesis 5, I expected that name change and headquarters change would be 
stronger predictors of acquisition performance in the emerging market; however, the 
results specify the opposite.  
 
7.3.4 Effects of the Control Measures 
 
With respect to the control variables included in the resource replacement models 
(Table 6.4 and Table 7.7), all the indicators of the coefficient estimates behaved the 
same as in the acquisition experience models. Apart from method of payment and 
advisory measures, none were statistically significant.  
 
Consistent with prior acquisition studies (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Hayward, 2002), 
the acquirer method of payment was positively and significantly associated with 
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acquisition performance, further implying that cash payment generates significantly 
higher returns than stock financed deals, and is beneficial in acquisitions. Another 
significant finding from the control variables shows that the relationship between the 
use of an external advisory and focal acquisition performance was negative. 
Following to Hayward‘s (2002) argument, this negative effect might be explained by 
the firms‘ poor acquiring skills or higher premiums and commission to be paid to 
investment banks in return for bank loans for the final deal value.  
 
The results for some of the traditional control variables are worth mentioning even 
though they were insignificant in the resource replacement models. Firstly, consistent 
with Laamanen and Keil (2008), the cross-border measure was found to be negatively 
related to acquisition performance in Models 6, 9, 12, and 15; however, the 
relationships in these models were not statistically significant. Secondly, I expected a 
positive relationship between the traditional measure of industrial relatedness, which 
is the measure examining whether the target and acquirer are in the same industry, and 
acquisition performance. Following Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), it was 
anticipated that due to similarity and potential synergies between related resources, 
the market is likely to value related acquisitions more highly than unrelated 
acquisitions. Surprisingly, industrial relatedness measures were negatively associated 
with acquisition performance in all resource replacement models. While all these 
negative relatedness effects were insignificant, the negative relationship is an 
unexpected outcome and it might be interpreted as corroborating the overall picture of 
diverse acquisition types. Furthermore, consistent with hostile acquisitions 
underperforming friendly ones, acquirer attitude was negatively related to acquisition 
performance in resource replacement models. Finally, contrary to expectations, the 
maturity of the acquiring firm was negatively associated with acquisition 
performance. Summaries of the expected effect of hypothesised relationships, and 
their univariate and multivariate outcomes, can be seen in Appendix D. 
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7.4 Supplementary Analyses and Robustness Checks  
 
In this section, I will examine the robustness of my results and present additional 
analyses. To explore the study's hypotheses further, and to enhance the robustness of 
the results, I have conducted several different supplementary analyses. These are: 
using the accounting proxy as an acquisition performance measure (ROA), changing 
the acquisition performance (CAR5) time window, changing the observation period of 
acquisition experience, excluding the outliers, trimming the sample, aggregating the 
sample, and adding extra measures.  
 
First of all, given the importance of accurately assessing acquisition performance, I 
followed King et al.‘s (2004) recommendation and conducted all the analyses through 
Return on Assets (ROA) as an alternative acquisition performance measure. I 
computed and tested long-term change following an acquisition through an 
accounting-based measure. This measure helps me capture to what extent the 
acquisition generated value for the acquirer in the long-term. Therefore, using both 
the CAR and ROA measures as dependent variables allows me to examine 
hypothesised effects in the short- vs. long-term and see the differences. As explained 
in the data and methods section (Section 5.4.2), consistent with the acquisition 
literature (Zollo and Reuer, 2010; King et al., 2004) I computed ROA as the 
difference between each firm‘s pre-acquisition and post-acquisition ROA 
performances. This enabled me to see the changes in the accounting-based measure 
following an acquisition. I tested all the hypotheses with an independent samples t-
test and reran all the regression with the dependent variable ROA. However, the 
results were dissimilar to those based on the market-based measure of acquisition 
performance. Similarly to Selcuk and Yilmaz (2011), I found that there is no 
significant difference between the pre-performance and post- performance of ROA in 
the publicly listed Turkish firms which were engaged in acquisitions. Only the 
similarity of cross-border acquisitions (H1d) and CEO change hypotheses (H3a and 
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H3c) was supported by the long-term accounting based measure. I also constructed an 
alternative measure of explanations for ROA, but these approaches provided almost 
identical estimates of the acquisition performance. I present the results for acquisition 
performance ROA in Appendix C1.  
 
Second, consistent with prior studies (Capron and Shen, 2007; Hayward, 2002), I 
conducted several different event windows for the cumulative abnormal returns 
measure. As I mentioned earlier in this study (section 5.4.1), following the prior 
acquisition literature I used commonly practiced event windows to test the robustness 
of my results through the market based measure CAR. These different event windows 
are (t = 0), (t = -2, 0… +2), (t = -3…0…+3), (t = -4…0…+4) and (t = -5…0…+5) day 
intervals for the CAR analysis, and they brought almost identical results. These 
different time windows were all statistically different from zero and positive. 
Consistent with prior studies (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002) I did 
not use longer time periods. This was in order to avoid the lack of market anticipation 
of acquisitions after a focal acquisition announcement due to possible organisational 
activities that may occur and affect market performance. Regarding Hypotheses 1c 
and 1d, both similarity of prior related experience (ρ < 0.05) and similarity of prior 
cross-border experience (ρ < 0.05) are positively and significantly correlated with 
acquisition experience. Moreover, in regard to the resource replacement hypotheses, 
degree of resource replacement, CEO change, and HQ change arguments also 
supported Hypotheses 2, 3, and 5.  Results for another commonly used CAR window, 
CAR5 (t = -5…0…+5), are presented in Appendix C2 and provide strong 
corroborative support for my arguments and confirm the robustness of the overall 
pattern of results.   
 
Third, I observed the acquisition experience of the sampled firms from different time 
periods. To create alternative explanations for the number of prior acquisition 
experiences (acqexp), I counted the number of acquisitions a firm made over the two, 
three, four, six, and seven years preceding a focal acquisition, and analysed their 
impact on acquisition performance. Rerunning regressions with alternative time 
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windows provided essentially the same results. Experiences gained from acquisitions 
in the three, four, and six years in the past were highly correlated with the main five 
year time window. 
 
Fourth, I reran the analyses without the most acquisition-active firm, Haci Omer 
Sabanci, in Turkey. Going back to Figure 6.213, Haci Omer Sabanci made 15 
acquisitions in total during the study period. I tested the hypotheses without the most 
active acquirer firm in the dataset. Removing outliers is an important technique used 
in robust statistics that enables the data to fit the assumptions of normality (Larson-
Hall and Herrington, 2009). Outliers can have an undue impact on analysis. When 
omitting Sabanci Holding from the analyses, results were virtually unchanged. 
 
Fifth, I used the trimming technique as an alternative explanation of acquisition 
experience variables. This robust statistical technique allows me to make more 
accurate conclusions about my data. I trimmed the first and the last 1%, 5%, and 10% 
of the sample equally and did not find any significant result for Hypothesis 1a. 
 
Sixth, I aggregated the multiple acquisitions observed by the same firm in the same 
year. In my sample, there were multiple observations from the same responding firm. 
This may result in a calculation problem for long-term accounting-based measures in 
capturing the real acquisition effect of the focal acquisition. In order to address this 
problem, I took the average of all acquisitions that occurred in the same year by the 
same firms, and then all the acquisitions done by the same firm were aggregated. I 
reached almost identical results and did not find significant results for direct 
acquisition experience‘s effect on acquisition performance.  
 
                                                 
13 Figure 6.2 considers the whole study period, not 5-year time window prior to focal acquisition.   
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Finally, I added extra variables into the regression and extended the acquisition 
experience analysis. I included the squared term of the number of acquisition 
experience variables to test for the U-shaped relationship found by Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999), but found no evidence of such a relationship. I also conducted 
additional analysis to experiment with the resource replacement variable. ―AnyRR‖ is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if any one of the three resource replacement 
variables (CEOchange, namechange, and hqchange) is captured in the post-acquisition 
period following a focal acquisition and gets 1 in the deal, 0 otherwise. However, the 
dummy variable ―anyRR‖ statistically failed to support the resource replacement 
argument.  
  
7.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have presented the results of univariate and multivariate analyses of 
my hypotheses. I have presented the results for the acquisition experience arguments 
(H1). Consistent with the prior literature on M&A, I find that the number of 
acquisition (H1a) and any prior acquisition (H1b) turns out to be a non-significant 
predictor of acquisition performance, and has failed to support hypotheses H1a and 
H1b. Regarding the performance implications of prior acquisition similarity 
arguments (H1c and H1d), the similar prior acquisition industrial and geographical 
relatedness hypotheses are supported for both univariate and multivariate analyses. In 
the group acquisition experience argument, I attempted to increase the level of 
analysis by examining the business group experience as a whole, but failed to support 
Hypothesis 1e.  
 
In Hypothesis 2, I investigated the influence of degree of resource replacement on the 
performance of emerging market acquirers. Only the argument for the domestic 
acquisition acquirers (H2c) supports the degree of resource replacement arguments for 
the univariate analysis. When I control for other determinants of acquisition 
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performance, the results of H2c are no longer statistically significant. Then, the 
analyses for the top manager replacement in domestic acquisitions supported 
Hypothesis 3c, but failed to support Hypothesis 3b for cross-border acquisitions. 
Considering the name and headquarters replacement arguments (H4 and H5), only 
headquarters replacement in cross-border acquisitions supports Hypothesis 5b both in 
univariate and multivariate analyses.  
 
I present the summary of the analyses in Tables 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5 in the next 
chapter. I will further discuss the findings in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Conclusion, Contributions, 
and Future Research 
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8.1 Discussion and Summary of Acquisition Performance Determinants in the 
Emerging Markets   
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are always challenging for firms. The acquisition of 
a firm brings with it the challenges of successfully integrating the target firm and 
reaching the expected outcome. Learning how to manage the post-acquisition 
integration process gives the acquirer a better understanding of the target firm and its 
resources. Through learning how to manage the post-acquisition process, the acquirer 
firm may more easily evaluate the target firm‘s business environment, its economic 
health with acceptable financial risk, and its quality of tangible and intangible 
resources, and may know which strategies will be practiced. Many prospective 
acquisitions look good on paper, and managers assume that they can handle the M&A 
process successfully, but in reality a high number of M&A fail to reach their expected 
goals and do not achieve economic growth. In their recent book ―Masterminding the 
Deal‖, Clark and Mills (2013) listed 20 references to support the indications that 
approximately two-thirds of all M&A fail (e.g. Sakoui, 2012; Hitt et al., 2009; 
Papadakis and Thanos, 2010).  
 
In this study, I focused on the post-acquisition period in emerging markets by 
examining Turkish acquirers as a case that is much needed in the literature for better 
understanding of the organisational learning phenomenon. From a comparative 
perspective, Turkey represents an interesting emerging market case and provides a 
rich research setting for the purpose of this study. It is a country where M&A 
activities started at a relatively early stage of 2000s, but could only gather momentum 
after a significant economic development following the major global financial crisis 
of 2007-2008. Therefore, Turkey is at an earlier stage of economic development in 
comparison to the developed markets as well as BRIC economies. Furthermore, 
Turkish economic environment represents a diverse and complex setting as a unique 
country with its Western market style economy and Muslim cultural heritage 
(Demirbag et al., 2007; Kirca, 2011). I investigated 279 acquisitions in Turkey where 
the announcement date was between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2011.  In the 
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main quantitative analysis of this study, I hypothesised and tested the effects of prior 
acquisition experience on the economic performance of focal acquisition. I began by 
building on the acquisition experience perspective, and then I hypothesised and tested 
the effects of prior acquisition similarity on the economic performance of focal 
acquisition. I then went on to focus on post-acquisition resource transfer decisions, 
especially top manager replacement, and argued that these resource replacements 
affect the economic performance of focal acquisition. Through integrating the target 
firm successfully, acquirer firms gain or develop their acquisition capabilities.  
In this chapter, bringing together the existing literature on M&A studies and my 
findings from empirical research, firstly I will discuss the proposed effects and the 
results given in the quantitative analysis. Then, I will note the theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings of this study. Afterwards, a number of limitations of the 
research project will be highlighted. Additionally, I will outline recommendations for 
future research.  
 
8.1.1 Effects of the Acquisition Experience  
 
The literature on organisational learning mentions that in order for firms to enhance 
their acquisition performance, acquirer firms should choose a proper combination of 
integration decisions. Experience accumulation is one way of benefiting from the 
acquisition and managing the post-acquisition process effectively. The results from 
prior research (Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 
2002; Laamanen and Keil, 2008) have demonstrated that organisational learning from 
prior acquisition experience is an important aspect of the post-acquisition 
management phase, which in turn is a significant determinant of acquisition 
performance. Through frequent practice, firms learn how to use their newly acquired 
resources and may routinise the process.  
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Complementing the studies on the relationship between acquisition experience and 
acquisition performance in the developed world, I studied and tested the same 
phenomenon from the emerging market perspective. I expected a significant positive 
effect based on the number of prior acquisition experiences, and the change in 
cumulative abnormal returns to the acquirer firms‘ performance measure indicates 
that organisational performance is enhanced as the number of acquisition experiences 
increases. Similarly, I also predicted a significant positive relationship between any 
acquisition experience and the focal acquisition performance of the acquirer firm. 
 
I drew upon multiple theoretical backgrounds, such as behavioural learning, the 
process-based approach, evolutionary economics and the dynamic capabilities view in 
order to enrich the existing literature. In this study, I proposed that acquisition 
capability evolves from the acquisition itself instead of generating processes 
internally. Firms can achieve acquisition capability through transferring experience 
from prior acquisition activities to the focal one. Managers dealing with M&A 
activities within the firms attempt to apply exemplary settings to similar acquisitions 
with sufficient flexibility. Here, the conceptual necessity of routine procedures in 
dynamic capabilities comes to mind. 
 
In the evolutionary economics perspective, organisational routines that conserve a 
firm‘s experience are the core instrument for knowledge accumulation (Cyret and 
March, 1963). Moreover, it is suggested that the value of these capabilities rises if 
they are transferred into special or higher-level routines that are embedded more 
broadly in firm‘s resource base (Nelson, 1982; Zollo and Winter, 2002). On the other 
hand, the heterogonous structure of prior acquisitions may bring diverse levels of 
knowledge to the acquirer firm. Proper combination of all these forms of knowledge 
may not be applicable to all situations. This is because certain tasks may require more 
individual and flexible use, which varies according to the situation. Therefore, merely 
transferring knowledge is not an appropriate way of integrating diverse sets of 
knowledge efficiently with the aim of forming acquisition capability. A firm‘s main 
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task is rather to make these routines more flexible and adaptable to heterogeneous and 
complex acquisition types. 
 
Essentially, the entrepreneurial mind-set in emerging markets may fit with this 
flexible use of knowledge, and I predicted that emerging market firms would use their 
routines and capabilities better in managing the acquisition process. Success in the 
relatively fragile and capricious institutional environments which characterise 
emerging markets requires a certain degree of flexibility and resilience to take 
advantage of the opportunities that arise, and to deal with different acquisition types. 
Under highly unstable institutional conditions, firms learn what is needed for specific 
situations, and they can be more generalist in their decisions in order to compete in 
this dynamic environment (Madhok and Keyhani, 2012). This feature can be 
explained with a certain kind of entrepreneurial dynamism attempting to make the 
best use of its resources. Thus, emerging market firms, especially business groups, are 
compelled to be more nimble and entrepreneurial in their decisions. 
 
However, my results found no evidence for positive effects of prior acquisition 
experiences on focal acquisition performance. This result confirms the diverse 
assertions of the existing literature on the performance applications of accumulating 
acquisition experience, providing a further clarification to the literature. Thus, simple 
exposure to the acquisition experience effect does not seem to suffice.  
 
There might be several reasons why the acquisition experience accumulation that 
should have resulted in an improvement of performance was found to be less effective 
than expected. Pre-acquisition based factors, such as high acquisition premiums paid, 
misjudged targets‘ value and synergistic effects, might result in M&A failure. In this 
study, however, I am interested in the managerial decisions and post-M&A process; 
thus, pre-acquisition factors are beyond the scope of this study.  
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Firstly, these acquisition decisions are infrequent compared to those organisational 
activities that are associated with daily operations. Overall, in my dataset, M&A 
frequency in Turkey increased from 12 per year in 2001 to 40 in 2011. This clearly 
diminishes the success rate of these events in the Turkish setting. This is because 
managers usually base their implicit or explicit inferences about the performance 
effects of specific decisions on actual evidence from the past (March, 1991). Taking 
account of the very recent increases in the number of mergers and acquisitions 
activities in the emerging markets, as well as lack of managerial capabilities (Madhok 
and Keyhani, 2012) compared with managers from developed countries, the 
acquisition experience effect might be more problematic and may not impact directly 
on acquisition performance.  
 
Secondly, these infrequent corporate activities might be erroneously linked with prior 
decisions learned in past contexts that seem similar to acquisition but are different in 
nature (Zollo, 2009). Most strategic decisions vary considerably from each other in 
critical ways, and managers can make generalisation mistakes in their decisions by 
applying these different decisions in irrelevant contexts. Given the industrially 
diversified structure of publicly traded firms in Turkey, wrong inferences from the 
past could be a factor for the ineffective acquisition experience influence on 
acquisition performance.  
 
Thirdly, the characteristics of prior acquisitions may also vary in terms of the target‘s 
geographical context, its industrial setting, its managerial capabilities, and the 
motivation for the acquisition. This heterogeneity makes it very tough to tease out 
which action or decision produced which consequence. Managers may not be sure 
whether applying a prior acquisition‘s decisions will generate a positive consequence 
for the focal acquisition. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of acquisition 
experience can be beneficial in offering managers a range of possible decisions 
(Haunschild and Ni, 2002). This sounds more meaningful in the context of emerging 
markets with their diversified firms. However, I found no evidence that heterogeneity 
of acquisition experience leads to better acquisition performance. Zollo and Singh 
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(2004) have suggested investment in deliberate learning processes to learn more from 
heterogeneous prior experiences. Through deliberate work to articulate and codify 
prior actions, managers can make better quality inferences from prior decisions 
(Zollo, 2009). But related research failed to determine which of the target‘s resources 
relate to better inferences and which to worse.  
 
Lastly, the potential market imperfections in emerging markets and the lack of 
structural corporate governance may cause poor performance for emerging market 
firms. These diversified emerging market firms may carry huge coordination and 
administration costs (Young et al., 2008). A network mode of governing may reduce 
information asymmetry between affiliated firms, but due to the lack of transparency, 
minority shareholders in emerging markets find it difficult to determine where control 
resides. It also makes it difficult to find and challenge unfair transfer of acquired 
resources from the acquirer firm to affiliated group firms within the group (Chang, 
2003) since such networks are not transparent and unethical transactions are common 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000).       
 
As a result, considering the case of an emerging market, I have not observed 
acquisition capability grow through direct acquisition experience in which firms 
accumulate knowledge from prior experiences, develop routines, and transform these 
learning into capabilities. In Table 8.1, I present the summary results for determinants 
of acquisition performance characterised by prior acquisition experience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 269 
Table 8.1: The outcome of Hypotheses 1a – 1e 
Hypothesis Regression 
Outcome 
t-test Outcome 
H1a: For emerging market acquirers, the greater the acquirer‘s prior acquisition 
experience, the better the performance of the focal acquisition. 
Not Significant - 
H1b: For emerging market acquirers, having any prior acquisition experience will 
be positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
Not Significant Not 
Significant 
H1c: For emerging market acquirers, having a similar prior acquisition in terms of 
industrial relatedness will be positively related with the performance of the focal 
acquisition. 
Supported Supported 
H1d: For emerging market acquirers, having a similar prior acquisition in terms of 
geographical relatedness will be positively related with the performance of the 
focal acquisition. 
Supported Supported 
H1e: For emerging market business groups, the greater the acquirer‘s prior 
acquisition experience, the better the performance of the focal acquisition. 
Not Significant Not 
Significant 
 
8.1.2 Effects of Prior Acquisition Similarity 
 
In the first hypothesis I examined how prior acquisition experiences affect the focal 
acquisition performance of firms in an emerging market. In the second group of prior 
acquisition experience hypotheses, in a similar direction to Haleblian and 
Finkelstein‘s (1999), and Hayward‘s (2002) argument on acquisition similarity, I 
proposed that similarity between two successive acquisitions is a factor that can affect 
the focal acquisitions performance of the acquirer firm. The similarity issue I 
examined in this study is considering the characteristics of corporate acquisition, such 
as industrial relatedness or geographic similarity between two successive acquisitions‘ 
targets.  
 
The role of this prior similarity experience phenomenon is to provide a deeper 
understanding of the nature of acquisition capabilities. As examined earlier, the 
number of acquisition experiences or presence of any acquisition experience as 
measures of acquisition experience are usually hypothesised to have a direct effect on 
focal acquisition performance, and these studies have produced mixed outcomes 
(Kusewitt, 1985; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo 
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and Singh, 2004). My findings suggest that the relationship between acquisition 
experience and acquisition performance is more than a direct effect. It is the similarity 
between acquisitions that determines whether experience affects the post-acquisition 
period and the performance of the focal acquisition. The results show that those firms 
that make similar acquisitions within the same industry learn by generalising 
knowledge from prior acquisitions. Needless to say, it is possible to make poor 
inferences from prior experience, but poor inferences might be avoided if firms learn 
from their mistakes and apply this knowledge to similar acquisitions. Also, apart from 
target firms‘ industrial similarity, I extended the theory by using the similarity 
between target firms‘ geographical relatedness. That is to say, a series of international 
or domestic acquisitions leads to performance enhancement in the focal acquisition. I 
found that the better-performing firms in this study‘s sample were also those that 
made acquisitions similar to prior acquisitions in terms of geographical relatedness. 
 
Regarding the similarity between prior businesses, Hayward (2002) argued that 
acquiring a series of highly similar businesses leads to specialised learning about that 
business on the one hand, but on the other hand these firms may lack the skills to 
generalise this capability for dissimilar acquisitions. From the other side, acquiring a 
series of highly dissimilar businesses on the one hand leads to exploration of new 
bases of knowledge and experience, but on the other hand averts specialised learning 
about any specific business. Hence, Hayward (2002) suggested an inverted U-shaped 
association between the similarity of the businesses of acquisition experience and 
subsequent acquisition performance. This might be true in some cases within a 
specific environment. However, corporate acquisition is not a regular organisational 
activity and on average, it occurs quite infrequently and unsystematically throughout 
an organisation‘s life, thus reducing a firm‘s ability to accumulate large amounts of 
knowledge to utilise in ―learning-by-doing‖ mechanisms (Zollo and Singh, 2004). 
Moreover, in a world that‘s changing very rapidly, firms should adapt to these 
changes in order to stay competitive. Firms should refresh their capabilities, their 
knowledge, and their resources to be able to make accurate inferences and right 
decisions about their organisational activities. Organisational decisions and systems 
that become routinised are in danger of eroding when not applied regularly (Argote, 
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2012). The inferences from prior acquisition experiences may not be applicable after 
some time has passed. Therefore, we cannot consider a set of prior acquisitions over a 
long time period and with many prior acquisitions. It seems problematic to include all 
of a firm‘s prior acquisition experiences in measuring the similarity of prior 
acquisitions.  
 
It is worth noting that I did not directly investigate post-acquisition process issues 
through qualitative study, such as case studies and observing firms that may offer 
deeper understanding of the learning-by-doing argument. Instead, my focus was on 
the development of theoretical frameworks for emerging markets based on the 
antecedent-behaviour-consequence and post-acquisition management models 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). I was able to determine antecedent conditions by 
studying the similarity of acquisitions and determine consequences through assessing 
the acquisitions‘ performance. Through observing the antecedents and consequences, 
I could make inferences about the nature of organisational learning patterns, and I was 
able to make generalisations.  
 
With similar acquisition types, firms increase routine procedures and gain acquisition 
capability. An increase in organisational routines can be observed via a series of 
similar acquisitions, whereas this increase cannot be observed with a series of 
dissimilar acquisitions. With the help of similarity in prior acquisitions, these 
acquirers can recognise similarities, make the right inferences, and routinise the 
procedure to use in focal acquisition management, while simultaneously developing 
their acquisition capabilities. Despite the use of routines gained from prior similar 
acquisitions, firms should be aware of the need to keep these routines flexible enough 
to make them suitable for varying conditions.  
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8.1.3 Effects of Group Acquisition Experience  
 
In this research, the role of acquisition experience in organisational learning was 
examined through firm-level analysis. Only Hypothesis 1e solely focused on group-
level learning. This group level argument should be seen as a contribution to the 
received literature and requires a further research to better capture the phenomena. 
Characteristically, business groups are the main player in the Turkish corporate 
environment. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the Turkish stock exchange, the Borsa 
Istanbul (BIST), many firms operate as subsidiaries of large business groups or as 
business groups themselves. Apart from examining organisational learning from the 
perspective of business groups‘ subsidiaries, at the firm level, it is also important to 
consider the business groups‘ learning process through their subsidiaries‘ interactions 
with each other to better grasp the phenomenon. 
 
One important factor which might have contributed to the nature of the existing 
literature on acquisition experience is that previous papers have almost exclusively 
conceptualised and examined acquisition experience and organisational learning 
effects at the firm level. But firm-level assessment is just one level of organisational 
learning. We lack answers as to whether the capability development of a group 
subsidiary leads to the capability development of another subsidiary of the same 
business group. In other words, is there any collectiveness or interaction between 
group subsidiaries or are they totally separate in terms of learning from acquisition 
experience? Given the fact that an emerging market business group consists of a set of 
legally independent subsidiaries, the level of the group is a crucial level of 
organisational learning and has been rarely explored before in the literature. 
Examining how inter-subsidiary learning affects a business group‘s corporate 
performance is important to better understand organisational learning in emerging 
markets, as well as the acquisition capability of these business groups. Through 
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Hypothesis 1e, I aimed to contribute to the literature by raising the level one step 
further and examining the business group as a whole.  
 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, analyses of group learning failed to 
support Hypothesis 1e and found no effect of acquisition experience on acquisition 
performance at the group level. This result might be occurred due to differences in 
learning ability across groups and its subsidiaries, depending on the characteristics of 
acquisitions, industry, and geographic location, as well as the group‘s capacity to 
successfully manage the post-acquisition process. Therefore acquisition capability 
may not be developed collectively within the business group. 
 
On the other hand, some examples of business groups and its subsidiaries 
conceptually support my argument about group-level learning. For instance, in Koc‘s 
and Yildiz‘s cases, where these emerging market groups seek to grow both 
domestically and globally as well as to optimise their capabilities, group-level 
learning was detected between subsidiaries of these groups and acquisition 
experiences and led to an increase in the performance of subsequent acquisitions. 
Therefore, these firms achieved the adoptive ability to generalise one individual 
subsidiary‘s learning for the benefit of another, thanks to the collaborative 
coordination strategy of Turkish business groups, which is a specific and important 
acquisition-based dynamic capability. These supporting cases provide room for 
improvement for future studies both qualitatively and quantitatively, enabling M&A 
research to advance by using multi-level approaches as well as by examining the 
interaction mechanisms between subsidiaries of a business group.  
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8.1.4 Effects of Resource Replacement  
 
There is no doubt that the processes of partnering, reconfiguring, and re-coordinating 
present formidable challenges for a firm attempting to develop acquisition capabilities 
in handling these issues. The heterogonous forms of each acquisition and a number of 
unique challenges related to the post-acquisition management period force top 
management to work harder to integrate acquired businesses (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991).  
 
Accumulated knowledge through prior experiences might be a required precondition 
for the improvement of the capability to manage the acquisition process (Zollo and 
Singh, 2004). However, knowledge accumulation by itself is not an adequate 
mechanism to determine the improvement of acquisition capabilities. In this research, 
we have seen that it is not direct acquisition experience itself, but the similarity 
between two consecutive acquisitions that affects acquisition performance in 
emerging markets. Integration strategies and detecting which resources should be 
changed or retained in the target are obviously linked to overall acquisition capability 
improvement through development of integration capability (Helfat et al., 2007; 
Anand and Capron, 2007). Firms thus have to start accumulating knowledge 
regarding the post-acquisition integration process. By creating and updating 
management mechanisms for executing the post-acquisition integration and 
implementation, the acquirer firm may be able to practice and enhance its 
understanding of the determinants of acquisition performance. It is therefore very 
important to comprehend the performance implications of post-acquisition integration 
decisions (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) and to link them to the integration-based 
acquisition capability development process.  
 
At this point, it is a worth mentioning that in this study I specifically consider Turkey 
as a second tier of ―biggish‖ emerging markets. There might be misjudgement and 
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measurement errors if we treat Turkey as being in the same category as rapidly 
growing countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and I have already 
discussed the differences between MIST and BRIC countries in Section 2.5.1. It is not 
appropriate to accept each of the developing countries on equal terms. The 
heterogeneity of emerging markets is the main reason for this categorisation. While 
the heterogeneity of developed countries is being increasingly studied (Hoskisson et 
al., 2013), emerging markets also possess unique social, political, and economic 
conditions (Wright et al., 2005). Therefore, through this research, I attempt to advance 
existing literature on categorisation of emerging markets by drawing on the context-
specific nature of organisational learning, as well as to present a more fine-grained 
understanding of the determinants of acquisition performance in regards to the post-
acquisition period in mid-range emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2013) or 
countries aiming to catch up to the BRIC members.  
 
Central to my second hypothesis, I did not find support for my baseline argument 
about the positive relationship between the degree of resource replacement and 
acquisition performance in the emerging market context. Then, I extended the theory 
and suggested that the effects of post-acquisition management decisions through 
replacing or holding target‘s resources vary depending on the acquisition context with 
regard to domestic/cross-border differences in emerging markets.   
  
According to the resource replacement argument for cross-border acquisitions, 
emerging market firms use cross-border acquisitions for knowledge attainment to 
develop their capabilities, which is an issue of particular concern in emerging markets 
because firms are constantly seeking knowledge about new and rapidly changing 
environments, while aiming to increase their economic performance. In comparison to 
many developed world multinationals, which are now going abroad to seek lower 
costs, emerging market foreign acquirers are usually already low-cost and are seeking 
knowledge and development of their capability bases to become more global and 
competitive (Madhok and Keyhani, 2012). They simply cast aside the routines that 
they are using in their home country in order to compete in the open global 
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environment, and are willing to make a new start to learn more. Probably the last 
thing these emerging market firms want to do is to change the target firm into a 
completely ―Turkish‖ firm.  
 
The challenge for these emerging market firms during the post-acquisition of cross-
border deals would be that they do not utilise their own unique advantages and 
relations originating from their home country context. For instance, characteristically, 
emerging markets have institutional drawbacks, where regulatory structures are more 
inconsistent and less sophisticated. The emerging market context demands forming 
complex relationships with governments and key institutional actors. That is to say, 
these business groups largely rely on institutional support from the government, 
which is not the case with their new environment abroad. 
 
Arguably, the role of governments may be of vital importance in being supportive and 
taking on pioneer tasks to encourage firms to go abroad, and being internationalist 
with ―open door‖ and ―go global‖ policies (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Through such 
policies, emerging market firms obtain internationalisation experience and are 
evolved with the help of capability upgrading. Furthermore, gaining international 
experience might be a substitute for governmental dependency, and leads to more 
institutional and more democratic management structures. For instance, Koc and 
Sabanci are the main players in Turkey. They are not only the largest and most 
successful groups of firms in Turkey but also the most active players on the global 
scale. It can be observed from Turkey‘s perspective that these firms‘ relations with the 
government are not as good as those of newly-emerged family-oriented business 
groups. At present, this argument is beyond the scope of this study. However, the 
relationship between internationalisation and institutional improvement in emerging 
markets will be a noteworthy area to study.  
 
 277 
To summarise, considering the emerging market international acquirers, although the 
results for the resource replacement argument in cross-border acquisitions are not 
statistically significant, at least there is a correct direction with the expected effect that 
supports the argument for cross-border acquisitions. The reason for that insignificant 
result might be the relatively smaller number of cross-border acquisitions in Turkey 
compared to the BRIC countries. This may present difficulties for proposing a 
generalisation effect. Besides, there might be differences in some of this second group 
of emerging market firms‘ motivations for carrying out acquisition activities.    
 
From the other side, another dimension of resource replacement variables suggests 
that emerging market domestic acquirers are more inclined to change the target‘s 
resources during the post-acquisition period, as asserted in Hypothesis 3c. After the 
empirical work for this study, I found evidence for my argument about emerging 
market acquirers in integrating their domestic target‘s resources. Market extension 
and industrial diversification are the main motivators behind these domestic 
acquisitions.  
 
Post-acquisition strategies of emerging market firms may be shaped by a specific set 
of decisions. Performance outcomes of the acquisitions would be helpful for firms in 
deciding how to reconfigure the target firm‘s resources. At this point, the 
reconfiguration capability of firms plays an important role for a successful integration 
strategy. Having the required resources to reach the acquisition‘s desired goals is 
critical for a firm to gain economic performance. Managing a post-acquisition process 
includes the effective combination of acquired resources, which might be the most 
important factor for successful integration. These integration strategies may represent 
context-based behaviours but may not be sufficient conditions for better performance. 
The emerging market context plays a decisive role in a firm‘s domestic acquisition 
strategies, with three important factors during the post-acquisition process.  
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Firstly, a weak institutional environment would be the main factor affecting domestic 
acquisition strategies. As we have seen, concentrated ownership is the most practised 
governance model in markets (Young et al., 2008), and family-controlled business 
groups are the main players (Xu and Meyer, 2013) in emerging markets, and 
typically, this is equally the case for Turkey. Ideally, investors look for a range of 
institutional settings to enable the efficient functioning of markets. However, 
emerging markets fall short of meeting these institutional requirements. In the absence 
of said institutional requirements, which were discussed in Sections 2.5 and 3.5, 
emerging market firms face ―institutional voids‖ (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). To 
illustrate, in Turkey, the public procurement law as well as laws regarding rezoning 
plans and tender offers have been changed many times during the last decade 
(Kantrowitz, 2013). Thus, it is hard to speak of stability in this environment. These 
regulatory constraints and unstable environments not only challenge domestic firms 
but also challenge foreign firms that attempt to do business in these emerging 
markets. Therefore, by aiming either to benefit from these institutional voids or to 
generate substitutes for formal institutional settings to avoid inefficient market 
structures, these firms develop strategies specific to the emerging market context. On 
top of that, globalisation and liberalisation have also enabled multinational firms from 
developed markets to enter emerging market firms and use all their organisational 
capabilities. Beyond institutional challenges, emerging market firms have also been 
required to develop their acquisition capabilities in order to compete with these global 
players.  
 
Secondly, as a consequence of institutional voids, relationships are imperative in 
emerging markets. These relational ties can be recognised as a way of establishing 
and building strong positions at home. To do so, these firms need to constitute their 
management teams from family members or from their local networks or their 
government relations. Relational ties are, in fact, increasing due to continuously 
growing demands for transparency and more stable legislation practices. This may 
create challenges when uniformity and homogeneity continues in a firm‘s 
management team.  
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Thirdly, by using their context-based advantages and unique capabilities, emerging 
market firms pursue a path-dependent approach when integrating the target firm. As I 
am interested in resource reconfiguration in the target firm, in order to explore the 
process, I use three main resources, namely top manager, company name and 
headquarters, to identify the degree of change in the target. Emerging market 
acquirers, generally, choose to replace the target‘s key resources in their domestic 
acquisition. These acquirers commonly build on their current capabilities instead of 
exploring new ones. This is because, characteristically, emerging market firms pursue 
a strategy to develop their existing businesses or diversify into new areas with their 
own brands. For example, some of the Sabanci Group‘s companies are AKbank, 
AKLease, AK Investment, AkcanSA, TeknoSA, CarrefourSA, CimSA, TemSA, 
BriSA, and PhilSA.  
 
To sum up, three aspects of the results concerning resource replacement in the 
emerging market domestic acquisitions come into focus, and these aspects determine 
the resource replacement decisions in the home country. These aspects are: 
institutional voids, relational ties and lack of transparency, and lastly a path-dependent 
approach by emerging market firms. I present the determinants of acquisition 
performance characterised by degree of resource replacement in Table 8.2. 
 
 
Table 8.2: The outcome of Hypotheses 2a – 2c 
Hypothesis Regression 
Outcome 
t-test 
Outcome 
H2a: For emerging market acquirers, the degree of resource replacement will be 
positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
Not Significant - 
H2b: For emerging market acquirers undertaking cross-border acquisition, the degree 
of resource replacement will be negatively related with the performance of the focal 
acquisition. 
Not Significant - 
H2c: For emerging market acquirers undertaking domestic acquisition, the degree of 
resource replacement will be positively related with the performance of the focal 
acquisition. 
Supported - 
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8.1.5 Effects of Top Manager Replacement  
 
I carried out further analyses to examine resource replacement in the target firms in 
emerging markets. Acquirer firms face the concern of how to integrate an acquired 
firm and what to do with the target firm‘s resources when participating in acquisition 
activities. Basically, acquirer firms may either retain the target‘s resources or replace 
them with equivalent ones. In the previous hypothesis, I attempted to investigate the 
overall resource replacement effect during the post-acquisition period. Hypotheses 3, 
4, and 5 are extensions of Hypothesis 2, and can be used as proxies for the resource 
replacement variable. In general, the set of arguments asserted in Hypothesis 2 can be 
applied to the subsequent hypotheses. However, given the vital importance of the top 
manager in the organisational context, I have kept this section separate. 
 
In cross-border acquisitions, I tested for the direct effect of the replacement of the 
target firm‘s top manager on acquisition performance. My results show that the main 
effect of the replacement decision in the cross-border acquisitions was negative, 
which supports my argument, but it was not significant. Another way of saying this is 
that the prediction of the impact of top manager replacement on acquisition 
performance was correct and this supports the scholars‘ (Kumar, 2009; 
Chattopadhyay et al., 2012; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013) argument that emerging 
market acquirers retain, instead of replace, almost all of the senior top managers of the 
target firm when they acquire a firm outside their home country. However, the impact 
of top manager replacement was not statistically significant as reached after the tests.  
 
Importantly, it can be clearly seen from the results that when I control for other 
determinants of acquisition performance, the effect of the resource replacement on the 
acquisition performance changes, suggesting univariate and multivariate analyses can 
lead to diverse outcomes.  
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Additionally, these results confirm the value of doing empirical research with a bigger 
data set for more robust results for the literature on the view of cross-border 
acquisition strategies for emerging market acquirers. This is because Kumar (2009), 
Chattopadhyay et al. (2012), and Kumar and Steenkamp (2013) based their arguments 
on qualitative analysis through a few real-world cases. Under these circumstances, 
this study is a further step towards empirically examining the emerging market cross-
border acquirers‘ decisions during the post-acquisition period and their performance 
implications.   
 
The findings highlight that strategies in the post-acquisition integration of cross-
border acquisitions should consider the international environment that they are going 
to operate in, and should not be a plan merely to save the day. Completely 
assimilating acquisitions and pursuing a path-dependent approach, as suggested for 
domestic acquisitions, may be challenging, and firms will not attain the goal of the 
acquisitions. It is unusual for an emerging market firm to practice cross-border 
acquisition, then completely assimilate the target firm and be successful with this 
acquisition, for several reasons. Firstly, to the extent that relational ties and family-
based management approaches are common in emerging market firms, most of the 
emerging market firms, and even business groups, lack adequate managerial 
capabilities when they compete globally. Secondly, lack of recognition in foreign 
environments is a disadvantage for emerging market acquirers and it would be better 
for them to keep the top management of the target firm at first, as they know the 
environment and key stakeholders better. Thirdly, in parallel to the second argument, 
there are institutional, cultural, and geographical differences between home and 
foreign countries for emerging market acquirers which lead to the liability of 
foreignness. These emerging market acquirers do not reach key resources and acquire 
capabilities as easily as they can reach and acquire them in their home countries. 
Lastly, if they change the key resources of the target firm immediately, changed 
resources may not have the same effect as at home and may not provide value for a 
firm to gain competitive advantage. 
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Briefly, then, to escape the above situations, emerging market firms should follow a 
softer integration strategy when they practice an acquisition, especially if it is of a 
developed world firm. Only in this way can they learn from the foreign environment 
and develop their existing capabilities. This is an important element for 
reconfiguration capability in regard to emerging market firms‘ cross-border 
acquisitions. 
 
On the other side, in domestic acquisitions, I expect that acquirer firms will be more 
likely to change the top manager of the target firm in the domestic acquisitions, and 
this is supported by the quantitative research. Acquisition can serve as a means by 
which an acquirer firm gains excess managerial capabilities in addition to its existing 
capability. Changing the top management of the target firm and redeploying existing 
top management to the target firm allows the acquirer firm to retain skilled managers 
and to profit from any improvements that may happen in the target (Penrose, 1959). 
Furthermore, the managers of emerging market acquirers are often confident in their 
own managerial capabilities. They are eager to control the management of the target 
firm rather than to use the target‘s managerial resources as part of the acquirer 
(Capron et al., 1998). Hence, emerging market acquirers often colonise the target firm 
by employing their own management tools and taking control of the management.  
 
This can also be explained in terms of the entrepreneurial spirit of the emerging 
market firms. As was already discussed, in the majority of emerging market firms, 
especially family-based business groups, ownership and management are concentrated 
within a family unit, and its members strive to maintain intra-organisational family-
based ties (Sharma et al., 1996). The desire for growth through seeking new business 
opportunities for development by taking risks characterises the entrepreneurially 
managed and family-oriented business groups in emerging markets. Thus, the process 
of reconfiguring and leveraging resources effectively is creative and entrepreneurial 
(Barney and Arikan, 2001). These processes require firm specific tacit knowledge that 
is usually embedded in human capital (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Moreover, a primary 
source of tacit knowledge for effective post-acquisition management and 
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reconfiguration needs substantial experience. In this regard, family-oriented business 
groups may have an advantage in managing and reconfiguring these newly acquired 
resources, because family members or their relatives or friends are involved in the 
management and they may already be familiar with the process. They are unwilling to 
pursue heterogeneity in their management teams (Yiu et al., 2005). They tend to not 
recruit nonfamily and professional managers in order to increase heterogeneity of the 
experiences; rather, they usually seek management control from these family 
members. This path-dependent and relational knowledge is very critical and this time 
it is an important element for reconfiguration capability in regard to emerging market 
firms‘ domestic acquisitions. I summarise the quantitative analysis results of this 
study‘s Hypothesis 3. 
 
 
Table 8.3: The outcome of Hypotheses 3a – 3c 
Hypothesis Regression 
Outcome 
t-test Outcome 
H3a: For emerging market acquirers, replacing the top manager of the acquired firm 
will be positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
Supported Supported 
H3b: For emerging market acquirers undertaking cross-border acquisition, replacing 
the top manager of the acquired firm will be negatively related with the performance of 
the focal acquisition. 
Not Significant Not Significant 
H3c: For emerging market acquirers undertaking domestic acquisition, replacing the 
top manager of the acquired firm will be positively related with the performance of the 
focal acquisition. 
Supported Supported 
 
8.1.6 Effects of Name and Headquarters Replacement  
 
In order to extend the resource replacement argument, I also performed two more tests 
through consideration of two distinct proxies. Considering replacement of name and 
headquarters of the target firm as proxies leads to a specific construct of firm-wide 
replacement of resources. Measuring the extent of these resource transfers during the 
post-acquisition period allowed me to capture not only the degree of resource 
replacement but also the integration capability of the emerging market acquirers to 
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implement the reconfiguration of newly acquired specific resources between 
combined firms. 
 
However, once controlled for other determinants of acquisition performance, many of 
the results did not support the name and headquarters replacement arguments (H4 and 
H5). One insight worth mentioning from the results, which seems to be supported in 
both tests, is that emerging market firms that keep the HQ of the acquired firm have 
better acquisition performance than those that change their HQ. Locating headquarters 
in a foreign market may send a clear signal about firm strategies to the market, to 
current and future employees, customers, and to other external stakeholders. Still, 
given the small sample size of cross-border acquisitions in the Turkey case, that 
outcome needs to be developed through further analysis. Furthermore, redefining the 
role of corporate headquarters and a firm‘s regional divisions is critical as the 
functions of headquarters generally add complexity but little value (Collis et al., 
2007). With the rise of the digital world, the era of growing new communication 
technologies may decrease the perception of lower levels of hierarchy, but this does 
not mean regional offices should not receive full responsibility for their own 
organisational activities. In summary, further studies should better clarify the role of 
the corporate centre and its regional divisions. Otherwise it is difficult to make 
inferences about headquarters as a direct predictor of acquisition performance.  
 
Regarding the name replacement measure as a proxy for the resource replacement 
argument, the results suggest that it is unable to link this alternative measure directly 
with subsequent acquisition performance. It might be more meaningful to include 
other measures related to a firm‘s marketing capability to further explore the role of 
name changes during the post-acquisition period. Other determinants of acquisition 
performance variables in the model might influence the effect of name replacement. 
Limited cross-border acquisition activities by emerging market acquirers may be the 
other reason for lack of influence for Hypothesis 4.  
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Table 8.4: The outcome of Hypotheses 4a – 4c 
Hypothesis Regression 
Outcome 
t-test Outcome 
H4a: For emerging market acquirers, replacing the name of the acquired firm will be 
positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
Not Significant Not Significant 
H4b: For emerging market acquirers undertaking cross-border acquisition, replacing 
the name of the acquired firm will be negatively related with the performance of the 
focal acquisition. 
Not Significant Not Significant 
H4c: For emerging market acquirers undertaking domestic acquisition, replacing the 
name of the acquired firm will be positively related with the performance of the focal 
acquisition. 
Not Significant Supported 
 
 
 
Table 8.5: The outcome of Hypotheses 5a – 5c 
Hypothesis Regression 
Outcome 
t-test Outcome 
H5a: For emerging market acquirers, replacing the HQ of the acquired firm will be 
positively related with the performance of the focal acquisition. 
Not Significant Not Significant 
H5b: For emerging market acquirers undertaking cross-border acquisition, replacing 
the HQ of the acquired firm will be negatively related with the performance of the focal 
acquisition. 
Supported Supported 
H5c: For emerging market acquirers undertaking domestic acquisition, replacing the 
HQ of the acquired firm will be positively related with the performance of the focal 
acquisition 
Not Significant Supported 
 
 
8.2 Implications 
Research Implications and Contributions 
 
Several outcomes from this study deserve special attention. Taken together, the 
findings of this study contribute to the research on M&A in strategy by providing 
extension to the literature on organisational learning through acquisition experience, 
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M&A capabilities, M&A in the dynamic capability context, and M&A strategies in 
emerging markets.   
 
First, this study mainly offers a contribution to the literature by extending the scope of 
enquiry to an emerging market, Turkey. Prior studies have usually focused on the 
developed world or on US cases. Transcending this uniformity not only enhances our 
understanding of this topic per se, but also is likely to contribute to the further 
development of M&A strategies in emerging markets. To overcome this problem, I 
extend the findings and theoretical suggestions of Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), 
Hayward (2002), Zollo and Singh (2004), and Laamanen and Keil (2008) by 
providing the attributes of emerging market acquirers in domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions that can enhance post-acquisition performance, and develop acquisition 
capabilities.  
 
Second, using similar theoretical backgrounds, I extend previous research (Haleblian 
and Finkelstein, 1999; Laamanen and Keil, 2008) by examining the role of acquisition 
experience on the performance of acquirer firms and derive conclusions on how 
similarity of prior acquisitions can enhance the acquisition performance of the focal 
M&A. Prior studies that employed the number of acquisitions as a measure of 
acquisition experience and looked at a direct effect on acquisition performance have 
suggested mixed results (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Kusewitt, 1985; Zollo and 
Singh, 2004). The results of H1a, H1b, and H1e support the insignificant results in the 
literature and found no direct effect between acquisition experience and acquisition 
performance. In a more theoretical level, the findings of this study suggest that 
acquisition experience has a more sophisticated relationship with acquisition 
performance. When firms have experience of an M&A that was highly similar to the 
focal one, they gain specialist knowledge about how to manage the M&A process and 
achieve better performance. According to this theory, when executing the focal M&A, 
firms repeat or adjust their organisational routines in view of previous acquisition 
outcomes. Therefore, this finding refines our knowledge of how organisations learn 
from prior M&A activities.  
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Third, this study contributes to the strategy literature on the emerging market context, 
especially on business groups and international business. Emerging economies are 
growing rapidly, and in some cases are already the largest economies in the world 
(Chattapodhyay et al., 2012). The extant scholarly literature on the strategies and 
performance of emerging market firms deals predominantly with particular national 
and regional cases, more often in large emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (BRIC). Specifically, I focus instead on the country case of Turkey, one of the 
second tier of biggish growing economies of ―MIST‖ (Mexico, Indonesia, South 
Korea and Turkey). Given that each emerging market has its own history and its own 
set of business environment, there can be no best model for imitation among the 
BRIC markets for developing firm-level organisational actions (Colpan et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the nation-specific case studies are important in order to better understand 
the nature of diversified emerging market acquirers‘ unique M&A strategies and 
capability development mechanisms.  Given the emerging nature of the Turkish 
market and the transitional characteristics of the institutional environment, Turkish 
context has a good potential for future analyses as well.  
  
Fourth, another expected contribution of this study is to provide a deeper 
understanding of the role and nature of M&A capabilities.  In this study, I primarily 
focused on two of them. In the first one, similar to many studies (eg. Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004), I focused on capability development 
through prior acquisition experience. In the second one, I found that the capability to 
manage post- acquisition period is also an important layer of capability development 
for acquisitions. Importantly, I found that geographic scope of the acquisition affects 
the resource replacement decisions and capability development of acquirer firms. The 
different knowledge requirements and resource replacement decisions for successful 
cross-border and domestic acquisition are substantial in the post-acquisition process. 
Specifically for emerging market acquirers, the challenges involved in competing 
across the border are significant, as are the resources already present in the target firm 
that help acquirer firms‘ deal with these challenges. On the other hand, given the 
unique characteristics of the emerging market context, acquirers are more likely to 
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pursue a path-dependent approach in their domestic acquisitions. Therefore, the 
findings of this study suggest that acquirers develop their integration capability, which 
is considered an important dynamic capability, differently when they acquire a firm 
across the border versus domestically, highlighting that contextual characteristics 
matter for emerging market M&A. We can clearly say that firms‘ post-M&A 
integration decisions vary depending on the geographic scope of the acquisition. 
Further, this study also contributes to the emerging literature on CEO effect on firm 
performance by emphasising the role of individuals in learning strategy. My 
unstructured validating interviews are also in line with the view of how specific 
contexts map onto post-acquisition organisational routines, and support my empirical 
conclusions.  
 
Lastly, at a more theoretical level, this paper also aims to contribute to M&A 
literature on strategy by attempting to bridge and integrate different theoretical 
approaches. In this study, I draw upon multiple theoretical approaches, using 
organisational learning, the resource-based view, and institutional theory arguments to 
enrich the existing literature on the dynamic capabilities perspective. I extend it by 
explicating how emerging market acquirers shape the post-acquisition routines of 
M&A and develop their integration capability, which is considered an important 
dynamic capability affected by the requirement of context-based decision-making and 
strategic responses. Therefore, this study contributes to the dynamic capabilities 
literature of strategy by quantitatively examining the role of dynamic capabilities in 
contributing to the post-acquisition performance enhancement of an acquirer.  
 
Managerial Implications 
There are clearly some implications of this study for business people. For managers, 
the results in this study have three broad implications.  
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First of all, the results for the direct acquisition experience effect on acquisition 
performance indicate that an acquirer‘s focal acquisition usually underperforms its 
previous acquisition, further suggesting that top managers may not fully consider the 
dissimilarity between acquisitions. It appears that managers in emerging markets feel 
more confident in generalising prior acquisition experience when their focal 
acquisitions are similar to prior ones. Given the unique institutional nature of 
emerging markets, and the way that highly diversified business groups are prominent 
in this context, managers should pay closer attention when evaluating the acquisition 
performance of both similar and dissimilar M&A, and shape their strategic actions by 
learning from failure and success. Furthermore, having an appropriate team or M&A 
specialist could be a vital aspect of the acquisition management of firms in order to 
pursue collaborative organisational practices. Similarly, Zollo and Winter (2002), and 
Inkpen (2000) raised the issue of the need for focused professionals or even 
specialized M&A departments and units responsible for M&A transactions (including 
contracting and coordinating advisors) for big businesses. In light of this need, some 
of the largest groups in Turkey (e.g. Yildiz, Sabanci, Koc, and Dogus) have pursued 
this option in order to better integrate the resources of the target. Many of these 
people and departments are highly specialised in individual elements of the M&A 
process (e.g., deal-making or integration), and this improves the final success level of 
domestic and cross-border deals by implementing the right strategies. 
 
Second, business conditions are continuously changing in today‘s world, in part 
owing to increasing competition globally and to the developing digital era. Thus, 
firms should continually renew themselves and seek external consultation to keep up 
with changing circumstances. When managers turn to academia for some direction on 
how to increase their chances of creating value from their corporate actions, they are 
usually faced with a set of highly partitioned recommendations (Zollo and Singh, 
2004). I hope this study will help to describe the nature of the emerging market 
business environment, offering managers more clearly-defined post-acquisition 
integration strategies that are helpful for staying competitive in their domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions. M&A activity should be beneficial to the economy as a 
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whole if the decision-makers use the firms‘ resources wisely and behave in the best 
interests of the stakeholders so as to maximise the firm‘s performance. 
 
Finally, so long as institutional voids and relational ties remain in an economy, these 
highly diversified emerging market firms will continue to hold unique advantages and 
play a significant role in their home country. In that case, managerial ties and relations 
as well as entrepreneurial management facilitate opportunity capture for these 
diversified emerging market firms. On the other hand, things can change across the 
border and emerging market firms may face managerial weaknesses in their global 
organisational structure. The pyramidal structure of management and dependence on 
the founder family in their strategic directions may create operational conflict when 
these firms go abroad. Increasing the professionalisation of the management is likely 
to have a positive role in performance enhancement.  
 
8.3 Limitations  
 
As with all academic studies, it is necessary to explicate some of the limitations of 
this research. In this research, I only focused on publicly-traded firms in the study 
context. Although this creates some limitations for the generalisability of the findings, 
the choice was justified by the focus on variables which were only available in 
publicly-traded firms. The unobserved deals by SMEs may be important for the 
Turkish context because they are paving the way for the transformation of Turkish 
industry. However, it was not possible to uncover any publicly-available data about 
these corporate activities and to make objective performance assessments of them.  
 
Furthermore, measuring acquisition performance remains an on-going challenge in 
M&A literature in strategy and finance. I attempted to overcome this problem by 
introducing multiple measures of acquisition performance, namely cumulative 
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abnormal returns (CAR) and return on assets (ROA). While both measures estimate 
the post-acquisition performance of M&A, they are conceptually distinct.  
Announcement returns reflect the market‘s initial reaction to announcement of the 
acquisition. Return on assets is the ex post accounting measure of the longer-term 
performance of the M&A. There is discrepancy between the results for the two 
acquisition performance variables and this raises doubts about which one to rely on. 
As many strategy scholars highlight that under the assumption of an efficient market, 
CAR is the most effective technique to capture acquisition performance and predict 
post-acquisition performance (Haleblian et al., 2009; Healy et al., 1992; Kaplan and 
Weisbach, 1992; Capron and Shen, 2007). However, it is widely accepted by M&A 
scholars that there is no perfect acquisition performance measure that accurately 
captures the effect. I have therefore analysed the research arguments with both 
acquisition performance variables in order to capture evidence about investors‘ and 
accounting views. This is because I support the view that all the aforementioned 
acquisition measures in the literature are of value and performance metrics should be 
carefully selected according to the purpose of the study. In the case of this research, 
stock market performance CAR serves well for the purpose of H1, as following prior 
studies that have examined acquisition experience, I also used short-term CAR to 
determine the impact of an acquisition on a firm. Many confounding factors, such as 
new product development, changes in corporate strategy, top management, and 
headcount, may affect firm performance. Thus, we cannot reach the realised effect 
from the acquisition. Moreover, while stock market measure allowed us to distinguish 
among the performance of individual acquisitions completed in close temporal 
proximity, accounting-based measures cannot differentiate these effects. In addition, 
long-term measures may assess post-M&A integration decisions better than short-
term measures, as it incorporates information about the changes in the resource base 
of the firms. Given these issues, one can argue that there is simply no measure of 
performance that can be considered to be the most reliable one. Every performance 
measure has its own advantages and disadvantages. Thus, future research is required 
to develop a more comprehensive and complete empirical framework in order to 
guide researchers‘ choice of appropriate acquisition performance as well as M&A 
capability measures. 
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I further limited my sample to essentially single-case, country-based, emerging 
market firms in Turkey, and so the relatively narrow nature of the number of mergers 
and acquisitions may not allow for wider generalisation across other emerging 
markets as a whole. All the same, it is important to note that this restricted focus of 
my context-specific approach was consciously selected. There was a need for a highly 
dynamic environment in terms of M&A activity within the emerging market context. 
Moreover, theoretically, firms in other emerging markets may experience similar 
processes in their own environment. The results related to the capability development 
mechanisms might be extended to other institutional contexts, as long as they 
maintain same emerging market characteristics. Therefore, a useful extension would 
be to conduct this study in other emerging markets.  
 
One of the striking characteristics and an irony of the Turkish business environment is 
that the Turkish politics have been trying to adopt Western practices and aiming to 
―reach not only the standards of economic, scientific, and technological development 
of the West but also to establish a secular and democratic political order‖ as the 
negotiation to join the EU is still an on-going process (Onis, 2006, pp. 280). However, 
there is an evolving characteristic of Turkish business environment that political 
connectedness through personal ties and institutional networks become critical for 
business success (Ozcan and Gunduz, 2014). Institutional voids may deepen these 
business-politics connections and can have an impact on the strategic choices of firms 
and their performance outcomes. Thus, the findings of this study may best be 
applicable to some emerging market economies in which there are similar abuses and 
absence of credible law enforcement, and institutional settings to rule economic 
development beyond narrow group interests and political relations. 
 
It is important to note that there may be a particular limitation related to using the 
stock market measure as part of testing organisational learning and capability 
development arguments in a market where the stock market plays a relatively small 
role. Many of the emerging market economies underwent a liberalisation process 
within the last two decades and these developments take time for these economies in 
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adopting them to their capital markets. Specifically, the Turkish stock market is not 
fully integrated into the world capital markets (Neuhaus, 2005; Oelger and Schiereck, 
2011). The negotiations with the European Union since 2005 constrained Turkey to 
open its economy and become more integrated into the global markets. However, the 
reforms to develop the integration are not finished yet. Therefore, when abnormal 
stock returns are analysed as a performance metric, it should be kept in mind that the 
efficiency of the emerging market stock market is questionable since they are 
relatively small and emerging market. Future studies should also address this 
limitation in their work. 
 
Another limitation was the unavailability of firm-specific data needed to further 
analyse the impacts of some firm characteristics pertaining to the difference between 
the effects of domestic and cross-border acquisitions on the acquisition performance 
of Turkish acquirers. This is a common problem for emerging markets because more 
detailed data cannot be gathered as easily as in developed world cases. The manual 
data collection of this study proved to be a time and effort-consuming exercise. 
 
Additionally, another limitation of the analyses might come from differences in the 
target firm‘s characteristic, as privatisations were included as acquisitions in my 
dataset. There might be several problems with including privatisations in the analyses. 
First, energy privatisations, where the majority of privatisation activities in my dataset 
recognised in this sector, may take long periods and have been subject to extensive 
bureaucratic negotiations between the private firm and the government. Second, 
acquirer firms might constitute a consortia and finance pooling, which may cause a 
trouble in determining the acquirer firm‘s focal acquisition performance. Third, there 
might be a political interference in the management of the acquired firm.  
 
As mentioned earlier, relational ties and governmental networks are very important in 
emerging markets and may influence firm performance. For instance, Acemoglu et al. 
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(2010) argued that having a personal connection with a senior politician produced a 
cumulative abnormal return for financial firms. Moreover, Ozcan and Gunduz (2014) 
also found that firms with political connections have had an abnormal performance on 
average over non-connected firms in Turkey considering the period between 2003 and 
2011. However, there are also cases where inefficiencies and risks come out of this 
close relationship with political interference (Boubakri et al., 2012). Thus, possible 
selection effects in the privatisation process may bias the observed ownership-
performance relationship and performance measures may not accurately predict the 
expected effects. However, we are not sure whether the privatisation process was 
biased in a number of ways and was an outcome of a relational tie. Thus, this subject 
beyond the scope of this study and the research presented here does not attempt to 
enter the politically sensitive debate. Rather, I sought to develop and test a conceptual 
model that would identify the strategic resource replacement decisions associated with 
performance improvements after an ownership change. For my study, since the 
emphasis is on the determinants of acquisition performance from the acquirer‘s 
perspective following the ownership change, and due to the exclusion of privatisation 
deals from my dataset where a consortia won the auction, I ignored the privatisation 
effect that may arose on the performance of the acquirer. In this respect, it should also 
be noted that privatisation plays only a small role in my sample, as there are only 16 
deals. However, it remains unclear whether the results apply to other geographies. 
Future research could usefully concentrate upon developing more elaborate models 
and methods. 
 
The limitations mentioned above demonstrate that further research is necessary, as 
outlined in the following section.  
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8.4 Further Research 
 
The previous sections listed this study‘s implications for existing management theory 
and practice as well as its inevitable limitations. Based on these considerations, in this 
section I will provide recommendations and suggestions for future investigation in 
order to gain greater understanding of the results presented in this study and to 
improve them.  
 
As already touched upon in the previous section, future research on M&A 
performance should engage more deeply in developing appropriate measures for post-
acquisition performance. The recommendation to apply multiple performance 
measures is in line with prior research. More careful selection of the acquisition 
performance measure is likely to provide an explanation for the greater variation in 
acquisition impact on acquisition performance.  
 
Understanding of the role of acquisition experience may be advanced in the strategy 
literature by qualitatively examining the post-acquisition process issues through 
participant observation that may better capture the organisational routines generalised 
from prior acquisition experiences. Instead, my focus in this study was on the 
development of a theoretical framework and testing it using quantitative data. I was 
able to capture antecedent settings by exploring acquisition similarity and determine 
consequences by predicting M&A performance. Then, through the combination of 
antecedents and consequences, I was able to make inferences about the nature of 
organisational learning and generalisation. Since the conclusions of the results are 
inferential, further work should develop a model to identify antecedents that can help 
predict post-acquisition performance, and apply multiple levels of analysis to better 
understand the specific learning process and application of experience. Furthermore, 
the learning mechanisms specific to pre- and post-acquisition processes may differ. 
Associating acquisition experience with learning during the pre-acquisition stages 
 296 
such as screening, target selection, and due diligence would be a fruitful study for 
examination of these phenomena.  
 
Deeper understanding of the role of post-acquisition integration capabilities could be 
achieved through exploring the important moderators in the study context. There are 
unexplored moderators between post-acquisition strategic decisions and acquisition 
performance. Such moderators could be country-level factors (such as national 
culture, governmental effects, or corporate governance structure), firm-level factors 
(such as corporate culture, management structure, or size), or individual-level factors 
(such as a CEO‘s prior experience, education, or leadership characteristics). Further 
research is required to develop a better understanding of such moderators and better 
predict acquisition performance.  
 
The results of this study indicate the need for future work on the moderating role of 
context on organisational learning related to mergers and acquisitions, and other 
corporate activities. Therefore, future research could build on my study by testing the 
hypotheses in different geographical contexts and corporate level diversification 
strategies in order to attain a more fine-grained appreciation of the conditions under 
which post-acquisition strategies lead to better outcomes and of how firms develop 
their integration capabilities. Applying the analyses presented in this study to other 
emerging markets as well as developed world markets can guide scholars in 
promising directions toward developing understanding of the antecedents of 
acquisition performance. Additionally, further research should also use the analyses of 
this study when examining the capability development mechanisms in strategic 
alliances, greenfields, and joint ventures. These approaches will be helpful to validate 
and extend the knowledge of the capability-based view of the firm.  
 
Moreover, there is need for better description and analysis of the post-acquisition 
strategies of emerging market firms. Supplementary to the findings of this study‘s 
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resource replacement hypotheses (H2, H3, H4 and H5), demonstrating what changes 
happen after firms‘, usually business groups‘, domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
is also important in order to obtain a better sense of the post-acquisition process in 
emerging markets at the group level. My empirical models focused on firm-level 
variables and employed publicly available data to measure them. However, 
characteristically the majority of the firms in the Borsa Istanbul are either subsidiaries 
of a business group or business group themselves. Therefore, a useful direction for 
future research would be to explore the interaction mechanism between the 
subsidiaries of a business group at the group level. Indeed, going beyond what 
numbers may indicate, there is a need to assess the process of how these business 
groups‘ post-acquisition decisions occur in the emerging markets by presenting the 
evidence through in-depth analysis. This should contribute to the scholarly debate 
about emerging market business groups‘ post-acquisition strategies by untangling the 
black box of coordination and learning mechanisms between a group‘s subsidiaries. 
 
A further promising avenue for M&A-related studies to come may be associated with 
cross-disciplinary approach. The majority of M&A papers and studies come from 
either management or finance scholars, and usually with divergent perspectives 
(Haleblian et al., 2009). If our interest is in expanding our understanding of mergers 
and acquisitions by emphasising the conditions under which strategies and 
organisational routines give firms superior M&A performance, scholars should also 
look at the other literatures. Otherwise, practitioners will continue to complain about 
the contradictory instructions on how to generate value from M&A activities. So, one 
clear way forward for M&A scholars is to develop multi-disciplinary work. 
 
The presented approach to the dynamic capabilities view opens up several areas for 
further investigation. Much has been written about dynamic capabilities; however, 
there are misunderstandings, inconsistencies, and overlapping definitions within the 
field (Zahra et al., 2006; Barreto, 2010). In this study, I conceptualise M&A capability 
and integration capability as dynamic capabilities for emerging market acquirers, 
which contributes to the post-acquisition performance enhancement of the firms and 
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makes the term ―dynamic capability‖ more tangible. Going beyond this, future 
research should deepen the understanding of M&A capabilities by using mixed 
methodological approaches. It is a promising approach to qualitatively explore the 
M&A capability development process through in-depth or comparative case studies, 
then testing the anticipated effects by applying appropriate empirical methods. 
Moreover, it is recommended that future research in the dynamic capabilities field 
should offer a clearer framework that may shed light on the uncertainties inherent in 
measurement of the capability‘s effect on overall performance.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
Why are some firms more successful in their corporate actions than others? What 
distinguishes those which perform better from those which underperform or worse? Is 
it their visionary ability to predict the future, their creativity which allows them to do 
things differently, the way they take risks for more returns, being more disciplined in 
their corporate actions, or being more innovative? The reasons could perhaps be all of 
the above, or it could be none. In essence, ―greatness is not primarily a matter of 
circumstance; greatness is first and foremost a matter of conscious choice and 
discipline‖ (Collins and Hansen, 2011, pp.182). Thus, the main driver of this success 
is a good strategy designed by the management of a firm.  
 
But what is a good strategy and where does it come from? In fact, a good strategy 
contains a set of rational activities, and they are not hidden in the implementation 
details; rather, they are the punch in the strategy (Rumelt, 2011). Realising the main 
factors that may affect the performance of a situation and designing a way of 
coordinating activities to take advantage of those factors are the essentials of a good 
strategy. A firm‘s management is responsible for identifying the nature of the main 
challenges and designing a way of dealing with these factors. In short, strategy 
matters for firms, and a good strategy is usually determined by its success. 
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Over the past decade, emerging markets have enjoyed huge economic success. The 
remarkable growth in emerging markets has made them prime grounds for the global 
economy. As economies get wealthier, their institutional environment improves and 
emerging market firms become more global. Most emerging market firms are 
frequently reforming their corporate strategies to keep up with the increasing pace of 
change. What worked in the beginning of the 2000s may not be right in the current 
time, and will not be right for the next 15 years. Thus, a clear and well-understood 
strategy is vital for these emerging market firms to better compete not just with their 
developed world counterparts but even at home, and to become successful in their 
corporate activities. Yet strategy is only one component of what a firm needs. It is 
equally important to successfully execute this strategy on the ground.  
 
As a result of the economic development in emerging markets, the strategy 
perspective for emerging market firms has gained increasing attention. Consulting 
firms have increased their attention to emerging markets and published various 
studies adopting this perspective, and several academic contributions investigating the 
emerging market phenomena have been realised. As these dynamic markets continue 
to evolve, the exploration of emerging market firms‘ strategies remains incomplete 
and more insights into this largely unexplored topic are of great importance for the 
field of management.  
 
I undertake this research to contribute to the exploration of the strategies of emerging 
market firms and to understand more about their acquisition events. I document the 
stock market and accounting-based performance measures for a sample of 
acquisitions performed by Turkish firms. I first examine whether emerging market 
firms can develop their collective M&A capabilities through the accumulation of 
acquisition experience. I find that a firm‘s focal acquisition performance positively 
relates to prior acquisition experience that is similar to the focal acquisition. Then, I 
focus on the emerging market firms‘ post-M&A consequences on performance of 
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integration decisions. I realise that post-M&A integration strategies of emerging 
market firms vary depending on the geographical similarity of the focal acquisition. 
However, the analyses only statistically support the view that replacing the acquired 
firm‘s resources, especially top manager, is an important determinant of focal 
acquisition performance in domestic M&A. Apart from HQ replacement, I find no 
statistical support in my analyses for the view that emerging market firms those keep 
acquired firm‘s resources in their cross-border acquisitions reach superior 
performance. The lack of results may owe in part to the inaccuracy of determining the 
emerging market firms‘ motivation behind undertaking a cross-border M&A. In my 
research, I assume that these emerging market firms use cross-border acquisitions to 
obtain technologies, and capabilities essential for their globally expansion strategies- 
not merely lowering costs. Therefore, there may have different motivations or 
expectations for why emerging market firms would choose cross-border M&A as a 
way of expansion that could also affect the post-M&A integration decisions. 
Likewise, pre-M&A performance of the acquired firm may affect the resource 
replacement decisions of the acquirer firms. Much deeper understanding of these 
discussions; how emerging market firms use cross-border acquisitions, what the 
selection process of the target is, and how they shift resources from one area to other, 
may help to better understand the performance implications of emerging market cross-
border acquisitions. Future researchers should take these factors into consideration to 
further explore the strategies of emerging market firms.  
 
Moreover, the unsupported hypotheses may have some links with the recently 
evolving market conditions in Turkey, as the full integration of Turkish stock market 
into the world and especially into the European capital markets is still not achieved 
yet. Also, the institutional Turkish market of corporate control is still under-developed 
and concentrated ownership is common. Apart from these conditions, Turkish firms 
are still in the process of evolving and growing globally. In fact, Turkey looks like a 
laggard, as it has only three firms in the Boston Consulting Group‘s 100 global 
challenger list (2014), while China and India supplied nearly two-thirds of the list, 
Brazil has 13, and 6 from Mexico. This point needs further argument as industry 
structures, institutional environment, and infrastructural settings may not only vary 
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greatly between developed market economies and emerging market economies, but 
also within the emerging market economies as well. Therefore, what works with 
developed market firms may not be applicable to emerging market firms. Needless to 
say, the approach and arguments chosen should depend on the focal issue of concern. 
To more fully benefit from the underlying research opportunities, further research 
should go beyond mere verification and extension of existing theory and instead 
involve deeply in the emerging market context for theory building. 
 
The globally continuing importance of emerging markets requires that academics, 
managers, and policy makers strive to better understand them. I hope that this study is 
a step towards providing insight on emerging market firms‘ post-acquisition strategies 
and their capability development mechanisms. I further hope that this study develops 
manager perspectives by providing more specific guidance regarding value generation 
from M&A.  
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Appendix A: Summary of Empirical Research on Acquisition Performance 
AUTHOR TITLE AIM OF THE STUDY METHOD & SAMPLE Dependent Variable Independent Variable 
Barkema and 
Schijven (2008) – 
AMJ  
Toward unlocking the full 
potential of acquisitions: 
The role of organisational 
restructuring 
Building on behavioural theory, they 
studied when and how firms unlock 
synergy from acquisitions over extended 
periods of time. They conceptualized 
organisational restructuring 
as a second stage in the integration 
process 
Panel data on 1600 
acquisitions over four 
decades. 25 large Dutch 
multinational firms  
Return on Assets (ROA)  1) Organisational 
restructuring. 2) Number of 
related acquisitions since last 
restructuring. 3) Number of 
related acquisitions between 
last two restructuring. 4) 
Elapsed time since last 
restructuring. 5) Acquisition 
experience. 6) Restructuring 
experience  
Cannela and 
Hambrick (1993) – 
SMJ 
Effects of Executive 
Departures on the 
performance of acquired 
firms 
They examined post-acquisition 
performance in relation to pre-
acquisition performance. They also used 
relatedness as a moderator variable  
Sample of 96 acquisitions 
occurred between 1980 and 
1984. They concluded that 
the departure of executives 
from acquired firm is 
harmful to post-acquisition 
performance 
Acquisition performance 
through survey (expert 
informants) (Subjective) 
1- Management change 2- 
status bestowal 2- relatedness   
Capron (1999) – SMJ The long term 
performance of horizontal 
acquisitions 
She examined the impact of post-
acquisition asset divestiture and 
resource redeployment both asset 
divestiture and resource. 
Redeployment can contribute to 
acquisition performance. 
on the long-term performance of 
horizontal acquisitions 
Survey – 253 horizontal 
M&A in the period of 1988-
92. European and US firms  
(Insight from cost efficiency 
and resource-based theories) 
Managerial judgement 
(survey on synergies) & self-
reported measures of changes 
on acquisition performance. 
CONTROLS: Relatedness, 
Geographic scope, relative 
size of the target, diversified 
acquirer 
1- Asset divesture 2- 
Resource redeployment 
(R&D capabilities, 
manufacturing know-how, 
marketing resources, supplier 
relationships, distribution 
expertise) 
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Haleblian et al (2009) 
– Journal of 
Management 
Taking stock of what we 
know about M&A – 
review and research 
agenda 
They developed a framework to 
organize and review recent empirical 
findings principally from management, 
economics, finance in which interest in 
acquisition behaviour 
Firm characteristics – 
acquisition performance. 
Moderators of the 
Acquisition–Performance 
Relationship (p 478-83)  
Measurement issues (p 492-
493) 
Many studies examined 
abnormal returns over either 
short (2-4 days) time period. 
Scholars consider CARs as 
the most effective technique 
and seemingly default 
measure of the post-
acquisition performance. 
Longer term measures also 
present challenges 
 
Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999) – 
Administrative 
Science Quarterly 
The influence of 
acquisition experience on 
acquisition performance: 
behavioural learning 
perspective 
They examined the influence of prior 
organisational acquisition experience on 
the performance of acquisition from the 
behavioural learning perspective 
Data from 449 acquisitions 
show an overall U-shaped 
relationship. (1980-92) 
Abnormal returns (5 day 
prior and 5 day after the 
announcement) 
1- Acquisition experience 2- 
target to target similarity (4 
digit SIC)  CONTROLS: 
Acquirer to target 
relatedness, relative 
acquisition size, attitude, 
acquisition slack 
Hayward (2002) – 
SMJ 
When do firms learn from 
their acquisition 
experience?  
Used the org learning theory to examine 
how the nature, performance, and timing 
of a firm's acquisition experience help it 
to learn how to select the right 
acquisition.  
214 acquisitions made by 
120 firms in 6 industries over 
the study period 1990-95 
CAR (30 days prior to 
announcement – after 5 days 
interval) 2- survey 
assessment (Likert scale) 
1- Acquisition experience 2- 
relatedness (4 digit SIC) 3- 
Small acquisition losses 4- 
Timing of prior acquisition 
5- discount factors  Many 
control variables 
King et al  (2004) – 
SMJ 
Meta analyses of post-
acquisition performance 
Employed meta-analytic technique to 
empirically assess the impact of the 
most commonly researched antecedent 
variables on post-acquisition 
performance 
Meta-Analysis – 93 empirical 
studies and 852 effect sizes  
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Laamanen and Keil 
(2008) – SMJ 
Performance of serial 
acquirers  
First, they examined whether different 
acquisition frequency patterns affect 
acquirer performance. Second, they 
examined whether firm level influences 
moderate the relationship between the 
acquisition frequency patterns and 
acquirer performance 
5,518 acquisitions of 611 
active U.S. acquirers in 
seven industry sectors during 
the 10 years between 
1 January 1990 and 31 
December 1999. They find 
that ‗high acquisition rate is 
negatively related to acquirer 
performance' 
Acquirer performance: 
Longer term excess market 
returns to acquirer 
shareholders.  
(1) Acquisition 
rate, (2) variability of the 
acquisition rate, (3) 
acquisition experience, (4) 
acquirer size, and (5) 
acquisition program scope. 
CONTROLS: target 
similarity, target to target 
similarity, the use of external 
advisors, 
the method of payment, the 
proportion of 
international acquisitions, the 
proportion of hostile 
acquisitions, the proportion 
of private targets, 
and acquirer‘s leverage 
McDonald et al 
(2008) – SMJ 
The effects of outside 
director acquisition 
experience on firm 
acquisition performance 
They focused on asset divestiture and 
resource redeployment following an 
acquisition. Directors will develop 
expertise in making particular kinds of 
acquisition decisions through their past 
experiences 
Large and medium size US 
listed industrial and service 
firms 1989-98. 1916 deals by 
489 firms.  
Cumulative Abnormal return  Directors' prior experience, 
board member experience. 
CONTROLS; size, 
profitability, financial slack, 
no of acquisition experience 
Vermeulen and 
Barkema (2001) – 
AMJ 
Learning through 
acquisitions 
They focused on the distinction between 
acquisitions and greenfield investments.  
Longitudinal database 
containing data on the 
subsidiaries of 25 large 
Dutch firms  
Survival. 
Acquisition/greenfield. 
1- No of preceding deals 2- 
preceding greenfields in 
familiar market 2- preceding 
acquisition in 
related/unrelated domains 
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Zollo and Meier 
(2008) – Academy of 
Management 
Perspectives 
What is M&A 
Performance? 
They examined the concept of 
acquisition performance, proposing a 
model linking task-, transaction-, 
and firm-level constructs under different 
time horizons.  
Questionnaire-based survey 
(1994-2001). 211 projects. 
146 acquisitions across 
industries and geographies. 
The survey of expert 
observers; 1- integration 
process performance 2- 
employee retention 3- 
customer retention 4- overall 
acquisition performance 5- 
accounting performance 6- 
financial performance 
 
Zollo and Singh 
(2004) – SMJ 
Deliberate learning in 
corporate acquisitions; 
post acquisition strategies 
and integration capability 
in US bank mergers 
They focused on acquirers‘ performance 
and examined how learning processes 
specific to management of the post-
acquisition phase affect it.  
Questionnaire based sample 
study. 250 largest US bank 
holding companies.   
Return on Assets (ROA): 3 
years after the deal vs. the 
same measure 1 year before 
the deal.  
1- Knowledge codification 2- 
Acquisition experience 3- 
Integration 4- Replacement  
CONTORLS: Relatedness, 
Resource quality, Asset size, 
relative asset size 
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Appendix B: Description Of Variables       
      
Category  Description Code Type Relevant 
Hypotheses 
Dependent Variables       
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
represents the change in stock-market 
reaction 
CAR continuous  all 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Accounting based approach shows how 
firm‘s assets are in generating revenue  
ROA continuous  all 
Independent Variables       
Number of acquisition 
experience 
Number of acquisitions completed by the 
acquiring company 5 years before the focal 
acquisition 
acqexp continuous >0 1a 
Acquisition experience 
dummy 
Any prior deal in the past 5 years by the firm 
(Yes=1) (No=0) 
firmexpdummy dummy 1b 
Similarity of prior 
relatedness 
The dummy refers to the similarity across the 
targets in terms of their industrial relatedness. 
If the prior acquisition has the same 2 digit 
SIC code as the focal acquisition (1), 
otherwise (0) 
priorrelatedness dummy 1c 
Similarity of prior 
crossborder 
The dummy refers to the similarity across the 
targets in terms of geographic similarity that 
is cross-border or domestic. If the prior 
acquisition has the same crossdomestic code 
as the focal acquisition (1), otherwise (0) 
priorcrossdomestic dummy 1d 
Group level acquisition 
experience dummy 
Any prior deal in the past 5 years by the 
group (Yes=1) (No=0) 
groupexpdummy dummy 1e 
Degree of resource 
replacement 
Resource replacement proxy that shows the 
overall resource replacement in the target 
firm 
degree Ordinal 
             
2 
Top management 
replacement 
The dummy that indicated whether acquired 
company's CEO change occurred in a year 
time after the deal (Yes=1) (No=0) 
CEOchange dummy 3 
Name replacement  The dummy that indicated whether acquired 
company's name change occurred in a year 
time after the deal (Yes=1) (No=0) 
namechange dummy 4 
Headquarters 
replacement 
The dummy that indicated whether acquired 
company's headquarter change occurred in a 
year time after the deal (Yes=1) (No=0) 
hqchange dummy 5 
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Category  Description Code Type Relevant 
Hypotheses 
Cross-border  Based on the companies' headquarters; If the 
acquirer and acquired HQ in the same 
country, domestic (0), or cross-border (1)  
crossborder dummy all 
Relatedness Acquirer to target business similarity 
(Related=1) (Unrelated=0). By doing the 
same business, the company have already 
routinized their system and able to manage 
properly 
relatedness dummy all 
Cash Cash is  a dummy where (1) is a cash offer, 
and (0) for stock payments or combination of 
stock and cash. According to the research 
stock ﬁnanced acquisitions generated 
signiﬁcantly lower returns than cash ﬁnanced 
ones 
cash dummy all 
Advisory The dummy in which external advisors have 
been engaged in (Yes=1) (No=0). Acquirer 
firm may lack acquisition skills and thus 
employ an external advisor on the deal either 
financially, or legally, or on the decision 
making process. 
advisory dummy all 
Hostile The attitude of an acquisition may vary from 
friendly to hostile. Coded friendly 
acquisitions or neutral acquisitions 0, and 
hostile acquisitions as 1. Hostile acquisitions 
may negatively affect acquirer returns by 
attracting multiple bidders who drive 
premiums higher. 
hostile dummy all 
Maturity The dummy shows the maturity of the 
acquirer company. If an acquirer company's 
establishment date was older than acquired 
company (1), otherwise (0). Mature acquirers 
are expected to be better in co-ordinating and 
managing the process. 
maturity dummy all 
Stake The dummy which indicates the acquiring 
company's controlling stake in the acquired 
company (Wholly owned=1) (Majority 
stake=0) With the higher share of controlling 
stake, acquirer firm has more power on the 
decision making 
stake dummy all 
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Appendix C1: Return on Assets (ROA) as an Acquisition Performance Measure 
Table C1.1: Regression results for the Hypothesis 1 
 
*   < 0.10; **   < 0.05; ***   < 0.01 
Coefficients with standard errors are listed under coefficients in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.008 0.007 0.022 -0.023 0.026 
 (0.03) (0.031) (0.019) (0.018) (0.031) 
M&A 
Experience 
     
Acqexp -0.004     
 (0.004)     
Firmexpdummy  -0.008    
  (0.018)    
Priorrelated 
  
-0.004  
   (0.013)  
Priorcrossborder 
  
 0.011 
 
    (0.027)  
Groupexpdummy  
  
 
 
-0.039 
     (0.02) 
Controls      
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observation 203 203 140 141 203 
F-statistic 0.94 0.84 1.20 0.97 1.27 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 
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Table C1.2: Regression results for the Hypotheses 2 and 3 
 
*   < 0.10; **   < 0.05; ***   < 0.01 
Coefficients with standard errors are listed under coefficients in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: ROA Model 6 
Model 7 
(Cross-
border 
M&As) 
Model 8 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Model 9 
Model 10 
(Cross-border 
M&As) 
Model 11 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Constant 0.003 0.034 -0.017 0.004 0.038 -0.005 
 (0.03) (0.029) (0.04) (0.031) (0.03) (0.017) 
Resource 
Replacement 
      
Degree  0.007      
 (0.008)      
Degree 
(Crossborder)  0.004 
    
  (0.007)     
Degree 
(Domestic)   0.009 
   
   (0.012)    
CEO change    0.014   
    (0.020)   
CEO change 
(Crossborder) 
  
 
 
-0.001 
 
     (0.015)  
CEO change 
(Domestic) 
     0.030** 
      (0.012) 
Controls       
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observation 203 203 144 202 59 143 
F-statistic 0.92 1.64 0.82 0.88 1.56 0.79 
R-squared 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.04 
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Table C1.3: Regression results for the Hypotheses 4 and 5 
 
*   < 0.10; **   < 0.05; ***   < 0.01 
Coefficients with standard errors are listed under coefficients in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: ROA Model 12 
Model 13 
(Cross-
border 
M&As) 
Model 14 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Model 15 
Model 16 
(Cross-border 
M&As) 
Model 17 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Constant 0.002 0.03 -0.009 0.001 0.037 -0.012 
 (0.03) (0.029) (0.039) (0.014) (0.029) (0.039) 
Resource 
Replacement 
      
Name Change  0.002      
 (0.018)      
Name Change 
(Crossborder)  0.03 
    
  (0.016)     
Name Change 
(Domestic)   -0.005 
   
   (0.026)    
HQ change    0.002   
    (0.009)   
HQ change 
(Crossborder) 
  
 
 
0.004 
 
     (0.017)  
HQ change 
(Domestic) 
     0.037 
      (0.028) 
Controls       
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observation 202 58 144 203 59 144 
F-statistic 0.81 2.07 0.75 1.04 1.56 1.00 
R-squared 0.03 0.23 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.05 
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APPENDIX C2: CAR5 as an Acquisition Performance Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C2.1: Regression results for the Hypothesis 1 
*   < 0.10; **   < 0.05; ***   < 0.01 
Coefficients with standard errors are listed under coefficients in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: CAR5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.007 0.004 0.028 -0.023 0.011 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.026) 
M&A 
Experience 
     
Number of Prior 
M&A 
Experience 
-0.000 
    
 (0.003)     
Prior M&A 
Experience 
dummy 
 
0.004 
   
  (0.015)    
Similarity of 
Prior Relatedness 
  
0.027*  
   (0.014)  
Similarity of 
Prior 
Crossborder 
  
 0.038* 
 
    (0.021)  
Group M&A 
Experience 
dummy  
  
 
 
-0.007 
     (0.017) 
Controls      
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observation 203 203 140 141 203 
F-statistic 3.13 3.13 3.13 3.12 3.18 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.11 
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Table C2.2: Regression results for the Hypotheses 2 and 3 
 
 
*   < 0.10; **   < 0.05; ***   < 0.01 
Coefficients with standard errors are listed under coefficients in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: CAR5 Model 6 
Model 7 
(Cross-
border 
M&As) 
Model 8 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Model 9 
Model 10 
(Cross-border 
M&As) 
Model 11 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Constant 0.001 -0.016 -0.005 0.002 -0.01 -0.007 
 (0.025) (0.048) (0.029) (0.026) (0.048) (0.030) 
Resource 
Replacement 
      
Degree  0.006      
 (0.007)      
Degree 
(Crossborder)  -0.025** 
    
  (0.011)     
Degree 
(Domestic)   0.021** 
   
   (0.009)    
CEO change    0.005   
    (0.016)   
CEO change 
(Crossborder) 
  
 
 
-0.057** 
 
     (0.025)  
CEO change 
(Domestic) 
     0.038* 
      (0.022) 
Controls       
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observation 203 59 144 202 59 143 
F-statistic 3.24 1.29 4.10 3.11 1.27 3.61 
R-squared 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.16 
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Table C2.3: Regression results for the Hypotheses 4 and 5 
 
*   < 0.10; **   < 0.05; ***   < 0.01 
Coefficients with standard errors are listed under coefficients in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: CAR5 Model 12 
Model 13 
(Cross-
border 
M&As) 
Model 14 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Model 15 
Model 16 
(Cross-border 
M&As) 
Model 17 
(Domestic 
M&As) 
Constant 0.003 0.024 0.004 0.005 -0.032 0.010 
 (0.024) (0.049) (0.028) (0.024) (0.048) (0.028) 
Resource 
Replacement 
      
Name Change  0.012      
 (0.015)      
Name Change 
(Crossborder)  -0.043 
    
  (0.028)     
Name Change 
(Domestic)   0.03 
   
   (0.019)    
HQ change    0.013   
    (0.016)   
HQ change 
(Crossborder) 
  
 
 
-0.051* 
 
     (0.028)  
HQ change 
(Domestic) 
     0.038* 
      (0.021) 
Controls       
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observation 202 58 144 203 59 144 
F-statistic 3.24 0.85 3.59 3.22 0.98 3.75 
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.12 
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Appendix D: Summary of the Univariate and 
Multivariate Results 
   
Category  Code Expected Sign t-test (CAR) Regression 
(CAR) 
Regression 
(ROA) 
Acquisition Performance           
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return 
CAR  (+)   (+) 
Return on Assets  ROA  (+)   (+) 
Determinants of 
Acquisition Performance 
          
Number of acquisition 
experience 
acqexp (+) Not Significant Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Acquisition experience 
dummy 
firmexpdummy (+) Not Significant Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Similarity of prior 
relatedness 
priorrelatedness (+) (+) (+) Not 
Significant 
Similarity of prior 
crossborder 
priorcrossdomestic (+) (+) (+) Not 
Significant 
Group level acquisition 
experience dummy 
groupexpdummy (+) Not Significant (-) (+) 
Degree of resource 
replacement 
degree (+) (+) Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Top management 
replacement 
CEOchange (+) (+) (+) Not 
Significant 
Name replacement  namechange (+) Not Significant Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Headquarters replacement hqchange (+) Not Significant Not Significant (-) 
Controls           
Cross-border  crossborder (-) Not Significant Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Relatedness relatedness (+) Not Significant Not Significant (-) 
Cash cash (+) (+) (+) Not 
Significant 
Advisory advisory (-) (-) (-) Not 
Significant 
Hostile hostile (-) Not Significant Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Maturity maturity (+) Not Significant Not Significant (-) 
Stake stake (+) Not Significant Not Significant Not 
Significant 
      
